RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
AIR FORCE BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS
IN THE MATTER OF: DOCKET NUMBER: BC-2004-01936
INDEX CODE: 115.02
COUNSEL:
HEARING DESIRED: NO
_________________________________________________________________
APPLICANT REQUESTS THAT:
He be returned to aviation service as a pilot and/or navigator and
that his nonjudicial punishment action be removed from his record, or,
at the very least, he receive a rehearing.
_________________________________________________________________
APPLICANT CONTENDS THAT:
With regard to nonjudicial punishment (NJP) he received and the Flying
Evaluation Board (FEB) he underwent:
1. The justification for the FEB was flawed. He was erroneously
and unjustly disqualified from aviation service by an FEB that was
both procedurally and substantively defective. The memorandum used to
notify an applicant of an impending FEB is supposed to present the
exact reasons why the applicant is meeting the FEB. He contends the
reasons for the FEB were unclear to the point they hindered him from
building a sufficient defense, made it difficult for him to ensure his
right of due process, allowed irrelevant evidence to be presented to
the Board and negatively influenced the factual findings of the Board.
Additionally, the legally insufficient memorandum of notification
allowed the Board to consider removing him from navigator service as
well as pilot service. As a result, the FEB improperly recommended
his disqualification from aviation service as a navigator. The fact
the Board was to consider his continued navigator service was not part
of the memorandum. Another effect of the memorandum of notification
was that while trying to build a defense against unspecific
allegations, the memorandum was unclear on the specific violations of
aviation instructions he allegedly committed. Again, due to the
ambiguousness of the memorandum, evidence from previous incidents were
allowed but were unspecified in the memorandum thereby disallowing him
the opportunity to address the exact allegations. He contends the
memorandum of notification was legally insufficient as it put him at a
prejudicial disadvantage when building a defense. A further result of
the memorandum was to confuse Board members as it allowed uncontrolled
development of improper and extraneous evidence leading to the Board’s
inconsistent and contrary findings.
2. He was deprived of his fundamental right to counsel. He
contends he asked for an Area Defense Counsel (ADC) due to the
seriousness of the FEB and his assigned military counsel’s lack of
familiarity with the proceedings. In deed, his assigned counsel
ultimately had to be ordered to represent him. His request for an ADC
was turned down by a group of senior management consisting of the FEB
Senior Board Member (SBM), the FEB Legal Advisor (LA) and the NY State
Staff Judge Advocate – some of which were in his counsel’s rating
chain.
While the memorandum of notification was clear that he was entitled to
military counsel, Air Force Instruction (AFI) 11-402 states he may
request military counsel of his own choosing realizing the military
counselor’s commander determines availability. Instead, he was
assigned military counsel who was not an ADC, nor was he a military
defense counsel. He was actually the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate
(DSJA) for the 109th Airlift Wing and as such, presented an inherent
conflict of interest in representing his best interests before the
FEB. At a minimum, he should have been assigned counsel from another
unit within the NYANG, experienced, but perhaps one who did not have
to temper his overzealous representation in order to not damage his
standing in the unit.
3. Improper evidence was considered by the FEB. The minutes
from his previous Review and Certification Board (R&CB) were provided
to the FEB and he feels there was no reason the minutes should have
been included as evidence. In fact, by including the R&CB minutes,
the FEB Recorder was in effect sending the FEB a signal indicating
their responsibility was only to rubber stamp the R&CB findings. He
was not present at the R&CB hearing and therefore feels the FEB
consulted evidence of a completely irrelevant nature and built
opinions tainted by the R&CB findings and not evidence surrounding his
case. The R&CB minutes are irrelevant opinions of those members and
should not have been considered by the FEB.
4. His rights were violated by the introduction to the FEB of
the NJP administered to him. He contends, as with the introduction of
the R&CB findings, that the FEB received an implicit message from the
strong language of the reprimand that prejudiced his case. The
inclusion of the NJB to the FEB should not have been entered into
evidence as it undoubtedly implied to the FEB that he was someone
deserving of harsh treatment and perhaps as a bad person. He contends
the NJP itself violated his rights as the administration of the
punishment was contrary to the requirements of New York State Military
Law which maintains no person subject to said code may compel any
person to answer any question which may tend to be incriminating.
Accordingly, no questioning of an accused may take place unless he is
appropriately advised of his rights. On 3 March 2003, he underwent an
interview described to him as “fact finding in nature” and that any
information gathered would be used by the squadron commander to piece
together the events of the evening in question, determine a course of
action, and that the information gathered could not be used for
judicial punishment. He was not read his rights prior to being
questioned about the events that formed the basis for his NJP. He
contends the NJP should be removed from his record and the FEB should
be overturned because it relied so heavily on the record of the
illegal NJP. He deems it highly improper that all the statements
gathered in anticipation of the NJP proceedings were lumped into one
exhibit for use by the FEB.
5. The FEB members were exposed to unlawful command influence.
He contends the R&CB minutes and the highly charged statement of the
Chief of Staff (COS) were tantamount to impermissible unlawful command
influence on the FEB. To further exacerbate unlawful command
influence, the FEB convening authority paid a visit to the FEB and
imparted his point of view to the members on how they should conduct
themselves while carrying out their Board duties. While there is no
verbatim transcript of what the convening authority said, or how he
said it, he is left to speculate whether or not the FEB was improperly
influenced by the comments of the convening authority. He asks the
AFBCMR to not condone the appearance of impropriety in this regard as
the stakes are so high regarding his career.
6. The FEB was unfair in that a critical witness on the
notification memorandum was not called to testify. Applicant contends
had he known the Board would not call the witness he would have taken
action to secure his testimony himself. He contends the Board’s
failure to call this witness is in clear violation of AFI 11-402 that
maintains the Board should consider all available evidence. He notes
the witness did provide a cryptic statement of the critical facts from
his point of view but the Board paid little attention to it. He urges
the AFBCMR to consider the statement of the witness who acknowledges
he returned to the base several hours before the planned show time and
also stated that aside from the argument with an enlisted crewmember,
he acted and appeared normal. He notes this witness was the aircraft
commander on the scene at the time and an instructor/evaluator pilot
trained to specifically assess the training and performance of other
pilots. He is also a medical professional adept at evaluating the
physiological aspects of another pilot’s ability to fly. The witness
described him as doing all the usual functions at base operations
without difficulty or prompting. The witness also stated all his
briefings were normal, timely, and that he “showed no difficulties”.
Perhaps more importantly, the witness stated if he felt anyone was
impaired the aircraft would not have left Florida. He states this
witness’s testimony as the most important evidence in his case. The
fact he was listed on the notification memorandum as a witness but was
not called by the Board Recorder undermined the legitimacy of the
FEB’s findings in that the Board did not have the opportunity to
consider the most meaningful evidence available. It is notable that
the Board recorder didn’t even point out the availability of the
witness’s statement. The Recorder also tried to keep out of the
record his favorable Officer Performance Reports (OPR’s).
7. The FEB had great difficulty in arriving at their final
decision due to the deficient notification memorandum. The memorandum
left the FEB to fend for themselves in terms of what they were to
determine just as he was forced to defend against vague and unclear
allegations. The Board’s conclusion he demonstrated a lack of
judgment in performing rated duties regarding the Greenland mission in
1999 must be wholly disregarded because the notification memorandum
only alleged violations that occurred on 25 January 2003 and no other
dates. He notes the Board procedurally failed to add further alleged
violations and as such, the Board should not have considered them. He
contends he was only a passenger on the Greenland mission and the
evidence presented did not establish he had any crew duty. Another
allegation the FEB considered in error was the finding he
intentionally operated a C-130 aircraft on 26 January 2003 by
consuming several alcoholic beverages within 12 hours of scheduled
takeoff. The FEB considered this allegation under the purview of
certain paragraphs of AFI 11-202 and AFI 11-2C-130. The Board used a
paragraph of AFI 11-202 that was not included on the notification
memorandum in order to help justify their findings. He notes the FEB
again procedurally failed to add the paragraph used in their findings
to the notification memorandum and as such, the FEB should not have
considered the allegation. The FEB’s findings that he violated a duty
to remove himself from flight crew duties is flawed in that there was
no development or discussion of any such duty during the course of the
FEB. There was however, evidence in the aircraft commander’s
statement he was not impaired. Even so, the FEB’s finding he
intentionally violated that duty by intentionally flying a C-130 falls
under AFI 11-402, paragraph 4.3.6 covering intentional violations of
aviation instructions or procedures and not under the FEB’s reference
of paragraph 4.3.4, addressing lack of judgment. Notwithstanding the
FEB’s use of the same fact pattern to find violations of separate
basis’ for the FEB, there is no proof whatsoever he desired or
intended to actually violate aviation instructions or procedures. He
submits he may have intentionally drunk alcohol but his intent was not
focused on a violation of aviation instructions or procedures.
8. The FEB was legally insufficient and generally unfair. The
FEB was forced to operate without the roadmap a properly conceived
notification memorandum would have given them. The Recorder left it
to the FEB to figure out “the exact reasons” for the FEB and the FEB
was just as confused as he was about the proceedings.
In support of his appeal, the applicant has provided a personal
statement, a copy of the FEB transcript and 27 additional attachments.
Applicant’s complete submission, with attachments, is at Exhibit A.
_________________________________________________________________
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Applicant began his military career in the West Virginia Air National
Guard (WVANG) as an enlisted airman from 9 March 1990 to 28 September
1994 where he attained the grade of staff sergeant. He applied for
navigator school, was accepted and, was appointed in the WVANG as a
second lieutenant effective 29 September 1994. He attended navigator
training from 1 October 1994 to 30 May 1996. He successfully
completed the training and returned to WVANG where he was eventually
promoted to the grade of first lieutenant effective 4 February 1997.
On 26 August 1997, he joined the New York ANG (NYANG). During 1998,
while on a mission to Pago Pago, he was involved in an incident with
an enlisted crewmate wherein a physical altercation took place.
Alcohol was determined to be a factor and he was verbally counseled on
his behavior. In 1999, while on a mission to Greenland, he was tasked
to perform Supervisor of Flying (SOF) duties. He received a letter of
counseling (LOC) from his commander while on that mission as the
commander felt he did not seem fit for duty. He attended a party the
night before his SOF duty and violated crew rest requirements. His
commander also noted smelling alcohol on his breath. The LOC was
primarily issued as a wakeup call to the applicant as he was leaving
for pilot training shortly and his commander wanted him to realize the
importance of pilot training and the ramifications of any bad behavior
while in training.
On 5 October 2000, he was promoted to the Reserve grade of captain.
He completed pilot training and was awarded a pilot rating on 13 July
2001. He then began service with the NYANG as a C-130 co-pilot.
On 26 January 2003, while on a mission to Eglin AFB, Florida, he
willfully violated flying regulations in that he consumed alcohol
inside the 12-hour allowable window and violated crew rest
requirements. On 13 March 2003, a Review and Certification (R&C)
Board met to review his failure to maintain the professional standards
of a rated Air Force officer. The Board voted unanimously that he
meet an FEB. On 6 June 2003, he received NJP that consisted of a fine
of $200 and a reprimand. He did not appeal the NJP. On 26 through 28
August 2003, he underwent an FEB wherein the following findings and
recommendations were made:
With respect to the specifications brought under Air Force Instruction
(AFI) 11-402:
1. The Board found the applicant did not lack rated proficiency
but did lack judgment in performing rated duties in that:
a. In 1999, he reported for a Greenland deployment unfit
for duty with insufficient crew rest and smelling of alcohol.
b. In January 2003, he intentionally operated a C-130
aircraft in violation of several flying regulations by consuming
several alcoholic beverages within 12 hours of scheduled takeoff.
c. He did not inform the aircraft commander of his
physiological condition that impaired his ability to safely conduct
aircrew related duties and he made no attempt to remove himself from
the flight.
2. He committed an intentional violation of aviation
instructions or procedures in that:
a. He consumed several alcoholic beverages near Eglin AFB,
FL, within 12 hours of scheduled takeoff on the night of 25 January
and early morning of 26 January 2003.
3. He does not exhibit traits of character and personality
characteristics that make it undesirable to continue using him in
flying duties.
The Board recommended that he be disqualified in the rated specialty
of pilot; that he be disqualified in the rated specialty of navigator;
and that he not be prohibited from wearing the aviation badge. The
Board felt he could still be a valuable ANG and Air Force asset as
long as he was not in a rated specialty.
_________________________________________________________________
AIR FORCE EVALUATION:
ANG/DPFOC recommends denial. DPFOC addresses his contentions in the
following order:
1. Regarding the Notice of Reasons, the FEB follows a semiformal
non-adversarial procedure wherein it discusses all the information
relevant to an officer’s rated and professional qualifications to
include his flight history. He is entitled to a written notification
of the time, place, and reason(s) for the FEB. DPFOC contends while
the applicant alleges the specific process as being unfair and
confusing to both him and the FEB, the FEB Recorder, during the
proceedings, explained the reasons for the FEB and specifically asked
for any questions. Neither the applicant nor his counsel raised any
questions then or at other subsequent opportunities.
a. In addressing his widespread allegations about the
reasons in the FEB notification, DPFOC states the notification
memorandum was specific and exact in stating the reasons for the FEB.
Besides he or his counsel not asking pertinent questions about the
reasons for the Board before or during the FEB, DPFOC logically
concludes both of them knew and understood the reasons for the FEB and
they were both prepared to participate in the proceedings. DPFOC
contends the Board member’s are required to consider relevant evidence
and that the transcript contained no record they improperly considered
any extraneous material. What the applicant cites as Board members’
confusion appears to be normal efforts of a Board to write proper
findings and present recommendations.
b. Regarding his contention the memorandum of reasons for
the FEB focused on his pilot qualifications and not his navigator
qualifications, DPFOC cites an NGB/JA advisory opinion wherein NGB/JA
states the applicant is correct that the reasons for the FEB in the
notification and at the Board, focus on his pilot qualifications and
do not mention his navigator status. However, NGB/JA contends this
appears to be a minor administrative oversight, probably caused
because FEBs normally only deal with members holding one rated
qualification or caused by people focused on the January 2003
incidents. But the rules he violated apply to “crewmembers” and “crew
duties” and “aircrew members”. What the FEB found improper for him as
a pilot would also be considered improper for a navigator.
Additionally, NGB/JA notes FEB’s recommendations focus on an officer’s
potential for rated or aviation service and in situations with dual-
rated officers, the FEB is required to consider both ratings and make
recommendations on both ratings. Therefore, he fails to show evidence
of error or injustice regarding the FEB’s consideration of his
navigator rating and in fact highlights the FEB’s proper
accomplishment of its duties.
2. Regarding his right to counsel, DPFOC contends there is no
right to specific type of counsel such as ADC and typically a by name
request for counsel is considered and decided by the Staff Judge
Advocate (SJA) as to the availability of the counsel. He has not
shown any instances where his counsel was deficient nor has he cited
any examples of why he should not have been represented by the Deputy
Staff Judge Advocate.
a. DPFOC explains several years ago, the Air Force began
the ADC program at active duty bases in an attempt to provide counsel
some independence from local JAGs and base commanders. However, the
ADC program has not been adopted by the NYANG nor several other
services and components. The lack of an ADC does not mean military
counsel is automatically biased or has a conflict of interest. He did
not ask for a specific military counsel, but for a specific type of
counsel (ADC) not available in the NYANG. He could have requested
specific military counsel by name or civilian counsel at his expense.
He did neither and DPFOC notes he never asked for his military counsel
to be replaced nor did he object to his representation. His counsel
made an effective defense by cross examining witnesses, providing
documentary and testimonial evidence and made a good closing argument.
An unfavorable outcome for the applicant is not evidence his counsel
was deficient.
3. Regarding his allegation that the FEB considered improper
evidence, DPFOC states the NJP and R&CB evidence were proper and
relevant to show the procedural standing of the case. According to
AFI 11-402, the FEB should review in a fair and impartial manner all
information relevant to an officer’s case including previous
statements, records, documents and reports of Faculty Boards. DPFOC
notes neither the applicant nor counsel objected to this evidence at
its presentation. Further, there is no evidence the FEB failed to
fully and fairly consider all of the facts to reach their decision.
4. Regarding his contention his NJP violated his rights because
he was not properly advised of his rights prior to giving a statement,
DPFOC notes while he wrote two letters of concern regarding the NJP he
never appealed the NJP. However, because the NJP was an
administrative action taken under NY Military Law and not the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), he had no right to refuse the
punishment or demand trial by court martial. The fact he was not
advised of his rights under Article 31 of the NY Military Law, only
means the statement could not be used in an effort against him in a
court martial. However, his statement could and was used for
administrative purposes such as an FEB. Regardless, DPFOC contends
even without the statement, there were numerous other witness
statements about his drinking and lack of crew rest to justify NJP and
an FEB. He has not shown any injustice or material error relating to
the administration of the NJP and the failure to receive his rights
under New York Military Law.
5. Regarding his allegation the R&CB, NJP, and a visit by the
convening authority to the FEB were impermissible unlawful command
influence on his FEB, DPFOC contends there is no evidence of unlawful
command influence and presents the following two key reasons for its
statement:
a. The applicant was involved in alcohol-related
misconduct three times over a five-year period. Other than a visit to
a doctor prior to the FEB, he presented no evidence of any attempt to
rehabilitate himself. His misconduct violated some of the most
important and basic rules of aviation and in so doing risked his and
the lives of many others. DPFOC is of the opinion that command
influence would not be a factor in any FEB deciding this case as the
amount of evidence and the repeated misconduct would probably cause
any aviation board to remove him from flying.
b. An FEB makes findings and recommendations but is not
considered the final authority on the recommendations. An entire
command chain reviews the findings and recommendations and has the
opportunity to concur or nonconcur. Additionally, the case receives
comments and recommendations from the convening authority and receives
a legal review. Finally, the Director of the Air National Guard has
the final decision authority. In this case, on 7 April 2004, the
Director of the Air National Guard concurred with the FEB’s findings
and on 30 April 2004, the Air Force published an order permanently
disqualifying the applicant from aviation service but allowed him to
continue wearing the pilot badge. DPFOC logically concludes there is
no reason for anyone in the chain of command to do anything to
pressure an FEB for a decision either way as the entire chain of
command has the opportunity to concur or not concur. The applicant
has not established material error or injustice related to unlawful
command influence.
6. Regarding his contention of a missing witness and the
importance of his testimony, DPFOC states he had the opportunity to
present favorable evidence about his flying capabilities and potential
for future rated service. He did so with testimonial and documentary
evidence. His decision not to call the witness in question appears to
be a strategic decision in a legal hearing. Perhaps the witness was
unavailable, or the email testimony from the witness contained all the
favorable evidence he needed without allowing the FEB the opportunity
for potentially damaging cross-examination. Regardless, he presented
the emailed testimony of the witness to the FEB and DPFOC notes he was
at least partly responsible for calling or not calling his witness.
The applicant’s assumption that this witness could cause the FEB to
make different findings given his own admission of repeated alcohol-
related and crew rest misconduct would be wildly optimistic. DPFOC
indicates he has not met his burden of showing there was any material
error or injustice in the lack of this witness’ live testimony.
7. Regarding his contention the FEBs findings were contrary to
the notification of reasons, and the FEB should not have considered
his previous incidents, DPFOC states the applicant appears to be
constructing a complex legal argument that he is innocent because of a
perceived technicality.
a. While he is correct the notification of reasons and
FEB findings cite different paragraphs, DPFOC states this error is
nothing more that a typographical error in the notification letter.
The letter referenced AFI 11-202V3, paragraph 9.9.3.4 which does not
exist. It appears the letter of notification meant to reference
paragraph 9.8.3.4 which prohibits aircrew members from flying within
12 hours of consuming alcohol or while impaired by its effects.
However, the same letter of notification does cite paragraph 3.3.2
which prohibits crew members from performing crew duties after
consuming alcohol within 12 hours of take-off or when under the
influence of alcohol. Thus he was not adversely affected by the
typographical error as he was put on notice the FEB would be
considering the 12-hour rule under paragraph 3.3.2.
b. His argument the FEB should not have considered the
1999 incident on the Greenland mission is without merit as both the
January 2003 and the 1999 incident were certainly similar and relevant
to one another. The FEB was charged with looking at all relevant
evidence. While he states he was not on duty that day, he was
scheduled for duty the next day. Regardless, this appears to be a
factual matter that should have been addressed at the FEB hearing.
c. He argues that the FEB findings and recommendations
are strained and difficult to understand. Contrary to the applicant’s
argument, DPFOC states based on the evidence provided to the FEB, the
findings and recommendations are both logical and supported by the
facts. DPFOC states he has not met his burden of showing there is any
material error or injustice that requires correction.
8. Regarding his contention of overall unfairness and order for
rehearing, DPFOC states he has not shown the FEB was unfair. Rather,
he does not understand the most important question in this entire
process: whether or not he is safe or fit to fly. Based on the
evidence provided, the R&CB, and the FEB, the Director of the Air
National Guard found that he is not. The FEB hearing process is a way
to build the record with the facts of the case. It is the applicant’s
chance to present any evidence he feels relevant. After careful
consideration of the more than 400 pages of documentation and a legal
review provided by NGB/JA, no material errors or injustices were found
in his case.
DPFOC’s complete evaluation, with attachments, is at Exhibit C.
_________________________________________________________________
APPLICANT'S REVIEW OF AIR FORCE EVALUATION:
Applicant’s counsel states DPFOC’s advisory is highly irregular and
improper in that it begins the advisory opinion with misstatements of
fact, gratuitous and self-serving conclusions, and matters not of
record in this case. Counsel argues the DPFOC advisory’s mentioning
of three separate incidences of misconduct, one in 1998, one in 1999,
and the incident that caused the FEB in 2003. Counsel questions why
DPFOC would write their advisory and base so much of their opinion on
three instances of misconduct when the FEB obviously recognized only
two incidences: 1999 and 2003. He asks the Board to disregard DPFOC’s
mention of the 1998 incident as not relevant, material, meaningful, or
helpful in determining the issues the applicant has raised in his
application. Counsel asks the Board to recognize that DPFOC
acknowledges the alleged 1999 incident as being impossible and
impracticable to fix now, yet offers the incident to the Board as
though there were no discrepancies, seeking to influence the Boards
decision with unreliable and admittedly disputed information. The
discrepancy of the 1999 incident being that no evidence was developed
or offered to the FEB that the applicant was able to perform his duty
on that deployment due to alcohol consumption. In fact, he was only a
passenger on the plane at the time and his deployment duties did not
begin until the next day. DPFOC seeks to place the burden on the
applicant to correct the Recorder’s misleading evidence and now asks
the Board to ignore the full truth of the alleged incident.
The DPFOC characterization of the applicant’s landing on completion of
the mission as problematic is in direct contradiction to the aircraft
commander’s description of the landing wherein he stated weather
conditions as the factor that would make the landing difficult for any
pilot. Additionally, the aircraft commander saw no influence of
alcohol on the applicant’s flight performance that day. Counsel asks
the Board to discount DPFOC’s background information as unreliable and
an affront to the Board’s purpose.
Counsel reiterates the notification memorandum’s overbroad statements
that compromised the applicant’s attempt to either have to guess which
of the many alleged bases he needed to defend against or unnecessarily
spend time and energy preparing to respond to all the various bases.
It is incomprehensible to counsel that DPFOC considers that there was
no extraneous material considered by the FEB when applicant’s
strongest complaint is that the record is replete with extraneous,
immaterial, irrelevant, and highly prejudicial material.
While DPFOC admits to the applicant not being aware the FEB would
consider removing his qualification as a navigator, they seek to
minimize this glaring error by calling it a minor administrative
oversight and then providing speculation as to why the error occurred
in the first place. The conclusion presented is that if he was not
qualified to be a pilot then he would not be qualified to be a
navigator. Counsel contends this self-serving and speculative
conclusion is not support by facts or any other basis.
Counsel reiterates applicant’s complaint that he did not receive the
type of counsel he requested. The fact that the NYANG and other
components have not evolved to the point they can provide independent
defense services is not the fault of the applicant. No apparent
effort was made to secure him a genuinely conflict-free and
experienced defense counsel. He was assigned military counsel, but
one that obviously carried at least the appearance of a conflict of
interest. Counsel states the assigned counsel initially asked to be
removed from the case but was denied based on having mostly Navy JAG
experience and never having heard of the Air Force’s FEB process.
Additionally, the assigned military counsel had been privy to a lot of
the build-up of this case through the NJP process. At the very least,
an attempt should have been made to provide military counsel from
another NYANG base.
DPFOC repeatedly argues that because the applicant or counsel raised
no objections to many of the proceedings that the proceedings were
legally sound. Applicant was not in a position to make objections as
he was a layperson and sat next to a counsel. Counsel notes the
assigned military counsel made many comments to the applicant that he
didn’t want to upset the Board by “lawyering it up” too much thereby
leaving the applicant with the feeling he was not being independently
and zealously represented.
Counsel states the admission of R&CB minutes and the tainted NJP
documents to the FEB belie DPFOC’s contention the material was
relevant material, showing how the case came to an FEB and showing the
procedural standing of the case. That DPFOC suggests the FEB made an
independent decision thereafter defies reality.
Counsel notes that DPFOC admits the applicant’s rights were violated,
as he did not receive a rights warning prior to the NJP but suggests
that the evidence against the applicant was such it would not have
mattered if he had received a warning. The applicant had a statutory
right to receive a rights warning before making any statement. He did
not receive one.
Counsel states it was improper for the Wing Commander to make
unrecorded comments to the FEB and claims there is no support for the
DPFOC statement that the chain of command would have no reason to
influence the Board as they had concur or nonconcur opportunities of
the FEB findings and recommendations.
Counsel states the DPFOC’s blame of the applicant for not calling a
special witness on the reason memorandum as he had partial
responsibility to do as being disingenuous and mean-spirited. The
Recorder listed the special witness as a government witness thus
leaving a clear impression he was to be called.
Finally, counsel contends the applicant was abused by the process and
procedure of this FEB. Counsel notes AFI 11-402 wherein it is stated
a rehearing is appropriate if any (emphasis counsel) review for legal
sufficiency of this FEB determines there was prejudicial error to the
substantial rights of the applicant that the Board, at the very least
order a rehearing.
Counsel’s complete response is at exhibit E.
_________________________________________________________________
THE BOARD CONCLUDES THAT:
1. The applicant has exhausted all remedies provided by existing law
or regulations.
2. The application was timely filed.
3. Insufficient relevant evidence has been presented to demonstrate
the existence of error or injustice. We took notice of the
applicant's complete submission in judging the merits of the case;
however, we are not persuaded that the applicant has been the victim
of either an error or an injustice. His numerous allegations are
noted, however, we believe that the detailed comments provided by the
Air National Guard adequately addressed his allegations. After a
detailed review of the evidence of record, we agree with the opinions
and recommendation of the Air National Guard office of primary
responsibility and adopt its rationale as the basis for our conclusion
that the applicant has not been the victim of an error or injustice.
Therefore, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we find no
compelling basis to recommend granting the relief sought in this
application.
THE BOARD DETERMINES THAT:
The applicant be notified that the evidence presented did not
demonstrate the existence of material error or injustice; that the
application was denied without a personal appearance; and that the
application will only be reconsidered upon the submission of newly
discovered relevant evidence not considered with this application.
_________________________________________________________________
The following members of the Board considered AFBCMR Docket Number BC-
2004-01936 in Executive Session on 27 September 2005, under the
provisions of AFI 36-2603:
Mr. Michael J. Novel, Panel Chair
Mr. Gregory A. Parker, Member
Mr. Patrick C. Daugherty, Member
The following documentary evidence was considered:
Exhibit A. DD Form 149, dated 1 Jun 04, w/atchs.
Exhibit B. Applicant's Master Personnel Records.
Exhibit C. Letter, ANG/DPFOC, dated 16 May 05, w/atchs.
Exhibit D. Letter, SAF/MRBR, dated 29 Jul 05.
Exhibit E. Letter, Counsel, dated 24 Aug 05.
MICHAEL J. NOVEL
Panel Chair
AF | BCMR | CY2014 | BC 2014 01808
Because the findings and recommendations of his FEB supported his return to aviation service, he believes the decision to permanently disqualify him from aviation service by the final approval authority, , was either improperly influenced by immunized information in the safety investigation or simply arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. After completing action under paragraph 3.7.1.6, convene an FEB if the member's potential for continued aviation service is still in question. On 18...
AF | BCMR | CY2006 | BC-2006-00576
_________________________________________________________________ APPLICANT CONTENDS THAT: Air Force Instruction (AFI) 11-402, Aviation Service, Aeronautical Ratings, and Badges, specifies two criteria for the award of Navigator Wings, (1) that he be a graduate of an Advanced Navigator Training School, and (2) that he have at least 400 primary navigator hours. A3OT’s complete evaluation is at Exhibit C. _________________________________________________________________ APPLICANT'S REVIEW OF...
AF | BCMR | CY2014 | BC 2014 00305
His records be corrected to reflect he was awarded the wings and rating as a fixed wing pilot. Apparently, and unknown to the applicant, the Air National Guard (ANG) decided not to follow the Air Force Predator entry requirements as outlined in AFI 11-402, Aviation and Parachutist Service Aeronautical Ratings and Aviation Badges, instead they decided he could not enter Predator training without first completing a fixed wing aviation training program; FWQ. Also significant is the unanimous...
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In support of his requests, the applicant provides a 21-page memorandum, copies of the FEB findings and recommendations, Administrative Discharge Board findings, AF Form 3070C, Record of NJP Proceedings (Officer); LOE, OPR, AF Form 8 and various other documents associated with his requests. However, if the incident demonstrates unacceptable performance or an intentional disregard of regulations or procedures, a recommendation to disqualify is appropriate. Further, paragraph 4.6.4.,...
ARMY | BCMR | CY2004 | 2004103203C070208
Counsel provides the following documents in support of this application: Summary of Proceedings of the FEB, Report of Proceedings of the FEB, Brigade Commander’s disapproval of FEB, Applicant’s Military Counsel Rebuttal to FEB Disapproval, Military Counsel Request for Approval of FEB to the Reviewing Authority, Division Commander’s Approval of FEB Disapproval, FEB Exhibits, Commander Statement on Punishment for the Incident, FEB Appointment of Challenged Member and Naming of...
AF | BCMR | CY2006 | BC-2005-01622
_________________________________________________________________ APPLICANT CONTENDS THAT: His request for separation was disapproved even though the Air Force Board for Corrections of Military Records (AFBCMR) rescinded his Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT)-incurred Active Duty Service Commitment (ADSC) of 18 October 2011 and the Record of Proceedings (AFBCMR Document Number BC-2004- 02126) stated that ACC/DOT would not hold him to his 10 June 2007 ADSC. ...
AF | BCMR | CY2014 | BC 2014 02210
The PRB will be convened to review the trainees records and recommend continuing training, retraining, modify training or an FEB. AIR FORCE EVALUATION: USAF/A3O-AIF recommends denial of the applicants requests and states that the FEBs final approval authority determined the applicant should be permanently disqualified from aviation service. The complete A3TK evaluation is at Exhibit G. APPLICANT'S REVIEW OF ADDITIONAL AIR FORCE EVALUATION: The AMC/A3TK advisory states that there was a...
AF | BCMR | CY2005 | BC-2004-02844
He was never informed of and there is no evidence the commander ever rescinded the initial letter of notification of processing for drug abuse with an UOTHC discharge. On 18 August 2002, military counsel responded to his commander’s notification of NJP with a memorandum denying drug use. AFI 36-3209 states “An administrative discharge board must be offered to the respondent if the recommended characterization of service in the letter of notification (LON) is UOTHC.
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