RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
             AIR FORCE BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS

IN THE MATTER OF:                       DOCKET NUMBER:  BC-2007-00885
                                             INDEX CODE:  100.00
                                             COUNSEL:  NONE

                                             HEARING DESIRED:  YES

________________________________________________________________

APPLICANT REQUESTS THAT:

The credit for a Mikoyan-Gurevich (MiG-15) “Probably  Destroyed”  in  aerial
combat  in  Korea  on  21  September  1952,  be  upgraded  to  a  “Confirmed
Destroyed.”

________________________________________________________________

APPLICANT CONTENDS THAT:

In light of new historical evidence, i.e., 1999  eyewitness  statement  from
wingman, Russian records of aerial combat during the Korean War,  and  Fifth
Air Force (5th AF) Intelligence Summary, he should  receive  aerial  victory
credit (AVC) for the MiG-15 he destroyed on 21 September 1952.

On the date in question, while  piloting  an  F-86E,  Sabre,  he  engaged  a
Russian-built MiG-15 in aerial combat near or north of  the  Yalu  River  in
Manchuria, at an altitude of approximately 30,000 - 35,000  feet.   From  an
estimated range of 1,800 - 2,000 feet, in a  long  tail  chase  that  lasted
about five minutes, he fired several bursts from  his  .50  caliber  machine
guns, scoring strikes in the MiG’s  right  wing  and  engine/tailpipe  area.
There was an explosion in the engine area and the  MiG  started  trailing  a
long stream of smoke.  He and his wingman started to gain on the MiG as  the
aircraft started to descend.  They were  being  chased  by  additional  MiGs
from above and behind, and when they got  into  firing  range,  his  wingman
called a defensive break.  They abandoned the chase and  returned  to  base.
On the ground, his wingman urged him to claim a  “Kill”  or  a  “Destroyed,”
but he did not since he  did  not  see  the  enemy  pilot  crash  or  eject.
Instead, he claimed and was properly awarded a “Probably Destroyed.”

In 1999, a fellow F-86 pilot, long convinced the  circumstances  of  the  21
September 1952 mission met the criteria for  a  “Confirmed  Kill”  contacted
his [the applicant’s] former wingman who  provided  a  statement  indicating
that he always thought the MiG-15 was one of the applicant’s several  kills.
 M---- G------ B-----, a  ten-victory  ace  in  Korea,  concurred  with  the
statement, and took his  case  to  The  American  Fighter  Aces  Association
(AFAA).  The AFAA,  an  organization  that  guards  its  integrity  closely,
referred his case to its Victory Confirmation Board, made up of  five  World
War II Aces, who unanimously agreed and awarded him the  confirmed  victory.
Despite this, the Air Force Historical Research Agency at  Maxwell  AFB  was
not convinced they should change the official historical record.

In 2004, Russian records of aerial combat in the Korean War were  discovered
at the National Archives.  The records for  the  21 September  1952  mission
were translated into English by two competent  linguists,  and  the  5th  AF
Daily  Intelligence  Summary  containing  time   of   encounter,   location,
altitude, number of planes in each  flight,  squadron,  and  call-signs  was
obtained.  An analysis of these documents  revealed  some  similarities  and
some striking  differences.   Notably,  the  claim  of  another  F-86  pilot
matched almost exactly with the Russian description of the loss  of  a  MiG-
15, i.e., very low altitude, a single F-86 versus a single  MiG-15,  in  the
vicinity of Dapu Airfield in Manchuria and that only his claim  matched  the
loss of another MiG-15, i.e., two F-86s attacked two MiG-15s,  same  general
area and time of day, and same time elapsed in  the  chase  from  the  rear,
matched closely with the five minutes specified in the Russian  report.   No
other US claim, “Destroyed” or “Damaged”, comes close to  the  circumstances
of his claim.  These records were presented to  a  respected  historian,  an
authority on aviation matters and a curator at the National  Air  and  Space
Museum, who opined the geographical locale and the  general  description  of
the air combat coincide with his air sortie on 21 September 1952.

Applicant’s complete submission, with attachments, is at Exhibit A.

________________________________________________________________

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

The applicant is a retired lieutenant general who served in the  Korean  War
as an F-86E, Sabre, pilot, assigned to the  4th  Fighter  Interceptor  Wing,
Kimpo Air Base, South Korea.  During this period, he completed  a  total  of
135 combat missions, totaling 191 combat hours, with four AVCs.

On 21 September 1952, the applicant, flying  an  F-86E,  engaged  in  aerial
combat with a MiG-15 near the Yalu River.  He was credited with a  “Probably
Destroyed.”

A Fifth Air  Force  Daily  Intelligence  Summary,  dated  22 September 1952,
indicated that during the morning of  21 September  1952,  an  estimated  16
MiGs were observed by F-86s (four encountered by three  F-86s)  with  claims
of one MiG damaged, pending  film  assessment.   During  the  afternoon,  an
estimated 111 MiGs plus one Type-15 (Lavochkin La-168) were observed  by  F-
86s (69 encountered by 43 F-86s) with claims of five MiGs destroyed, one  of
which was pending film.  In  addition,  during  the  afternoon,  eight  F-84
Thunderjets, encountered four MiGs with  claims  of  one  MiG  damaged.   An
additional two MiGs were observed by an RF-80 Shooting Star.

Applicant  was  credited  with  four  AVCs  between  5   August   1952   and
28 September 1952.

Examiner’s Note:

During the Korean War, the valley surrounding the western end  of  the  Yalu
River became the focal point of  a  series  of  epic  dogfights  over  North
Korea, earning the nickname "MiG Alley."

________________________________________________________________

AIR FORCE EVALUATION:

The Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) recommends the  application
be denied, and states, in part, that while they  recognize  the  applicant’s
commendable military career, including four  AVCs  during  the  Korean  War,
since he is unable to produce official documents proving a fifth  AVC,  they
do not support his request.

Far  East  Air  Force   (FEAF)   Intelligence   Roundup,                 20-
26 September 1952, stated there were five claims of aircraft “destroyed”  on
21 September  1952;  all  the  claims  were  converted  to  confirmed  AVCs;
applicant was not included in the five who had filed a  claim  of  destroyed
on 21 September 1952; he claimed a  “probably  destroyed”  on  21  September
1952.  In an oral history interview in 1987 and 1988, the applicant  stated,
“There were  pieces  flying  off  him  (MiG-15)...that  didn’t  satisfy  the
criteria for a confirmed kill.”  Contemporary histories of  the  applicant’s
group and squadron indicated he claimed “probably destroyed” aircraft on  11
July and 21 September  1952.   Within  a  month  of  each  engagement,  FEAF
intelligence, with access to mission reports, the original debriefings,  gun
camera film, and witness statements, reviewed the claims and concurred  with
the “probably destroyed” assessments.

In 1999, an eyewitness statement was obtained from the  wingman,  indicating
that he believed the applicant destroyed a  MiG-15  on  21  September  1952.
Translated Russian document cited  by  the  applicant  do  not  conclusively
support his claim.   The  Russian  document  states  the  MiG-15  went  down
northwest of the Yalu while applicant  claimed  the  location  as  near  the
Yalu.  No altitude was mentioned while the applicant states  he  was  flying
at 30,000 to 35,000  feet.   Neither  the  Russian  document  nor  the  1999
statement from the wingman satisfy the criteria  established  for  verifying
AVCs and should not be accepted as official documentation.

In 2000, the  American  Fighter  Aces  Association  (AFAA),  an  unofficial,
fraternal organization with no connection to the Air Force,  notified  AFHRA
that they had decided to recognize the applicant’s five AVCs  based  on  the
1999 statement from the wingman and issued a press release  stating  he  was
an Ace.  However, AFHRA confirms AVCs based on AFI 84-105, Chapter  5,  that
lists the authority for validating  AVCs  as:  an  official  order  awarding
credit, a victory credit  board  report  from  the  time  showing  award  of
credit, a contemporaneous witness statement, gun camera film,  and  evidence
from unit histories from the time of the encounter.

The AFHRA evaluation, with attachments, is at Exhibit C.

________________________________________________________________

APPLICANT'S REVIEW OF AIR FORCE EVALUATION:

The evaluation fails  to  render  any  kind  of  operational  assessment  or
critical look at his analysis.  In fact, the table submitted in  support  of
their conclusions inadvertently offers strong support  for  his  claim.   In
this respect, he notes the Russian evidence coincides  or  matches  closely.
None of the other claims  match  the  Russian  evidence  as  his  does.   In
regards to the time, the Russian records reflect  Chinese  time,  while  all
the American reports are in Korean time.  Of the five criteria  outlined  in
the governing AFI as authority for validating an  AVC,  there  is  not,  and
could not be mention of the unexpected  availability  of  the  enemy  combat
records of the time.  While the evaluation recommends  denial  since  he  is
unable to produce official documents as proof, he notes  that  although  the
Russian combat records are not  official  US  documents  they  are  official
historical Russian documents.  As an  exception  to  established  policy  or
simply justice, he submits that the wingman’s  statement,  the  judgment  of
the AFAA, and the  availability  of  the  Russian  records  with  the  close
correlation to  his  claim  and  only  his  claim,  give  more  than  enough
justification for approval of his request.

Applicant’s complete response, with attachment, is at Exhibit E.

________________________________________________________________

APPLICANT'S APPEARANCE AT FORMAL HEARING:

1.  The  applicant  appeared  before  the  Board  with  two  witnesses   and
testified under oath.  During  the  hearing  the  applicant  reiterated  his
previous request that his credit for a Mikoyan-Gurevich  (MiG-15)  “Probably
Destroyed” in aerial combat in Korea on 21 September 1952, be upgraded to  a
“Confirmed  Destroyed.”   Applicant  contends  the  new  evidence   (Russian
document) reflects his confirmed “Probably Destroyed,” on  21 September 1952
was in fact the same MiG-15 shot down on 21 September 1952  over  Dapoo  and
that his record should be corrected.

2.  The  following  additional  information  was  provided  in  response  to
specific inquiries by the Board members:

       a.  The  applicant  provided  the  following  opening  remarks:    He
indicated that he would not have applied, if it were not for the efforts  of
Mr. D--- O----- on his behalf over the last several years.  He  acknowledged
that the Record of Proceedings was complete and fair; and the  summary  from
the Air Force Historical Research Agency’s position was accurate  and  fair.
He was totally convinced the MiG-15 he fired upon was the one  listed  as  a
loss in the Russian documents.  He stated, “The  Russian  documents  are  so
detailed and with numbers of rounds fired but they're just  yet  inaccurate.
For example, on 21 September 1952, they claimed two F-86s  were  shot  down;
however, there was no F-86 shot down.  One was damaged, from  being  hit  in
the tail section of the plane.  But where  they  and  our  forces  including
some well-known names claimed five victories that day, all  except  for  one
was confirmed on the spot, and the other one was confirmed sometime  later.”
 Applicant believes we did have five victories – actually,  he  believes  we
had six.  The documents may have  been  exaggerated  due  to  some  internal
political reason; “the good communist did this but the less  good  communist
did that and the bad communist, they got shot down or  maybe  they  wouldn't
admit the losses south of the river because that  was  more  fair  territory
than north of the river.”

They admitted two losses, both of which were north of  the  river.   He  did
not know Lieutenant M----, whose mission or sortie north of the river was  a
confirmed victory and he claimed it and the Russians admitted  it  was  well
north of the River right near the Dapoo Airfield at traffic pattern  height.
 The other loss they had, the Russians did not specify  the  altitude  where
it was at; however, no  one  else  claimed  one  in  that  area,  which  was
actually  in,  what  was  formerly  known  as  Manchuria.   All  the   other
circumstances of comparing the Russian records to our records are  identical
to his sortie, with the exception of the altitude and the approximate  place
of the Russian crash.  The time of day was almost identical,  if  you  allow
for the difference in time zones.  The circumstances of the two MiGs  versus
two F-86’s are identical.

      b.  Response to the question as  to  if  his  wingman  saw  the  hits,
applicant states, “Yes, Oh, absolutely.”  He states, his wingman asked  him,
if he was going to claim a kill and stated that he would testify to a  large
explosion and smoke.  However, he told him that he did  not  see  the  pilot
eject so he did not claim a kill.

      c.  When asked about the debriefing for the 21 September 1952 mission,
he stated, “we had our parachutes on, put them away and Don said,  that’s  a
kill, I want you to claim a kill and I will confirm it.”  “I  remember,  I’m
almost positive the wingman was not in there  with  me  I  don’t  think  the
wingman went in.  The leader went in to debrief the  mission  and  if  there
was a claim or something then they contacted the wingman.  But I  think  the
debrief I had with the intelligence guy, I’m almost positive,  I  was  there
alone.”

Additionally,  when  asked  about  the  steps  in  the  debriefing  process,
applicant stated, “I think that’s basically it.  Either your wingman had  to
confirm it or somebody else who happened to see what was going on, …and  the
gun camera film if you happen to have a very good shot of  gun  camera  film
and it showed the pilot ejecting; …But it was those three  things;  wingman,
somebody else, or film.”

      d.  When asked about official victory credits during the  Korean  War,
this excerpt was read to the Board; “Official  victory  credits  during  the
Korean War were confirmed by the Far East Air Force General  Orders.   Those
orders were based on written recommendation from the Fifth Air  Force  Enemy
Aircraft Claims Evaluation board which was composed of six  officers,  three
from operations and three from intelligence.  The reports that went  to  the
board consisted of individual claim statement and  supporting  documentation
including  eyewitness  statements,  gun  camera  film,  and  photographs  of
wreckage.  The reports noted  whether  the  enemy  aircraft  was  destroyed,
probably destroyed, or damaged and whether the aircraft was airborne  or  on
the ground….”

      e.  The panel asked  Mr.  O-----,  were  there  any  similar  archives
maintained by the North Koreans with respect to their  planes?   Mr.  O-----
stated, “We found that the Russians kept more records than we did.   It  was
amazing what they did. They analyzed  every  mission  they  flew,  how  many
bullets were fired, how much gallons of gas, who was  on  the  flight,  what
happened, how they returned ….  So, we  have  a  complete  set  of  all  the
Russians flights every day for three and a half years on a disk that we  got
from Archives II at Silver Spring.”

Applicant and his witnesses’ complete sworn testimonies and their  responses
to the Board's questions are contained in the Transcript of  Proceedings  at
Exhibit F.

________________________________________________________________

THE BOARD CONCLUDES THAT:

1.  The applicant has exhausted all remedies provided  by  existing  law  or
regulations.

2.  The application was not timely filed; however, it is in the interest  of
justice to excuse the failure to timely file.

3.  After  carefully  assessing  the  applicant's   sworn   testimony,   his
responses to pertinent questions, the  sworn  testimony  of  witnesses,  the
evidence of record, and additional documentation submitted, the Board  finds
that sufficient relevant evidence has  been  presented  to  demonstrate  the
existence of error or injustice that warrants corrective action.

4.  The Board noted that official victory credit during the Korean  War  was
confirmed by the FEAF general orders; based on written  recommendation  from
the 5th AF Enemy Aircraft Claims Evaluation  Board.   With  respect  to  the
applicant’s claim, the FEAF documentation confirmed the  applicant  received
credit for a “Probably Destroyed.”  The Board found no  impropriety  in  the
review conducted resulting in the applicant’s “Probably  Destroyed”  credit,
on 21  September  1952.   It  appears  that  responsible  officials  applied
appropriate standards in effecting aerial victory  credit,  and  we  do  not
find persuasive evidence that pertinent regulations were  violated  or  that
applicant was not afforded all the rights to which entitled at the  time  of
the review.  Considered alone, we conclude the “Probably  Destroyed”  credit
was proper and appropriate and the applicant was  credited  as  others  with
similar circumstances.  Additionally, the Board noted the  comments  by  the
Air   Force   Historical   Research   Agency   that   without   contemporary
documentation  to  provide  supporting  documents  HRA  must  abide  by  the
standards applied during the Korean War and retain the records as they are.

5.  Notwithstanding the above, the applicant provided additional  supporting
documentation  which  based  on  expert  interpretation  substantiates   one
incident in which two MiG-15s were involved in a five-minute  dogfight  with
two F-86s on 21 September 1952, resulting in the crash of the  MiG-15.   The
Board noted the documentation  did  not  reflect  the  actual  altitude  and
location where the plane went down; however, both the Russian  document  and
the Air Force record confirmed that it was the only five-minute  air  battle
recorded between two MiG-15s and two F-86s on 21 September  1952,  and  that
no other battles  with  similar  circumstances  were  claimed.    The  Board
accepts  the  applicant’s  explanation  for   the   approximately   one-hour
difference between the encounter detailed in the Russian  document  and  the
Air Force record as the Russian document was recorded  using  local  Chinese
times; whereas, the Air Force record employed local Korean time.

5.  The Board further notes that based on the new  evidence,  the  statement
from the former wingman, sworn testimonies before us, we are  convinced  the
admitted loss reflected in the  Russian  translated  document  presented  as
evidence on the applicant’s behalf is in fact one in the  same  as  the  air
battle contested by the applicant.  In  view  of  the  above  findings,  the
Board recommends the applicant’s records be corrected to reflect the  credit
for  the  MiG-15  “Probably  Destroyed”  in  aerial  combat,  in  Korea,  on
21 September  1952,  properly  awarded  at  the  time,  be  upgraded  to   a
“Confirmed Destroyed” in light of the new evidence.

________________________________________________________________



THE BOARD RECOMMENDS THAT:

The pertinent military records of the Department of the Air  Force  relating
to APPLICANT, be corrected to show that:

            a.  His AF Form 5, Individual  Flight  Record,  Sheet  No. 24,
Item – Date, Column 13, Line - 21, during the period of 21 September 1952,
be amended to reflect  “(1  MIG  15  Destroyed)”  rather  than  “(1 MIG 15
Probably Destroyed).”

            b.  By Competent Authority, he was awarded  his  Fifth  Aerial
Victory Credit, for  destroying  a  MiG-15,  on  21 September 1952,  while
serving as a pilot on an F-86E during the Korean War.

________________________________________________________________

The following members of the Board considered AFBCMR Docket Number  BC-2007-
00885 in a Formal Hearing on 28 November 2007, under the provisions  of  AFI
36-2603:

All members voted to correct the records,  as  recommended.   The  following
documentary evidence was considered:

     Exhibit A.  DD Form 149, dated 14 March 2007, w/atchs.
     Exhibit B.  Applicant's Master Personnel Records.
     Exhibit C.  Letter, AFHRS/RS, dated 24 April 2007, w/atchs.
     Exhibit D.  Letter, SAF/MRBR, dated 4 May 2007.
     Exhibit E.  Letter, Applicant, dated 22 May 2007, w/atchs.
     Exhibit F.  Transcript of Proceedings.




                                   Chair




AFBCMR BC-2007-00885




MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

      Having received and considered the recommendation of the Air Force
Board for Correction of Military Records and under the authority of Section
1552, Title 10, United States Code (70A Stat 116), it is directed that:

      The pertinent military records of the Department of the Air Force
relating to APPLICANT, be corrected to show that:

            a.  His AF Form 5, Individual Flight Record, Sheet No. 24,
Item – Date, Column 13, Line - 21, during the period of 21 September 1952,
be amended to reflect “(1 MIG 15 Destroyed)” rather than “(1 MIG 15
Probably Destroyed).”

            b.  By Competent Authority, he was awarded his Fifth Aerial
Victory Credit, for destroying a MiG-15, on 21 September 1952, while
serving as a pilot on an F-86E during the Korean War.






            Director
            Air Force Review Boards Agency