RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 

AIR FORCE BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS 

 

 

IN THE MATTER OF: DOCKET NUMBER: BC-2011-04308 

 

 COUNSEL: 

 

 HEARING DESIRED: YES 

 

 

________________________________________________________________ 

 

APPLICANT REQUESTS THAT: 

 

1. His Officer Performance Report (OPR) covering the period 
2 Jul 08 through 4 Jun 09 and his In-the-Primary Zone (IPZ) 
Performance Recommendation Form (PRF) be declared void and 
removed from his records. 

 

2. He be reinstated onto active duty at his last duty station. 

 

3. He be directly promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel 
(O-5), or his corrected records meet a special selection board 
(SSB) for the grade of 0-5 using his one year Below-the-Primary 
Zone (BPZ) PRF. 

 

________________________________________________________________ 

 

APPLICANT CONTENDS THAT: 

 

While working for the Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) 
Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), he unjustly received a Letter of 
Reprimand (LOR) and an Unfavorable Information File (UIF), for a 
security violation associated with sharing his classified 
password with a civilian contractor with whom he worked. He was 
told by his superiors to allow a fellow contractor to share his 
own classified system password. The sharing of passwords was a 
sanctioned practice borne from operational necessity to ensure 
the completion of JIEDDO’s vital mission in the face of 
extremely limited resources. He took and passed a polygraph 
test confirming his supervisors knew about and condoned his 
password sharing. However, in the aftermath of a critical 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigation into his 
organization, he was painted as a scapegoat and his leadership 
targeted him to deflect blame and punished him inappropriately. 

 

Furthermore, the LOR is based upon his not following an Army 
Regulation (AR 25-2, Information Assurance), that was later 
determined not to apply; and a contractors’ Information System 
Security Briefing (ISSB) that, although he signed it, did not 
apply to him. Further, the Air Force Central Adjudication 
Facility (AFCAF) reviewed his case and fully reinstated his 
security clearance. 

 


The unjustified LOR resulted in his receiving the contested 
referral OPR, which is incorrect because it was referred for his 
receiving an “LOR for a security violation.” However, JIEDDO/JA 
determined no lawful order or punitive regulation had been 
violated. There was no security violation. Finally, a senior 
Air Force official completed an independent review of his case 
and concluded “the incident was baseless.” 

 

As a result of the LOR and referral OPR, he was given a “Do Not 
Promote” promotion recommendation, he was twice non-selected for 
promotion and ultimately forced to separate due to force 
shaping. 

 

In support of his appeal, the applicant provides copies of an 
expanded statement from his counsel, an excerpt from AFMAN 33-
223, Identification and Authorization, four GAO Reports, a JIEDDO Organization and Functions Guide, excerpts from his 
military personnel records, and other documentation related to 
his case. 

 

The applicant’s complete submission, with attachments, is at 
Exhibit A. 

 

________________________________________________________________ 

 

STATEMENT OF FACTS: 

 

According to the applicant’s military personnel records, he 
served in the Regular Air Force in the grade of major (O-4) 
during the matter under review. 

 

On 21 May 09, the applicant received a LOR with a UIF for 
violating security regulations and for being derelict in 
performance of his duties. The basis of this action was that an 
investigation revealed that he knowingly permitted a civilian 
contractor to have access to his Joint Worldwide Intelligence 
Communications System (JWICS) account and password to carry out 
non-delegable duties which he was assigned. 

 

According to information provided by the applicant, he submitted 
a response on 28 May 09. 

 

On 13 Oct 09, the contested referral OPR, closing 4 Jun 09, was 
rendered upon the applicant. The OPR was referred as it 
indicated a rating of “Does Not Meet Standards” and contained 
remarks related to the applicant’s violation of security 
regulations for which he received an LOR. 

 

On 30 Oct 09, the applicant submitted a rebuttal to the referral 
OPR citing similar contentions to the matter under review. 

 

According to information provided by AFPC/DPSOO, the applicant 
was considered, but not selected, for promotion to the grade of 
lieutenant colonel by the CY10A (P0510A) and CY11A (P0511A) 
Lieutenant Colonel Central Selection Boards (CSB). 


On 13 Jun 11, the applicant was notified of his nonselection for 
promotion by the CY11A Lieutenant Colonel CSB and the 
establishment of a 30 Nov 11 mandatory separation date (MSD) 
based on his being twice deferred for promotion. 

 

On 30 Nov 11, the applicant was honorably discharged with a 
narrative reason for separation of “Non-Selection, Permanent 
Promotion” and was credited with 15 years, 5 months, and 25 days 
of total active service. 

 

The remaining relevant facts pertaining to this application are 
described in the letters prepared by the Air Force offices of 
primary responsibility, which are included at Exhibits C, D, 
and E. 

________________________________________________________________ 

 

AIR FORCE EVALUATION: 

 

AFPC/DPSID recommends denial of the applicant’s request to void 
and remove his referral OPR and his IPZ PRF. The applicant 
contends the referral comments within the EPR were wholly 
inaccurate as they reported on a security violation the 
applicant believes he did not commit. In support of his 
request, the applicant mainly provides his recollection and 
snippets of what appear to be text conversations with 
individuals. However, the documentation provided does not 
indicate the identity of these individuals and the applicant’s 
hand-written annotations do not qualify as proof of their 
identity. In view of the fact this was the applicant’s only 
attempt to provide independent confirmation of this crucial 
aspect of his case, all of his claims that he was told to 
perform an illegal activity by his supervisors are 
unsubstantiated. Furthermore, the applicant did in fact sign an 
Information System Security Briefing (ISSB) that explicitly 
stated in several ways that it was prohibited for him to share 
or disclose his personal system password. In addition, his 
request to void and remove his PRF is unwarranted, as it is an 
accurate picture of his career performance during that 
particular promotion zone. The applicant appears to have been 
appropriately dealt with for this security violation and its 
mention on the contested OPR was appropriate to the 
circumstances. Air Force policy is that an evaluation report is 
accurate as written when it becomes a matter of record. The 
applicant failed to provide any information/support from the 
rating chain of record on the contested report. He has not 
substantiated the contested report was not rendered in good 
faith by all evaluators based on knowledge at the time. 

 

A complete copy of the AFPC/DPSID evaluation is at Exhibit C. 

 

AFPC/DPSOO recommends denial of the applicant’s request for 
direct promotion to lieutenant colonel or for SSB consideration 
to said grade using his BPZ PRF. This evaluation accepts and 
relies upon AFPC/DPSID’s recommendation to deny his request to 
void and remove his referral OPR and PRF. Although the officer 


may be qualified for promotion, he may not be the best qualified 
of other eligible officers competing for the limited number of 
promotion vacancies in the judgment of a selection board. 
Therefore, to grant a direct promotion would be unfair to all 
other officers who have extremely competitive records but did 
not get promoted. Additionally, as no changes have been made to 
the applicant’s record, we recommend denial of SSB 
consideration. 

 

A complete copy of the AFPC/DPSOO evaluation is at Exhibit D. 

 

AFPC/JA recommends denial, indicating there is no evidence of an 
error or injustice. The allegation of wrongdoing contained in 
the LOR refers to an incident in which the applicant violated 
security regulations and was derelict in the performance of his 
duties by permitting a civilian contractor to use his computer 
account and password to carry-out his non-delegable duties, and 
that his behavior violated the JIEDDO ISSB, which he 
acknowledged on 28 Aug 08, and AR 25-2. The evidence of record 
shows he did sign an acknowledgement of the ISSB brief, which 
explicitly prohibits sharing or disclosing of passwords. The 
fact he signed and dated this briefing establishes that he 
understood and acknowledged his responsibilities with regard to 
password/account sharing, and this evidence alone is enough to 
support an LOR. In addition, Attachment 7 to AR 25-2, the 
regulation then in use by JIEDDO, similarly prohibited the 
sharing of passwords. The applicant has offered no evidence 
that JIEDDO, a DoD Organization, ever adopted an Air Force 
manual to govern its security policy. On the contrary, JIEDDO 
relied on a very specific security briefing given to each member 
of the organization stating that password/account sharing was 
prohibited. Although the applicant has included in the file the 
aforementioned e-mail “snippets” suggesting that “JA” personnel 
found the listed Army regulation was not applicable in this 
case, those excerpts (one coming from the Area Defense Counsel) 
constitute nothing more than hearsay statements of others; there 
is no statement or legal review from any JA representative who 
may have performed an actual legal review. Even assuming 
arguendo that a JA review had found the Army regulation to be 
inapplicable, that regulation is not necessary to support the 
allegation of wrongdoing in the LOR. The applicant’s counsel 
goes even further and makes a broad assertion (Brief, page 4) 
that “despite judge advocate determinations which completely 
cleared him of the alleged wrongdoing,” the applicant received 
the LOR and referral OPR. Quite obviously, there is no evidence 
in the file to support the assertion. 

 

The applicant also challenges the LOR and OPR on the basis that 
his superiors knew of the violation and condoned it, that the 
overall circumstances and need to get the mission accomplished 
required it, and that he was made the scapegoat of what were 
organizational problems that went far beyond his actions. In 
our view, the applicant has failed to establish any of those 
contentions by a preponderance of the evidence. His polygraph 
test only proves that he believed that his supervisory chain 


knew and approved of his password sharing, not that is was in 
fact true. Counsel also offers a purported statement from the 
applicant’s direct supervisor that indicates she was aware of 
the applicant’s password sharing and had no concern with it. 
First, the statement in question has a redacted name; it has not 
been authenticated as genuinely representing the statement of 
this or any person. Even if it is what the applicant’s counsel 
purports it to be, it does not prove that his supervisor 
approved his actions. On the contrary, the author of the 
statement clearly states the use of the applicant’s password by 
the contractor “was completely wrong” and she “could not support 
it.” The Investigation Officer (IO) makes it clear the 
applicant failed to provide proper supervision with regard to 
the contractor’s unauthorized computer account use and 
essentially allowed a contractor to perform his assigned DASO 
duties by default: “his unfulfilled requests for an alternate 
DASO and his dissatisfaction with initial DASO training did not 
absolve him of his DASO duty requirements,” and he knew the 
procedures he was using were not permitted under the governing 
regulations. The evidence of record fully supports the adverse 
actions taken against the applicant, who failed to prove any 
error or injustice in his case. 

 

A complete copy of the AFPC/JA evaluation is at Exhibit E. 

 

________________________________________________________________ 

 

APPLICANT'S REVIEW OF AIR FORCE EVALUATION: 

 

The comments and recommendations contained in the advisories are 
based on an alleged security violation addressed in the LOR, 
which misses an important point - the LOR was for violation of 
AR 25-2 and the same official who gave him the LOR later 
conceded the regulation did not apply. This is not hearsay but 
an official e-mail bearing a date/time stamp. Further, the 
advisories opine that his signing a non-binding, contractor ISSB 
form in some way outweighs Air Force regulations that he was 
verbally ordered to follow. There is no proof the ISSB was used 
by JIEDDO as a binding form. Both JIEDDO/JA and AFCAF 
determined this form did not apply to him despite his signature, 
which was accomplished to placate contractor requirements for 
their company. The Air Force made a definitive determination 
that he did not violate security regulations or procedures. 
Additionally, the Director of Staff for Air Force Reserve 
Command, after carefully studying his record and this 
allegation, found the incident baseless and recommended him for 
a position in the Reserves. The advisories suggest that his 
proof is questionable. However, the statements in question were 
drawn from the original command-directed investigation. Fair 
play dictates recognition of how difficult it is for him to 
obtain statements from his superiors, when the GAO was coming 
down hard on his leadership. They would risk their own 
livelihood by admitting they sanctioned his actions. The 


referral OPR states he received an LOR for “Violation of 
Security Regulations.” This is simply not so. 

 

A complete copy of the applicant’s response, with attachments, 
is at Exhibit G. 

 

The applicant’s counsel also submitted an independent rebuttal 
stating, in part, the knowledgeable decision makers—JIEDDO/JA 
and AFCAS—ruled that: [a] there was no dereliction; and [b] the 
applicant did NOT violate security regulations. The signing 
Staff Judge Advocate at JIEDDO was a JAG Major General serving 
as a GS-15. The applicant was working in a contractor building 
on a contractor computer system—not at JIEDDO Headquarters. The 
contractor’s form in question governed contractors alone. Aside 
from the contractor’s form, there is no stand-alone violation of 
AR 25-2. He was charged with dereliction under Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ) Article 92, failure to obey an order or 
regulation. However, no regulation was violated, as confirmed 
by AFCAF, the LOR Approval Authority, and JIEDDO/JA. 

 

A complete copy of the counsel’s response is at Exhibit H. 

 

The applicant’s counsel submitted an additional response 
reiterating his earlier points on 11 Jun 12. 

 

A complete copy of the additional counsel’s response is at 
Exhibit I. 

 

________________________________________________________________ 

 

THE BOARD CONCLUDES THAT: 

 

1. The applicant has exhausted all remedies provided by 
existing law or regulations. 

 

2. The application was timely filed. 

 

3. Sufficient relevant evidence has been presented to 
demonstrate the existence of an error or injustice to warrant 
removal of the contested LOR, OPR, and PRF from the applicant’s 
records; providing his corrected record promotion consideration 
to the grade of lieutenant colonel by a Special Selection Board 
(SSB); and if selected, retroactively reinstating him to active 
duty. After a thorough review of the evidence of record and the 
applicant’s complete submission, we believe a preponderance of 
the evidence establishes sufficient doubt as to the propriety of 
the contested Letter of Reprimand (LOR) based on a number of 
mitigating factors. In this respect, we note that the 
following: 

 

 a. At the time of the alleged incident resulting in the 
applicant’s receipt of the contested LOR, the applicant was 
assigned to the JIEDDO, composed of military, government 
civilian, and contractor personnel. JIEDDO’s unique and 
critical mission in support of the war on terror, is to attack 
the network line of operations enabling offense operations 
against complex networks of financiers, improvised explosive 
device (IED) manufacturers, trainers, and their supporting 
infrastructure by providing real-time intelligence surveillance, 
reconnaissance, information operations, counter-bomber 
targeting, biometrics and weapons technical intelligence 
capabilities in support of service members deployed in Iraq and 
Afghanistan1. The applicant’s organization of assignment within 
JIEDDO, i.e., the Counter IED Operations Integration Center 
(COIC), was responsible for providing real-time data mining of 
various highly-restricted inter-governmental and non-military 
sources for immediate dispatch of usable intelligence data to 
service members fighting the war on terror. 
b. While the applicant acknowledged the prohibition against 
the sharing of passwords when he initialed the Information 
System Security Briefing (ISSB), JIEDDO/JA and the Air Force 
Central Adjudication Facility later determined the form did not 
apply to him despite his signature, since it was a contractor 
form produced to placate the Defense contracting company. 
c. Sufficient evidence has been presented to convince us the 
sharing of passwords with contractors was condoned by the 
applicant’s leadership and that such activities continued 
unabated for an extended period in an effort to meet the 
demanding organizational mission; specifically, to combat the 
escalating number of US casualties due to IEDs responsible for 
over 60 percent of all American combat casualties in Iraq and 50 
percent of combat casualties in Afghanistan2. We also believe 
this is further substantiated by fact that he successfully 
passed a polygraph test, indicating “no deception” regarding the 
issue of whether his leadership was aware of and condoned the 
practice of password sharing with contractors. 
d. We find it unjust the applicant was singled-out for 
punishment, when clearly there was an atmosphere of noncompliance 
in an effort to ensure the mission was accomplished 
and performance objectives were achieved. The General 
Accounting Office (GAO) confirmed that JIEDDO had staffed 
contract personnel in positions of key governmental 
responsibility and relied too heavily upon a civilian contractor 
workforce. As such, the sharing of classified passwords with 
civilian contractors was necessitated due to disparate manning 
levels between contractors and government civilian/military 
personnel and the insufficient number of government 
civilian/military personnel possessing the required skills and 
level of experience. Specifically, of the 1,000 personnel 
assigned to COIC only 22 were military or DoD civilian 
personnel. In view of this, we find it readily apparent these 
1 Ref, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Improvised Explosive 
Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and Countermeasures, dated 
August 28, 2007. 2 Ref, DoD Personnel and Military Casualty Statistics, Defense Manpower Data 
Center, Casualty Summary by Reason October 7, 2001 through August 18, 2007.

systemic government-manning deficiencies were the driving force 
behind such un-orthodox actions being taken in order to “cut 
through red tape” in order to accomplish the mission of saving 
American lives in warzones. 

 

 e. The incident did not result in any breach of security. 
The investigation conducted in accordance with Army Regulation 
15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of 
Officers, determined a Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) 
compromise was improbable and there was no evidence that any had 
occurred, as both the applicant and the subject contractor had 
valid Top Secret SCI clearances and access to the Joint 
Worldwide Intelligence Community System (JWICS). More 
importantly, the investigation noted there was no evidence the 
contractor utilized the applicant’s JWICS account for any reason 
other than the transmission of unclassified e-mails concerning 
Defense Intelligence Information System Automated Security 
Officer (DASO) account access requests. We also recognize the 
contractor with whom the applicant shared his classified 
password was a highly-skilled, former Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA) employee, who had previously performed the 
applicant’s additional duty as the DASO prior to the applicant’s 
arrival and was a trusted-agent with legitimate access to DIA 
databases and close-hold government inter-agency computer 
programs. 

 

 f. The applicant’s actions were taken in the interest of 
ensuring the continued operation of COIC and accomplishment of 
its mission objectives. Based on the evidence before us, it is 
apparent that upon the applicant’s assignment of the additional 
duty of DASO, a duty for which he had not received the necessary 
training, he requested formal DASO training from DIA and was 
told that it did not exist and was instructed by his leadership 
to seek-out the assistance of the subject contractor, as the 
organization’s “go to” for DASO. Moreover, it appears that he 
was led to believe that another government representative had 
been appointed as the DASO during his Temporary Duty to the 
United Kingdom. Despite the fact the password breach was 
brought to his leadership’s attention in July 2008 and numerous 
times thereafter, it was not until April 2009 that any issue 
with the practice arose. 

 

 g. In view of the above and given the mitigating factors in 
this case, we believe the interest of justice can best be served 
by removing the contested LOR and any reference thereto from his 
records. Furthermore, inasmuch as the LOR formed the basis of 
the subsequent referral OPR and Promotion Recommendation Form 
(PRF), we recommend they also be removed from his records and 
that his corrected record be considered for promotion to the 
grade of lieutenant colonel by an SSB for the CY10A CSB and if 
necessary, the CY11A CSB, and if selected, that he be 
retroactively reinstated to active duty, effective 30 November 
2011. In arriving at our decision, we are keenly aware the 
courts have held that correction boards have an abiding moral 
sanction to determine, insofar as possible, the true nature of 


an alleged injustice and take the appropriate steps to grant 
full and fitting relief. We believe the recommended corrections 
to the applicant’s records will provide him such full and 
fitting relief. 

 

4. Notwithstanding the above, we find no evidence to warrant 
his direct promotion through the correction of records process. 
In this respect, the Board observes that officers compete for 
promotion under the whole person concept whereby many factors 
are carefully assessed by selection boards. An officer may be 
qualified for promotion but, in the judgment of a selection 
board vested with the discretionary authority to make the 
selections, may not be the best qualified of those available for 
the limited number of promotion vacancies. Therefore, in the 
absence of evidence that he would have been a selectee had his 
folder reflected the recommended change, we believe that a duly 
constituted selection board, applying the complete promotion 
criteria, is in the most advantageous position to render this 
vital determination, and that its prerogative to do so should 
only be usurped under extraordinary circumstances. Therefore, 
we believe affording the applicant SSB consideration for the 
contested promotion boards represents full and fitting relief in 
this case. Should the applicant be selected for promotion, his 
records should be corrected to reflect that he was not released 
from active duty due to being twice deferred for promotion, but 
continued to serve on active duty. 

 

5. The applicant's case is adequately documented and it has not 
been shown that a personal appearance with or without counsel 
will materially add to our understanding of the issues involved. 
Therefore, the request for a hearing is not favorably 
considered. 

 

________________________________________________________________ 

 

THE BOARD RECOMMENDS THAT: 

 

The pertinent military records of the Department of the Air 
Force relating to the applicant be corrected to show that: 

 

 a. Any and all references to his Letter of Reprimand, 
dated 21 May 09, and associated Unfavorable Information File, be 
declared void and removed from his record. 

 

 b. His referral AF Form 707, Officer Performance Report, 
rendered for the period 2 Jul 08 through 4 Jun 09, be declared 
void and removed from his record. 

 

 c. His AF Form 709, Promotion Recommendation Report, 
prepared for the Calendar Year (CY) 2010A Lieutenant Colonel 
Central Selection Board (CSB), be declared void and removed from 
his record. 

 

 


It is further recommended that his corrected records be 
considered for promotion to the grade of lieutenant colonel by 
Special Selection Boards (SSB) for the CY 2010A and CY 2011A 
Lieutenant Colonel CSBs, and, if selected, his records be 
corrected to show that he was not released from active duty on 
30 November 2011, but on that date he was retained on active 
duty. 

 

________________________________________________________________ 

 

The following members of the Board considered AFBCMR Docket 
Number BC-2011-04308 in Executive Session on 12 Jul 12, under 
the provisions of AFI 36-2603: 

 

 , Panel Chair 

 , Member 

 , Member 

 

All members voted to correct the records, as recommended. The 
following documentary evidence was considered: 

 

 Exhibit A. DD Form 149, dated 19 Oct 11, w/atchs. 

 Exhibit B. Applicant's Master Personnel Records. 

 Exhibit C. Letter, AFPC/DPSID, dated 27 Feb 12. 

 Exhibit D. Letter, AFPC/DPSOO, dated 23 Mar 12. 

 Exhibit E. Letter, AFPC/JA, dated 11 Apr 12. 

 Exhibit F. Letter, SAF/MRBR, dated 12 Apr 12. 

 Exhibit G. Letter, Applicant, dated 18 May 12, w/atchs. 

 Exhibit H. Letter, Counsel, dated 24 May 12. 

 Exhibit I. Letter, Counsel, dated 11 Jun 12. 

 

 

 Panel Chair