N.B.:  The delegate of the Secretary approved this Final Decision on 
Remand on January 22, 1999. 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS 

 

 
Application for the Correction of 
the Coast Guard Record of: 
 
                                                                                        BCMR Docket No. 1997-062 
 
 
   

 

 
 

 

FINAL DECISION ON REMAND 

 
ANDREWS, Attorney-Advisor: 
 
 
This is a proceeding under the provisions of section 1552 of title 10 of the United 
States Code.  It was commenced upon the BCMR’s receipt of the applicant’s application 
on  January  28,  1997.    The  Board’s  first  decision,  signed  on  January  30,  1998,  was  re-
viewed by the Deputy General Counsel, who remanded it to the Board for further con-
sideration on August 28, 1998. 
 
 
duly appointed members who were designated to serve as the Board in this case. 
 

This final decision on remand, dated September 23, 1998, is signed by the three 

RELIEF REQUESTED 

 
 
The applicant, a xxxxxxxxxxxx in the United States Coast Guard, asked the Board 
to correct his military record to show that he had extended his enlistment or reenlisted 
in  1982  so  that  he  could  receive  a  Selective  Reenlistment  Bonus  (SRB)  pursuant  to 
ALDIST 340/81.  The applicant stated that he did not discover his eligibility for this SRB 
until January 22, 1997. 
 

APPLICANT’S ALLEGATIONS 

In  his  application  to  the  BCMR,  the  applicant  alleged  that  he  was  never  coun-
seled about his eligibility to receive an SRB under ALDIST 340/81 in 1982.  He alleged 
that, if he had been told he was eligible to receive an SRB at that time, he would have 
reenlisted to receive the bonus.  Aside from providing the date of his discovery of the 

alleged injustice, the applicant did not explain under what circumstances he discovered 
his alleged eligibility for an SRB.  

 

SUMMARY OF RECORD 

 
 
The applicant enlisted in the Coast Guard on January 7, 19xx, for a term of four 
years. His rating and pay grade at the time the ALDISTs discussed herein were issued 
were xxxx and E-4. 
 
 
On October 1, 1981, the Commandant of the Coast Guard issued ALDIST 340/81, 
which allowed members within 30 days of the end of their enlistment periods to receive 
an SRB if they reenlisted or extended their current enlistments for at least three years.  
The  Zone  A  SRBs  authorized  for  xxxs  who  extended  their  enlistments  or  reenlisted 
under  ALDIST  340/81  were  calculated  with  a  multiple  of  one.    On  January  12,  1982, 
ALDIST 004/82 temporarily locked in the multiples issued under ALDIST 340/81 and 
waived the requirement that members be within 30 days of the end of their enlistment 
periods  in order to be eligible to receive the SRB for extending their enlistments.  To 
take  advantage  of  ALDIST  004/82,  members  had  to  extend  their  enlistments  before 
February 15, 1982. 
 
The applicant did not extend his enlistment or reenlist during the period when 
 
ALDIST 004/82 was in effect.  There is nothing in his military record to indicate that he 
was ever counseled about the terms of ALDIST 340/81 or ALDIST 004/82.   
 
 
The applicant remains on active duty with the Coast Guard.  Subsequent to his 
four-year enlistment on January 7, 1980, the applicant’s military record shows that he 
either reenlisted or agreed to extend his enlistment on the following dates for the peri-
ods indicated: 
 

January 6, 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 months1 
July 5, 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 year  
June 25, 1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 months 
July 5, 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 years2 
November 9, 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 years 
April 6, 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 years 

 
 
Two of the records for the above listed extensions and reenlistments are missing 
from the applicant’s military record.  Two indicate that the extensions were made at the 

                                                 
1 Although there is no record of this extension in the applicant’s military record, the extension dated July 
5, 1985, indicates that it is the second extension of his first enlistment. 
2  Although  there  is  no  record  of  this  enlistment  in  the  applicant’s  military  record,  the  extension  dated 
November 9, 1989, indicates that it is the first extension of a 3-year enlistment dated July 5, 1987. 

“member’s request.”  The 3-year extension dated November 9, 1989, indicates that the 
reason for the extension was “to have obligated service for PCS transfer.” 
 

VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

On  December  17,  1997,  the  Chief  Counsel  of  the  Coast  Guard  recommended 

 
 
denial of the applicant’s request for relief.   
 

The  Chief  Counsel  urged  the  Board  to  deny  the  applicant’s  request  for lack of 
proof because the applicant had failed to establish a prima facie case by proving that (1) 
the Coast Guard owed him a duty to counsel him regarding his eligibility for an SRB 
under ALDIST 004/82, (2) the Coast Guard did not so counsel him, and (3) had he been 
so counseled, the applicant would have been willing, in 1982, to extend his service from 
1984 through 1990.   

 
Regarding  these  issues,  the  Chief  Counsel  argued  first  that,  under  ALDIST 
004/82, the Coast Guard had no duty to inform potential extendees of their eligibility. 
COMDTINST 7220.13E required the Coast Guard to inform only potential reenlistees, 
and the applicant was not a potential reenlistee in February 1982 because he was not 
within three months of the end of his existing enlistment.  
 

Second, the Chief Counsel argued that, even if the Board were to find that the 
Coast Guard had a duty to counsel the applicant, a lack of memory of counseling is par-
ticularly unreliable after so many years, and the applicant’s statement about his lack of 
memory of counseling should be “insufficient to overcome the strong presumption that 
military officials carried out their duties correctly, lawfully, and in good faith.”    

 
Third,  the  Chief  Counsel  argued  that,  even  if  the  Board  were  to  find  that  the 
Coast Guard had a duty, but failed, to counsel the applicant, the Board could not pre-
sume, based on the member’s word and subsequent years of service, that the applicant 
would have, in fact, chosen to obligate himself to serve through 1990.  The Chief Coun-
sel cited the applicant’s two3 short-term extensions of his enlistment in the mid 1980s as 
evidence that the applicant had not committed himself to a career in the Coast Guard.  
The Chief Counsel urged the Board to require the applicant “to articulate specific, fact-
based reasons for his conclusion” that he would have extended his enlistment had he 
been counseled about ALDIST 004/82, rather than accepting the applicant’s “specula-
tion”  and “self serving opinion” that he would have extended. 

 
The  Chief  Counsel  also  argued  that,  even  if  the  Board  found  that  the  Coast 
Guard had erred and that the applicant would have extended his service if he had been 
counseled, the Board should still deny relief because, under the Supreme Court’s deci-
                                                 
3 Although there are records for only two extensions prior to the applicant’s reenlistment on July 5, 1987, 
the applicant must have extended his first enlistment three times. 

sions in United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979), and Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 
(1975), violations of agency procedural regulations do not create private rights of action 
and  because  Congress  intended  the  SRB  program  to  reward  members  who  obligated 
themselves to future service, and the applicant had not done so in 1982. 
 
Finally,  the  Chief  Counsel  argued  that  Congress  intended  the  SRB  program  to 
 
benefit  the  Coast  Guard  and  the  United  States  by  encouraging  experienced  members 
with critical skills to extend their service.  Therefore, paying the applicant retroactively 
would  be  contrary  to  the  statute’s  purpose  (because  it  would  not  benefit  the  Coast 
Guard), and the  applicant did not in fact obligate himself to serve for another six years 
when ALDIST 004/82 was in effect. 
 

APPLICABLE REGULATIONS 

 
SRB Regulations 
 
 
Commandant  Instruction  7220.13E  (Administration  of  the  Reenlistment  Bonus 
Program)  was  released  on  May  4,  1979,  and  was  in  effect  when  ALDIST  340/81  and 
ALDIST  004/82  were  distributed.    Section  1.c.(4)  of  Enclosure  (1)  to  the  Instruction 
stated  that  “[e]ntitlement  to  an  SRB  vests  only  on  the  date  the  member  reenlists  or 
makes operative an extension of enlistment . . . .”  Section 1.c.(6) of Enclosure (1) stated 
that early separation could only occur “within three months of [the end of] activated 
obligated service, in accordance with Article 12-B-7 [of  the] Personnel Manual . . . .”  
Section 1.d.(1) of Enclosure (1) provided the criteria for SRB eligibility in Zone A.4  It 
stated the following, in part: 
 

(1)    Zone  A  Eligibility.    [To  be  eligible,  a  member  must  meet  all  of  the 
following criteria:] 
 

(a)  Be serving on active duty in pay grade E-3 or higher in a military 
specialty designated [in the SRB announcement].  
 
(b)  Must have completed at least 21 months of continuous active duty, 
other than active duty for training, but not more than six years of total 
active duty, immediately preceding the date of reenlistment or opera-
tive date of extension of enlistment. . . . 
 

                                                 
4  SRBs  vary  according  to  the  length  of  each  member’s  active  duty  service,  the  length  of  the  period  of 
reenlistment or extension of enlistment, and the need of the Coast Guard for personnel with the member’s 
particular skills.  Coast Guard members who have more than 21 months but less than 6 years of active 
duty  service  are in “Zone A,” while those who have more than 6 but less than 10 years of active duty 
service are in “Zone B.”  At the time ALDIST 340/81 and ALDIST 004/82 were issued, the applicant was 
in Zone A.  Members may not receive more than one bonus per zone. 

(c)  The extension of enlistment or reenlistment must be at least three 
years and, when combined with prior active duty, must yield a total of 
at least six years of active duty.  [Emphasis in original] 
 
(d)    Has  not  previously  received  a  Zone  A  SRB,  nor  previously 
enlisted,  reenlisted,  or  extended  (extensions  that  have  become  effec-
tive) beyond six years of active duty. . . .  
 

 
Section 1.g. of Enclosure (1) stated that in order to “attain the objectives of the 
SRB program, each potential reenlistee who would be eligible for SRB must be informed 
of their eligibility and the monetary benefits of the SRB program.  It is expected that the 
reenlistment interview, held approximately six months before expiration of enlistment, 
will provide the potential reenlistee with complete information on SRB.” 
  
ALDIST 340/81 
 
 
ALDIST 340/81, issued on October 2, 1981, changed the existing multiples of the 
SRBs that members could receive to reflect the degree to which the Coast Guard needed 
to retain personnel in each skill rating.  The multiple to be used for calculating SRBs for 
reenlisting or extending members in the xx rating was one. 
 
ALDIST 004/82 
 
 
ALDIST 004/82, issued on January 12, 1982, locked in the multiples used for cal-
culating SRBs under ALDIST 340/81 until February 15, 1982.  Thereafter, the multiples 
were to change to reflect the degree to which the Coast Guard needed to retain person-
nel in each skill rating.  ALDIST 004/82 also suspended the provisions of Article 1-G-83 
of the Personnel Manual (Execution of Agreement to Extend Enlistment) until February 
15, 1982, and therefore allowed members to extend enlistments that were not within 30 
days of termination.   
 
 
stated the following, in part: 
 

Article 1-G-83 of the Coast Guard Personnel Manual (COMDTINST M1000.6A) 

(b)  Generally, an individual should not be permitted to agree to extend 
his/her enlistment until approximately 30 days prior to the date of expira-
tion of the then existing enlistment.  For certain purposes, however, such 
as  qualifying  for  assignment  to  a  service  school,  duty  outside  CONUS, 
assignment  to  active  duty  in  the  case  of  a  Reservist,  or  for  other  duty 
requiring additional obligated service, it is permissible to permit an indi-
vidual  to  agree  to  extend  his/her  enlistment  a  considerable  time  in 
advance.  

 

FEDERAL COURT CASES CITED 

 
United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979). 
 

In Caceres, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant was not entitled to 
the benefit of the exclusion rule even though the IRS had violated its own regulations 
when  an  IRS  agent  tape  recorded  the  defendant  offering  him  a  bribe.    The  Court 
reasoned that neither the Constitution nor a federal statute (or even defendant's reason-
able  reliance  on  IRS  regulations)  required  the  IRS  agent  to  obtain  advance  approval 
from his superiors before tape recording the conversation.   

 

 

Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
 

In Cort, the Supreme Court held that a stockholder does not have a private cause 
of action (i.e., stockholder's derivative suit for damages and an injunction) against cor-
porate directors for violating a federal statute prohibiting corporate expenditures in a 
Presidential election campaign.  The Court listed four factors that should be considered 
in determining whether a statute creates a private cause of action and private remedy: 
(a) whether the stockholder was one of the class for whose special benefit the statute 
was  enacted;  (b)  whether  Congress  intended,  implicitly  or  explicitly,  to  create  or  to 
deny such a remedy; (c) whether the private remedy is consistent with the underlying 
purposes of the legislative scheme; and (d) whether the cause of action is traditionally 
relegated to state law and is basically the concern of the states. 

APPLICABLE BCMR DECISIONS 

 
Precedent Decision in BCMR Docket No. 121-93. 
 
 
In  BCMR  Docket  No.  121-93,  the  applicant  asked  the  Board  to  reconsider  its 
denial of his request (in the final decision in BCMR Docket No. 237-91) to correct his 
military record to show that he had extended his service on February 14, 1982, and was 
therefore due an SRB. Although the Board again denied the requested relief, the Deputy 
General Counsel granted relief, finding in part that  
 
  
because the Coast Guard had presented no evidence as to how the appli-
cant could or should have learned of ALDIST 004/82 any earlier than he claimed, the 
applicant’s  sworn  statement  that  he  learned  of  it  in  1991  would  be  accepted  at  face 
value, especially since “[a]llegations that the first knowledge members have had of the 
provisions of ALDIST 004/82 came from contact with [the ‘C’ school] are common, and 
have often been accepted without challenge in the past”;5  
 

1. 

                                                 
5 The Deputy General Counsel cited in support BCMR Docket No. 151-91. 

2. 

“Coast Guard regulations require that members be ‘fully advised’ of SRB 

 
opportunities”;6 and  
 
the Board had “commonly afforded relief under similar circumstances in 
 
the past, and . . . reversal of such precedents without a firm basis in the record would be 
clearly unreasonable here.” 
 
Precedent Decision in BCMR Docket No. 69-97 
 

In BCMR Docket No. 69-97, the applicant had reenlisted on May 2, 1980, for a six-
year term, after completing his first, four-year enlistment.  Subsequently, the applicant 
extended his enlistment three times for periods of two years or less before reenlisting 
for  three  years  on  March  1,  1991,  and  for  another  six  years  on  January  6,  1994.    The 
applicant asked the BCMR to correct his record to show that he had requested an exten-
sion of his enlistment for a period of six years on February 14, 1982, in order to receive a 
Zone B SRB.  He stated that if he had been properly counseled and made aware of the 
provisions of ALDIST 004/82, he “would have taken the necessary steps to secure [a] 
zone ‘B’ bonus.”  There was no documentation in the applicant’s record to indicate that 
he was ever advised of the provisions of ALDIST 004/82 while it was in effect.  
 
The Board recommended that the requested relief be granted.  That recommen-
 
dation was based in part on (1) the applicant’s sworn statement that he had not been 
properly counseled about ALDIST 004/82 when it was in effect and had not learned of 
it until 1997; (2) the applicant’s statement that he would have extended his enlistment to 
receive  the  SRB  had  he  known  of  the  opportunity;  (3) the applicant’s previous enlist-
ments  and  subsequent  years  of  service,  which  provided  a  reasonable  basis  to  believe 
that  he  would  have  extended  his  service  obligation  had  he  been  properly  counseled 
about ALDIST 004/82; and (4) the Coast Guard’s failure to reveal if and how informa-
tion about ALDIST 004/82 had been disseminated to the members. 

1. 

 
The  Deputy  General  Counsel  wrote  a  concurring  decision  which  responded  to 
several of the Coast Guard’s arguments that were not mentioned in the Board’s decision 
but are pertinent to the case in hand:   
 

In  response  to  the  argument  that the Coast Guard was only required to 
counsel  potential  reenlistees,  not  potential  extendees,  she  found  that  Congress  had 
intended both groups to benefit from the SRB program and that the Coast Guard had 
presented no rational basis for counseling one group but not the other.  She concluded 
that the “Coast Guard erred in drafting COMDTINST 7220.13E when it failed to require 
mandatory counseling for potential extendees . . . .”  BCMR Docket No. 69-97, Deputy 
General Counsel’s Concurring Decision, at 3. 

3. 

 

                                                 
6 The Deputy General Counsel cited BCMR Nos. 224-87, 263-87, 268-87, 285-87 for this position. 

2. 

In response to the argument that the applicant’s statements were insuffi-
cient to overcome the presumption of regularity in administrative matters such as coun-
seling, she stated that the applicant’s history of service and his statements concerning 
the  lack  of  proper  counseling  and  what  he  would  have  done  had  he  been  properly 
counseled were sufficient to nullify the presumption in this case.   

The Deputy General Counsel found unpersuasive the argument that the 
applicant’s short extensions show that he was not, in fact, committed to a career in the 
Coast Guard and therefore was not likely to seek a maximum SRB.  She reasoned that 
short extensions for particular purposes, such as enrollment in school or transfer to a 
different station, are made frequently for the convenience of the government and do not 
necessarily reflect negatively on a member’s career commitment to the Coast Guard. 

In response to the Coast Guard’s claim that the applicant had no private 
right of action under its regulations, she found that Congress had created a private right 
of action in the SRB statute (37 USC § 308) and the BCMR statute (10 USC § 1552). 

 
4. 

 
5. 

 
3. 

 
6. 

In response to the argument that paying SRBs many years after ALDIST 
was inconsistent with the purpose of the statute, which was to benefit the Coast Guard, 
she cited the decision in Larinoff, which held that “[t]he intention of Congress in enact-
ing  the  [reenlistment  bonus  statute]  was  specifically  to  promise  [members]  who 
extended their enlistments that a [reenlistment bonus] award would be paid to them at 
the  expiration of their original enlistment in return for their commitment to lengthen 
their period of service.”  United States v. Larinoff, 431 U.S. 864, 878-79 (1977). 

Finally,  the  Deputy  General Counsel cited several “Comptroller General 
cases that authorize government agencies to correct errors of wrongful advice or failure 
to advise when an employee otherwise meets the statutory criteria for obtaining a bene-
fit.”7  BCMR Docket No. 69-97, Deputy General Counsel’s Concurring Decision, at 11. 
 

HISTORY OF THIS CASE 

 
 
The Board’s first decision in this case was issued on January 30, 1998.  Based on 
the applicant’s allegations, his military record, and the views of the Coast Guard pre-
sented above, the Board made the following findings:  (1) the application was timely; (2) 
the applicant was not eligible for an SRB under ALDIST 340/81 but may have been eli-
gible under ALDIST 004/82; (3) the Coast Guard had a duty to counsel the applicant 
concerning his eligibility under ALDIST 004/82; (4) the Coast Guard erred by failing to 
advise the applicant of his SRB opportunities; and (5) the applicant’s request should be 

                                                 
7 The Deputy General Counsel cited Matter of Hanley, B-202112, November 16, 1981; Matter of Anthony 
M. Ragunas, 68 Comp. Gen. 97 (1988); and Matter of Dale Ziegler and Joseph Rebo, B-199774, November 
12, 1980. 

granted.    The  Board  ordered that the applicant’s record be corrected to show that he 
had extended his enlistment for six years under ALDIST 004/82. 
 
On August 28, 1998, the Deputy General Counsel, acting as the Secretary’s dele-
 
gate, remanded the decision to the Board for further consideration.  The Deputy Gen-
eral Counsel stated that the Board had not addressed some of the Coast Guard’s argu-
ments against granting the applicant’s requested relief.  She asked the Board to address 
each of the Coast Guard’s arguments in its decision on remand and to include a finding 
as to whether the applicant would have extended his enlistment in 1982 if he had been 
properly counseled. 
 

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 

 
The  Board  makes  the  following  findings  and  conclusions  on  the  basis  of  the 
 
applicant's military record and submissions, the Coast Guard's submissions, and appli-
cable law: 
 

The Board has jurisdiction concerning this matter pursuant to section 1552 

of title 10, United States Code. 
 

1. 

2. 

3. 

The applicant has made a sworn statement that he discovered the alleged 
error which he has asked the Board to correct on January 22, 1997.  The Coast Guard did 
not present any evidence indicating that the applicant knew or might have learned of 
his eligibility to receive an SRB in 1982 any earlier than the date of discovery alleged by 
the applicant.  Therefore, the Board finds that the application was timely as it was filed 
within three years of the date of discovery of the alleged error. 
 

The SRB statute, 37 USC § 308(a), expressly includes members who “vol-
untarily extend[] [their] enlistment[s]” among those who may be eligible for SRBs.  To 
achieve Congress’s goals for the SRB program, the Coast Guard must inform members 
who are eligible to receive a bonus of their eligibility.  In Larinoff, the Supreme Court 
held that “[t]he intention of Congress in enacting the [reenlistment bonus statute] was 
specifically to promise [members] who extended their enlistments that [an SRB] would 
be paid to them at the expiration of their original enlistment in return for their commit-
ment to lengthen their period of service.”  United States v. Larinoff, 431 U.S. 864, 878-79 
(1977).   
 
Thus, the Coast Guard’s argument that it was required to inform only potential 
reenlistees and not potential extendees because its regulation specified only the means 
by which potential reenlistees would be informed of their eligibility must be rejected.  
The  fact  that  the  Coast  Guard  neglected  to  specify  in  its  regulations  how  potential 
extendees should be informed of their eligibility under ALDIST 004/82 does not mean 
potential  extendees  had  less  right  to  be  informed  than  did  the  potential  reenlistees.  

4. 

Moreover,  the  Deputy  General  Counsel  has  held  in  BCMR  Docket No. 69-97 that the 
“Coast Guard erred in drafting COMDTINST 7220.13E when it failed to require manda-
tory  counseling  for  potential  extendees  on  an  equal  basis  with  potential  reenlistees.” 
BCMR Docket No. 69-97, Deputy General Counsel’s Concurring Decision, at 3.  Thus, 
the Board finds that the Coast Guard did have a duty to counsel the applicant about his 
eligibility under ALDIST 004/82. 
 

The applicant was not eligible for an SRB under ALDIST 340/81.  Under 
ALDIST 004/82, however, he was eligible to extend his enlistment for up to six years, 
from the end of his then-current enlistment in 1984 to 1990.  Although the applicant did 
not mention ALDIST 004/82 and is clearly unsure of the legal grounds for his request, 
his allegation that he was eligible for an SRB under ALDIST 340/81 in 1982 convinces 
the  Board  that  he  is  requesting  that  his  record  be  changed  to  show  that  he  took  full 
advantage of ALDIST 004/82 by extending his enlistment on February 14, 1982, for the 
maximum number of years allowed: six.  The Board will not withhold justice from an 
applicant merely because he is confused about the basis of his rights.  
 

 
6. 

5. 

As the Coast Guard stated, the lack of evidence of counseling in the appli-
cant’s  record  is  not  proof  that  he was never counseled because the regulations at the 
time did not expressly require members to sign documents stating that they had been 
properly counseled about SRBs.  However, the applicant made a sworn statement on his 
DD Form 149 that he had not been counseled on the provisions of ALDIST 340/81 or on 
his eligibility for an SRB under that ALDIST in 1982.8  Although the Coast Guard called 
the applicant’s memory concerning an event that might have occurred 15 years in the 
past unreliable, the Board finds the assertion unpersuasive.   

 
Moreover, the Coast Guard has made no statement and submitted no evidence to 
rebut the applicant’s claim that he was not informed of his eligibility for the SRB.  The 
Coast  Guard  has  not  presented  any  evidence  as  to  how  potential  extendees  were 
informed of the opportunity.  Therefore, the Board finds that the presumption that mili-
tary  officials  have  carried  out  their  duties  correctly  is  overcome  with  respect  to  the 
Coast  Guard’s  informing  potential  extendees  of  their  eligibility  for  an  SRB  under 
ALDIST  004/82.    With  a  credible,  sworn  statement  by  the  applicant  and  no  contrary 
evidence presented by the Coast Guard, the Board finds that the preponderance of the 
evidence indicates that the applicant was not properly counseled in 1982 about his eli-
gibility for an SRB. 

The applicant signed a sworn statement to the effect that, if he had been 
counseled about his eligibility for an SRB in 1982, he would have reenlisted or extended 
his enlistment to take advantage of the opportunity to receive the SRB.  Although the 
Coast Guard called the applicant’s statement self-serving and speculative, it presented 
                                                 
8    The  BCMR  application,  DD  Form  149,  contains  a  warning  for  applicants  regarding  the  penalties  for 
willfully making a false statement or claim, pursuant to 18 USC §§ 287 and 1001.  

no evidence indicating that in the winter of 1982 the applicant was in any way dissatis-
fied with, or had any intention to leave, the Coast Guard.   

The  applicant’s three short-term extensions subsequent to the expiration 
of his first, four-year enlistment do not necessarily reflect a lack of commitment to con-
tinue to serve in the Coast Guard.  First, the Personnel Manual (CG 207) in effect at the 
time permitted one-year extensions.  Short-term extensions of enlistments are common 
and are made for a variety of reasons, such as personnel specialists’ avoiding the extra 
administrative work and arrangement of medical appointments required to process a 
reenlistment or a member’s attending school or being transferred to a new station.  As 
two  of  the  records  for  the  applicant’s  extensions  and  reenlistments  are  missing,  their 
purpose cannot be determined.  In the records that are not missing, none of the pur-
poses recorded suggests that the applicant was considering leaving the Coast Guard or 
did not want to pursue a career in the Coast Guard.  

 
The Board also notes that the applicant had no break in service whatsoever dur-
ing this six-year period even though Article 1-G-7A of the Personnel Manual permits a 
three-month break in service with no loss of eligibility for an SRB or loss of time in pay 
grade in rating for advancement.  The lack of any break in service during this period—
as well as the applicant’s approximately 20 years of continuous service to date without 
an SRB—demonstrates his commitment to the Coast Guard. 

 
7. 

  
In addition, according to Article 1-G-19 of the Personnel Manual, once an enlist-
ment  becomes  operative,  it  cannot  be  canceled  by  either  the  member  or  the  Coast 
Guard.  Therefore, if the applicant had executed a long-term extension in the mid-1980s, 
he could not have canceled it to reenlist and obtain an SRB if one had become available.  
(The  SRB  instruction  is  clear  that  entitlement  to  an  SRB  is  established  on  the  date  of 
reenlistment or the date that an extension agreement is executed.)  Likewise, if an SRB 
had become available to the applicant in the mid-1980s and he executed a further exten-
sion to receive the SRB, the bonus payment would have been reduced by the amount of 
obligated service remaining on the original extension agreement.  Even if the applicant 
executed the short-term extensions with the hope obtaining a future SRB payment, the 
Board would not find, particularly in light of the SRB regulations with respect to enti-
tlement, such an option to be indicative of the applicant’s lack of a commitment to the 
Coast Guard, but rather an indication of his desire to obtain an SRB.   

 
In short, there are so many reasons why a member might request or be directed 
toward short-term extensions in lieu of reenlistments that the Board will not consider 
such extensions to be proof of a lack of commitment to the Coast Guard without more 
evidence.  

 
 
Finally, the facts in this case are not dissimilar to those in BCMR Docket No. 69-
97, wherein the  Deputy General Counsel found that two two-year extensions and one 

ten-month extension did not establish that the applicant would not have extended for 
six years if he had been counseled on ALDIST 004/82.  In support of that finding, the 
Deputy General Counsel looked to the purpose of the extensions and found that each 
one was for a particular purpose and was for the convenience of the Coast Guard.  In 
the Board’s view, the difference between that applicant’s extensions and this applicant’s 
three short-term extensions is not so significant as to require the Board to reach a differ-
ent result in this case. 

Nor does the Board find compelling the Coast Guard’s argument that the 
applicant might have procrastinated or hesitated because of his youth and thereby lost 
the  opportunity  to  receive  the  bonus.    Likewise,  the  applicant’s  youth  does  not  per-
suade the Board that he would have rejected the bonus.  

The  Coast  Guard’s  argument  that,  even  if  the  applicant  had  chosen  to 
extend his service in 1982, the Coast Guard did not have to retain him is true but irrele-
vant  since  it  did  retain  the  applicant  on  active  duty  from  1984  to  1990,  and  there  is 
nothing  in  the  record  to  indicate  that he would not have been retained had he taken 
advantage of ALDIST 004/82.   

In light of the fact that the applicant did make a career in the Coast Guard, 
his sworn statement that he would have participated in the SRB program had he been 
properly counseled about it, and Findings 6, 7, 8, and 9, above, the Board finds that the 
applicant  would  have  extended  for  six  years  had  he  been  properly  counseled  about 
ALDIST 004/82. 

 
10. 

 
11. 

 
8. 

 
9. 

 

In regard to whether the applicant has a private cause of action, the Dep-
uty General Counsel has already decided that issue in her concurring opinion in BCMR 
Docket No. 69-97.  In that opinion, she found that Caceres does not support the Coast 
Guard's  position,  because  the  applicant's  claim  to  an  SRB  is  not  based  solely  on  the 
Coast Guard's regulations but on the SRB statute (37 USC § 308) that authorized pay-
ment.    In  Caceres,  there  was  no  underlying  federal  statute  to  support  the  criminal 
defendant's claim of being deprived of a right.   

 
Nor  does  Cort  support  the  Coast  Guard's  position.    All  four  factors  that  the 
Court  stated  should  be  considered  weigh  in  the  applicant’s  favor  here:    (a)  Congress 
specifically  intended  Coast  Guard  members  to  benefit  under  the  SRB  statute;  (b)  the 
Deputy General Counsel has found that Congress implicitly created a private remedy; 
(c)  a  member's  suit  for  a  wrongfully  withheld  SRB  would  be  consistent  with  the 
underlying  legislative  scheme;  and  (d)  disputes  over  SRBs  are  clearly  not  within  the 
province  of  the  states.    Furthermore,  the  Board  finds  that  the  applicant  has  a  private 
right of action to seek relief from the alleged error of the Coast Guard under the BCMR 
statute (10 USC § 1552). 

12. 

The Coast Guard stated that Congress intended the SRB program to bene-
fit the Coast Guard and the United States by encouraging experienced members with 
critical skills to extend their service, and that paying the applicant retroactively would 
be contrary both to the statute’s purpose and to the fact that applicant did not in fact 
extend for six years when ALDIST 004/82 was in effect.  However, the Deputy General 
Counsel has held that Congress intended to benefit experienced members with critical 
skills who would agree to extend their years of service.  In Larinoff, the Supreme Court 
held that “[t]he intention of Congress in enacting the [reenlistment bonus statute] was 
specifically to promise [members] who extended their enlistments that a [reenlistment 
bonus]  award  would  be  paid to them at the expiration of their original enlistment in 
return  for  their  commitment  to  lengthen  their  period  of  service."  431  U.S.  at  878-79 
(footnote omitted).  Furthermore, although the applicant did not extend his during the 
month when ALDIST 004/82 was in effect, he did serve continuously for more than six 
years after the end of his original four-year enlistment.   
 

13. 

The Coast Guard erred in 1982 by failing to counsel the applicant of his 

eligibility to receive an SRB by extending his enlistment. 
 

14.  Accordingly,  the applicant’s record should be corrected to show that on 
February 14, 1982, he extended his enlistment for six years and thereby became entitled 
to receive a Zone A SRB with a multiple of one.  
 

[ORDER AND SIGNATURES APPEAR ON THE NEXT PAGE] 

 

 

ORDER 

 

The  application  for  correction  of  the  military  record  of  XXXXXXXX,  shall  be 
granted as follows:  The military record shall be corrected to indicate that the applicant 
agreed to extend his enlistment for six years on February 14, 1982, and he thus became 
entitled to receive a Zone A Selective Reenlistment Bonus with a multiple of one.  The 
applicant’s extensions and reenlistments dated between December 1984 and December 
1990 shall be canceled.  These shall be null and void and shall have no effect on his SRB 
entitlement.  The applicant’s record shall be corrected to show that, at the end of the six-
year  extension  of  his enlistment on January 6, 1990, the applicant reenlisted for three 
years  and  three  months.    All  other  extensions and reenlistments shall remain as they 
now appear in the record, with no break in service shown.    
 
 
corrections to his record. 
 
 

The Coast Guard shall pay the applicant the amount due him as a result of these 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 

 
Harold C. Davis, M.D. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
 
 

 
 

 
 
 

 
 

 
 
 

 
 

 

 
Jonathan L. Kaplan 

 

 

 
 
James G. Parks