RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
             AIR FORCE BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS


IN THE MATTER OF:      DOCKET NUMBERS:  BC-2002-02347
               INDEX CODE 145.06  134.02  108.10  110.02
            COUNSEL:  Eugene R. Fidell

            HEARING DESIRED:  Yes

_________________________________________________________________

APPLICANT REQUESTS THAT:

All references to his resignation in lieu of (RILO)  court-martial  be
deleted, he be reinstated on active duty to his former position in the
Reserves  with  back  pay  and  allowances,  and  he  receive  medical
separation pay in accordance with the recommendation from the  26  May
99 Informal Physical Evaluation Board (IPEB).
_________________________________________________________________

APPLICANT CONTENDS THAT:

He was involuntarily and unlawfully separated from the Air Force on 22
Jul 99 because his resignation  was  the  result  of  erroneous  legal
advice from his military counsel and the Air Force unfairly failed  to
act on his request to withdraw his resignation  that  was  filed  well
before the effective date of his resignation.

He denied allegations of inappropriate conduct with patients and staff
in the dental clinic, but his military counsel pressured him to submit
a RILO because, unlike a court-martial,  it  would  not  result  in  a
federal conviction that would prevent him from  practicing  dentistry.
At the same time, he  was  undergoing  treatment  for  central  serous
retinopathy (CSR) in his left eye, severe depression, and anxiety. His
military counsel erroneously advised him that he would be entitled  to
a  medical  discharge  with  separation  and  benefits  if  a  Medical
Evaluation Board (MEB) found him unfit  for  duty  because  a  medical
discharge would take priority  over  his  resignation.  In  fact,  the
likely  consequences  of  his  resignation  request  were  quite   the
opposite. The medical separation  and  disability  benefits  were  the
primary reasons he submitted his RILO.  Had he been  properly  advised
from the outset, he would not have submitted a resignation  or  waived
his rights to a contested  court-martial  or  administrative  hearing.
Nearly six weeks before the effective  date  of  his  resignation,  he
attempted to withdraw his resignation. However, he was discharged  and
it was not until four days later that the Air Force responded  to  his
withdrawal request. The Air Force abused its discretion by failing  to
act on his withdrawal request before his resignation became  effective
despite having ample opportunity to do so.

The applicant’s complete submission, with counsel’s 20-page brief  and
other attachments, is at Exhibit A.

_________________________________________________________________

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

The following information was extracted from the applicant’s  military
personnel and  medical  records,  the  Air  Force  Office  of  Special
Investigation (AFOSI) and the  Article  32  Reports  of  Investigation
(ROIs), and the Secretary of the Air Force Personnel  Council  (SAFPC)
case file.

The applicant enlisted in the US Army Reserves  and  served  with  the
448th Engineering Battalion from  1968  to  1974.  After  earning  his
undergraduate and dental degrees, he served in the Army  Dental  Corps
from 1982 to 1985, the Army Reserves from 1985 to 1992,  and  the  Air
Force since 16 Dec  92.  He  entered  active  duty  in  the  grade  of
lieutenant colonel (LTC) on 1 Dec 96 and was assigned as a dentist  to
the 49th Aeromedical-Dental Squadron (49 ADS), at Holloman AFB, NM.

According to testimony from the former squadron commander,  rumors  of
sexual  harassment  in  the  unit  surfaced  three  months  after  the
applicant arrived.  After speaking to three airmen and the  applicant,
the former commander concluded there was no overt problem with  sexual
harassment or  a  hostile  work  place  environment,  so  he  verbally
counseled the applicant regarding his inappropriate comments.

After the commander left in Jun 98, an AFOSI inquiry was initiated  on
15 Jul 98 following a command-directed  investigation  which  surfaced
allegations the applicant had maltreated a female senior airman  (SRA)
dental assistant from 1 Dec 96 to 30 Jun 98 by making  sexual  remarks
to and about her, touching her and exposing himself to her,  and  that
he made several inappropriate  remarks  to  two  other  female  airmen
dental assistants as  well  as  two  female  airmen  dental  patients.
Following rights advisement, the applicant requested legal counsel and
the interview was terminated.

As a result of evidence  cited  in  the  AFOSI  ROI,  the  applicant’s
privileges were suspended and he was removed from patient  care  on  2
Nov 98.

An Article 32 investigation officer (IO) was appointed on 2 Dec 98  to
investigate charges preferred against the applicant consisting of  two
specifications of indecent  assault,  one  specification  of  indecent
exposure, one specification of
maltreatment and four specifications of conduct unbecoming an  officer
and gentleman. Details regarding the charges  and  specifications  are
contained in the ROI, which was completed on 8 Dec 98.

Based on the findings and recommendations of the Article  32  ROI  and
the wing commander, amended charges related to the applicant’s alleged
inappropriate behavior towards three female airmen  dental  assistants
and two female airmen patients were referred for trial  by  a  general
court-martial (GCM) on 29 Dec 98.

The applicant responded  by  submitting  a  RILO  on  27  Jan  99.  He
indicated his understanding that if the SAF accepted his  resignation,
he would receive an under other  than  honorable  conductions  (UOTHC)
discharge, unless the SAF determined he should receive  a  general  or
honorable discharge.

On 13 Apr 99, SAFPC recommended that the applicant’s RILO be  accepted
but that his discharge be characterized as general.  SAFPC based their
upgraded  discharge  recommendation  on   their   doubts   about   the
credibility of the victim of the most serious offenses.

On 10 May 99, an MEB convened. According to the 10 May 99 Summary, the
applicant was originally diagnosed with CSR in 1997 after he developed
a distortion and “black shade” in his left eye. Visual acuity at  that
time was 20/25 and he underwent no treatment except follow-up. He  had
a recurrent episode in Aug 98 when his vision decreased to 20/200, but
did  not  necessitate  laser  treatment  intervention.  The  applicant
complained he was unable to work effectively since that  time  due  to
extremely  poor  vision  in  the  left  eye.  The  retinal  specialist
concluded that the level of visual dysfunction of which the  applicant
complained  at  the  time  was  not  consistent  with  the  ophthalmic
findings. The summary noted that  the  inability  to  elicit  accurate
responses from the applicant which are physiologic and consistent with
the objective ocular exam made it extremely difficult  to  detect  the
actual level of dysfunction.  The case was referred to a PEB.

On 12 May 99, the SAF accepted the applicant’s RILO and  directed  his
separation with a UOTHC discharge. However, the discharge was held  in
abeyance pending the outcome of the ongoing medical evaluation process
regarding the applicant’s eye condition.

On 26 May 99, the IPEB recommended the applicant’s  medical  discharge
with severance pay for CSR in the left eye. The IPEB  noted  that  the
minimum compensable rating for this disorder  is  10%  when  there  is
20/40 vision in one eye  and  20/200  in  the  other  eye.  Since  the
applicant had 20/20 vision in one eye and 20/200
in the other eye, the IPEB found the applicant unfit but recommended a
disability rating of 0%.  The applicant originally nonconcurred on  27
May 99 and demanded a Formal PEB (FPEB).

On 14 Jun 99, the applicant submitted a request to the SAF to  rescind
his resignation. He indicated he wanted to complete  the  PEB  process
and pursue medical retirement since the seriousness of  his  condition
would  prevent  his  practicing  dentistry.  In  the  alternative,  he
requested rescission so he could  face  court-martial  and  prove  his
innocence since he would  be  unable  to  practice  dentistry  in  the
civilian sector.

On 18 Jun 99, he waived his request for an FPEB and concurred with the
findings of the IPEB.

The Officer Performance Report (OPR) for the period 31 May 98  through
30 May 99 had been referred to the applicant on 2 Jun 99.  The  flight
commander (rater) had marked the  applicant  “Met  Standards”  in  all
performance categories.  The  squadron  commander  (additional  rater)
indicated  the  applicant  did  not  meet  standards  in  Professional
Qualities. In his 14 Jun 99 rebuttal, the applicant indicated that the
SAF had accepted his RILO on  12  May  99  and  he  had,  by  separate
correspondence, requested that the SAF rescind his RILO to  allow  him
to fight the charges that had been brought against him. However, after
discovering some administrative errors,  the  OPR  was  corrected  and
again referred to the applicant on 21 Jun 99. Despite  requesting  and
being granted an extension of time until 7 Jul 99 in which  to  rebut,
the applicant did not provide additional comments. The wing  commander
(reviewer) referred the OPR to the  applicant  on  22  Jul  99.  After
considering the applicant’s 14 Jun 99 comments, the reviewer indicated
the  applicant  did  not  meet   standards   in   Leadership   Skills,
Professional Qualities and Judgment and Decisions.  On 7 Aug  99,  the
12th Air  Force  (12  AF)  commander  concurred  with  the  reviewer’s
evaluation.

SAFPC found the seriousness  of  the  applicant’s  alleged  misconduct
outweighed the gravity of his medical condition and, after unanimously
finding his medical condition did not contribute to or  aggravate  his
propensity to engage in misconduct, recommended continuation with  the
RILO processing. Therefore, on 14 Jul  99,  the  SAF,  acting  through
SAFPC, directed the applicant’s  discharge,  thereby  terminating  the
applicant’s dual-action case.

The applicant was discharged on 22 Jul 99 in the grade of LTC  with  a
UOTHC characterization, triable by court-martial. He had  6  years,  7
months and 36 days of total active service and 16 years, 6 months  and
19 days of prior inactive service.

HQ AFPC/DPPR’s letter dated 26 Jul  99  advised  the  applicant  that,
prior to finalizing his discharge, HQ AFPC/DPPD had informed  them  of
the applicant’s pending PEB and his involuntary discharge was held  in
abeyance until his PEB was completed. Once completed, both his PEB and
RILO packages were sent to the SAF for a final  determination.  On  14
Jul 99, the  SAF  directed  his  discharge,  thereby  terminating  any
further disability processing actions. DPPR also indicated that, since
the SAF had accepted  his  resignation,  there  was  no  provision  to
rescind this decision to allow him to face a court-martial.

_________________________________________________________________

AIR FORCE EVALUATION:

HQ AFPC/DPPRS states that, based on the  documentation  in  the  file,
they believe the discharge was  consistent  with  the  procedural  and
substantive requirements of the discharge  regulation.  The  applicant
did not submit any new evidence or identify any errors  or  injustices
that occurred in the discharge processing. Denial is recommended.

A complete copy of the evaluation is at Exhibit C.

HQ AFPC/DPPD notes that individuals undergoing  disability  processing
who also have simultaneous ongoing  administrative/punitive  discharge
actions pending are forwarded to SAFPC for final determination  as  to
which case they want to pursue. This is referred to as  a  dual-action
case.  In this situation, both cases were forwarded to SAFPC on 30 Jun
99 for their decision. On 14 Jul 99, the SAF directed the  applicant’s
discharge and the  ongoing  disability  action  was  terminated.  DPPD
concludes the applicant was treated fairly,  was  properly  rated  and
afforded a full and fair hearing. Based on the SAFPC  decision  on  14
Jul 99, they find no grounds to overturn the Secretarial decision  and
award  the  applicant  a  disability  discharge  with  entitlement  to
severance pay. Denial is recommended.

A complete copy of the evaluation is at Exhibit D.

HQ AFPC/JA notes that had the applicant proceeded to trial, he  risked
not only receiving a dismissal and confinement, but also  his  ability
to practice dentistry as a civilian and he  risked  losing  a  medical
separation. His RILO clearly showed he was worried that  a  conviction
would prohibit him from practicing  dentistry  back  in  Puerto  Rico.
Second, the RILO was  based  on  his  counsel’s  concession  that  the
applicant would be found guilty of at  least  one  of  the  misconduct
allegations. Third, the applicant knew that submitting a RILO  allowed
his medical disability  case  to  continue.  Now,  he  is  essentially
arguing that had he been told that  a  medical  discharge  was  not  a
foregone conclusion and that SAFPC would make the final  determination
as to which discharge would be executed, he would not have submitted a
resignation. In short, he has failed to  prove  that  erroneous  legal
advice caused
him to submit his resignation or that it was anything  but  a  knowing
and voluntary act. The evidence clearly shows that counsel’s advice to
submit the resignation was soundly based on the applicant’s desire  to
save his civilian practice and continue to be processed in the medical
evaluation system. The applicant was not erroneously induced to submit
his resignation.  As  for  his  request  to  withdraw  his  RILO,  his
resignation had already been approved and was being held  in  abeyance
pending the outcome of the medical evaluation process. He was not,  in
fact,  asking  for  a  withdrawal  but  that  the   already   approved
resignation be rescinded. The governing directive makes  no  provision
for the rescinding of approved resignations, only  the  withdrawal  of
pending resignations. Finally, his reasons for requesting a rescission
of the resignation were counter to his best interests. Rescinding  the
RILO to face the misconduct charges  at  a  court-martial  would  have
ended the processing of his disability case.  Those  charged  with  or
convicted and sentenced for one or more offenses that could result  in
dismissal or punitive discharge may not undergo disability evaluation.
Paradoxically, if his  resignation  could  have  been  rescinded,  the
applicant faced all of the events he wanted to avoid by submitting the
RILO in the first place. Denial is recommended.

A complete copy of the evaluation is at Exhibit E.

_________________________________________________________________

APPLICANT'S REVIEW OF AIR FORCE EVALUATION:

Complete copies of the Air Force evaluations  were  forwarded  to  the
applicant’s counsel on 18 Oct 02 for  review  and  comment  within  30
days.  On 9 Dec 02, counsel requested that  the  case  be  temporarily
withdrawn until he was ready to proceed.   The  applicant’s  case  was
reopened upon receipt of counsel’s 23 Dec 02 rebuttal.

Counsel  contends  that  settled  law  provides  that   administrative
agencies have inherent authority to  reconsider  their  own  decisions
since the power to decide in the first instance carries  with  it  the
power to reconsider. Neither the SAF nor his  designee  acted  on  the
withdrawal request during the six weeks before the effective  date  of
his resignation. Counsel cites Cunningham v. US, which flatly  rejects
the Air Force’s what’s-done-is-done argument, as well as  Trujillo  v.
General Electric Co. If a  withdrawal  request  submitted  before  the
effective separation date is denied without any demonstrable  exercise
of discretion, it is an involuntary separation. The advisory opinion’s
suggestion that the approval of the  resignation  request  was  simply
being held in “abeyance” is completely illogical and inconsistent with
the dual processing regulation.  If that were the case, the premature
approval would operate  as  an  improper  predetermination  and  would
render the dual processing requirement meaningless.  In fact, the  Air
Force conceded that  its  initial  approval  of  the  resignation  was
ineffectual because the “disability case and administrative discharge”
were not forwarded to the SAF for a “final determination” until 30 Jun
99. The advisory opinion’s quibble over the  applicant’s  “request  to
rescind” rather than a “request to withdraw” is a preposterous, hyper-
technical argument--the words are synonymous. The meaning  and  effect
of such a request is patently the same and the SAF had  the  authority
to approve it. Moreover, the Air Force  completely  ignored  the  fact
that from Aug 98 until May 99 the applicant was  being  treated  on  a
daily basis by an Air Force psychiatrist  for  severe  depression  and
anxiety. He was taking prescription  medication  for  his  depression,
anxiety and a sleeping disorder, which bears directly on the issue  of
“voluntariness.”

A complete copy of counsel’s response is at Exhibit I.

_________________________________________________________________

ADDITIONAL AIR FORCE EVALUATION:

HQ USAF/JAG advises that SAFPC makes the final  disposition  in  dual-
action (disability/administrative)  processing.   If  SAFPC  does  not
accept a member’s retirement or discharge  in  lieu  of  court-martial
action, the court-martial will proceed.   If  the  sentence  does  not
result  in  punitive  discharge,  then  the  disability  case  can  be
processed. Administrative action continues in any disability case that
results in a fit determination. HQ USAF/JAG notes that, faced  with  a
high probability of conviction on all or  some  of  the  charges,  the
applicant, upon advice of counsel, elected to submit his  resignation.
Independent of the PEB process, if his resignation was accepted by the
SAF (which it was), the applicant reaped several benefits;  i.e.,  the
avoidance of the rigors  of  a  criminal  trial,  federal  conviction,
potential confinement, dismissal and, more importantly,  any  negative
impact on his dentistry license and practice. Conversely, by accepting
the applicant’s resignation, the Air Force was denied the  opportunity
to prosecute the applicant and, over  time,  the  ability  to  marshal
evidence and witnesses. JAG urges the Board not to blindly accept  the
applicant’s assertion as uncontroverted truth that his resignation was
based on erroneous legal advice of  two  highly  experienced  military
counsels that a UOTHC discharge would not be executed unless  the  PEB
process ultimately found him fit for duty. Nowhere in the  applicant’s
rescission (not withdrawal) memo of his SAF-accepted resignation  does
he state his military counsel gave him “bad advice.”   His  rescission
was  based  on  the  assertion  that  “new  information  regarding  my
ophthalmic condition has been discovered which substantially change my
status regarding the resignation.”  The applicant  claims  he  learned
for the first time that the advice of his military counsel  concerning
medical discharge and disability benefits was erroneous and misleading
when he retained civilian  counsel  on  12  May  99.  If  he  retained
civilian counsel  at  that  point,  why  didn’t  that  counsel  ensure
military counsel’s “erroneous and misleading” advice was  included  as
the primary reason or basis for his  resignation  rescission  request?
He has not provided affidavits from either  of  his  military  counsel
attesting to the “erroneous  and  misleading”  advice  they  gave  him
concerning dual processing. This should be particularly persuasive  to
the Board because one of the applicant’s counsels is still in the  Air
Force assigned to Bolling AFB.  The burden of proof resides  with  the
applicant and he  has  offered  no  credible,  let  alone  sufficient,
evidence.   Consequently,  his  accepted   resignation   is   presumed
voluntary and  further  analysis  and  comment  of  applicant’s  legal
authority concerning this assertion is unnecessary.

The applicant’s other assertion is no official action was  ever  taken
on his attempted rescission  six  weeks  before  its  effective  date.
Again, factually, his rescission request was predicated on a desire to
“complete the PEB process” and “the opportunity to pursue the  medical
retirement that I believe I am  entitled  to.”  At  the  time  of  his
attempted rescission, he had met the IPEB and then  demanded  an  FPEB
hearing. Regardless of the SAF’s action on the applicant’s  rescission
request, the PEB process would have been followed  to  completion.  In
other words, from the SAF and SAFPC perspective,  no  official  action
(approval/disapproval)  of  the  applicant’s  rescission  request  was
required or necessary to  grant  his  request  to  “complete  the  PEB
process.”  Once completed, the SAF, acting through  SAFPC,  considered
all the information before it and elected to execute  the  applicant’s
tendered and accepted resignation.

In order for the law cited in counsel’s rebuttal to be applicable, the
Board must accept the facts, as represented by the applicant,  as  the
uncontroverted  truth.  The  objective   facts   don’t   support   the
applicant’s  assertions.   The  applicant   and   his   counsel   have
inaccurately portrayed the facts to the Board and the cited  case  law
has no application. Since the  applicant  has  failed  to  demonstrate
error or injustice, denial is recommended.

A complete copy of the additional evaluation is at Exhibit J.

_________________________________________________________________

APPLICANT’S REVIEW OF ADDITIONAL EVALUATION:

Counsel asserts the advisory opinion fails to respond to the principal
points made in their submission and instead repeats  the  same  flawed
arguments. The applicant met his burden that he  relied  on  erroneous
advice from his ADC;  the  Air  Force  did  not  meet  its  burden  of
persuasion.  His eye condition is not  “pre-Air  Force”  but  in  fact
occurred during his Air Force service.  The  Air  Force’s  attempt  to
distinguish Cunningham v. US rests entirely on its claim that there is
a meaningful difference between a request to withdraw and a request to
rescind a resignation. Their argument  is  without  merit.  The  words
rescind and withdraw are synonymous or interchangeable.  The  advisory
opinion, not surprisingly, made no effort to define  either  term.  As
stated  earlier,  the  Secretary  and  administrative  agencies   have
inherent authority to reconsider their own decisions since  the  power
to decide  in  the  first  instance  carries  with  it  the  power  to
reconsider. Even if the SAF approved the resignation request, there is
no question that he had ample time and inherent authority  to  approve
the  applicant’s  request  to  rescind  his  resignation  before   its
effective  date.  The  Air  Force’s  argument  is  a  pure  post   hoc
rationalization for an improper  agency  action.  The  fact  that  the
applicant was being treated on a daily basis for severe depression and
anxiety at  the  time  he  submitted  his  resignation  request  bears
directly on the issue of voluntariness.

A complete copy of counsel’s response is at Exhibit L.

_________________________________________________________________

THE BOARD CONCLUDES THAT:

1.    The applicant has exhausted all remedies  provided  by  existing
law or regulations.

2.    The application was not timely filed;  however,  it  is  in  the
interest of justice to excuse the failure to timely file.

3.    Insufficient relevant evidence has been presented to demonstrate
the existence of error or injustice. We carefully considered counsel’s
arguments as well as the available evidence of record. The applicant’s
stated reason for rescinding his RILO was so he could complete the PEB
process or, in the alternative, be  allowed  to  prove  his  innocence
because he  had  discovered  his  ophthalmic  condition  affected  his
ability to practice dentistry. Nowhere in the  14  Jun  99  rescission
request did he or his civilian counsel assert, as they  do  now,  that
the RILO was submitted as a result of erroneous, ineffective  military
legal advice. Completing disability  evaluation  was  the  applicant’s
stated objective and his RILO facilitated the continuation of the  PEB
process. Without it, he first would have had to submit to  the  rigors
of trial and the very real possibility  of  a  dismissal  or  punitive
discharge, in which case he could not undergo  disability  evaluation.
Ironically, if the applicant’s rescission request had been granted  he
would have faced all the events he wanted to avoid by  submitting  the
RILO in the first place. He could have  requested  withdrawal  of  his
RILO while it was pending the SAF’s prerogative to  accept  or  reject
it. This he did not do, and once the SAF accepted the RILO, it was  no
longer pending but held in abeyance so that the PEB process  could  be
completed, which is what the applicant claimed he  wanted.  After  the
PEB process  was  finalized  and  the  applicant  found  unfit,  SAFPC
reviewed  the  accepted  RILO,  the  completed  PEB  evaluation,   the
applicant’s  concurrence  with  the  IPEB’s  recommendation  and   the
rescission request. SAFPC considered the dual  aspects  of  the  case,
i.e., whether to discharge the applicant medically  for  unfitness  or
discharge him administratively for his  misconduct.  SAFPC  apparently
concluded the applicant’s medical condition did not contribute  to  or
mitigate his misconduct. As a result, the SAF, acting  through  SAFPC,
directed the applicant’s UOTHC discharge based upon the SAF’s previous
acceptance of the RILO. With regard to  the  rescission  request,  the
Board notes  there  is  no  regulatory  provision  for  rescinding  an
accepted RILO. The Board also notes that the cases cited by  applicant
deal with resignations  by  civilian  employees.   The  law  governing
resignation by military officers is significantly different from  that
applying to civilians. The applicant’s  situation  undoubtedly  placed
him under severe stress, but that  would  not  inherently  impair  his
decision-making capability. Further, counsel has not demonstrated that
his client’s decision to request discharge in  lieu  of  court-martial
was uninformed or involuntary, or that the SAF, acting through  SAFPC,
abused or exceeded his authority in  ordering  the  execution  of  the
resignation despite the  applicant’s  request  to  rescind.  With  the
applicant’s accepted RILO, the Air Force was denied the opportunity to
prosecute him and we find no grounds for  allowing  the  applicant  to
litigate at this later date those issues he neatly  avoided  with  his
resignation.  In the final analysis, we  see  no  compelling  evidence
presented that the applicant suffered either an error or injustice and
agree with the rationale provided by the two legal  advisory  opinions
that this appeal should be denied.

4.    Since the  applicant’s  case  is  adequately  documented  and  a
personal appearance with or without counsel will not materially add to
our understanding of the issue involved, his request for a hearing  is
not favorably considered.

_________________________________________________________________

THE BOARD DETERMINES THAT:

The  applicant  be  notified  that  the  evidence  presented  did  not
demonstrate the existence of material error  or  injustice;  that  the
application was denied without a personal  appearance;  and  that  the
application will only be reconsidered upon  the  submission  of  newly
discovered relevant evidence not considered with this application.

_________________________________________________________________

The following members of the  Board  considered  this  application  in
Executive Session on 1 May 2003 under the provisions of AFI 36-2603:

                 Mr. Philip Sheuerman, Panel Chair
                 Mr. Christopher Carey, Member
                 Ms. Martha J. Evans, Member

The following documentary evidence relating to AFBCMR Docket Number BC-
2002-02347 was considered:

   Exhibit A.  DD Form 149, dated 22 Jul 02, w/atchs.
   Exhibit B.  Applicant's Master Personnel Records.
   Exhibit C.  Letter, HQ AFPC/DPPRS, dated 5 Sep 02.
   Exhibit D.  Letter, HQ AFPC/DPPD, dated 27 Sep 02.
   Exhibit E.  Letter, HQ AFPC/JA, dated 10 Oct 02.
   Exhibit F.  Letter, SAF/MRBR, dated 18 Oct 02.
   Exhibit G.  Letter, Counsel, 9 Dec 02.
   Exhibit H.  Letter, AFBCMR, dated 16 Dec 02.
   Exhibit I.  Letter, Counsel, dated 23 Dec 02.
   Exhibit J.  Letter, HQ USAF/JAG, dated 7 Mar 03.
   Exhibit K.  Letter, AFBCMR, dated 12 Mar 03.
   Exhibit L.  Letter, Counsel, dated 12 Apr 03.




                                   PHILIP SHEUERMAN
                                   Panel Chair