RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
         AIR FORCE BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS

IN THE MATTER OF:      DOCKET NUMBER:  99-02816
            INDEX NUMBER:  115.00; 131.00

      XXXXXXXXXXXX     COUNSEL:  George E. Day

      XXX-XX-XXXX      HEARING DESIRED:  Yes

___________________________________________________________________

APPLICANT REQUESTS THAT:

His Air Force Wings be reinstated.  It appears that  the  applicant
wants to have his permanent flying  disqualification  by  a  Flight
Evaluation Board (FEB) overturned.

His flight pay since February 1998 be reinstated.

He be reconsidered for promotion to Major.
___________________________________________________________________

APPLICANT CONTENDS THAT:

Since he was involved in a C-130 plane crash  as  the  co-pilot  on
1 April 1997, he  has  been  recovering  from  a  broken  back  and
military doctors have identified him as not fit for military  duty.
During the period that he was restricted from  performing  military
duties, he came up for promotion twice.  He was  not  selected  for
promotion.  The applicant states that he was advised  in  a  letter
that  “performance,  participation,   and   professional   military
education are the keys to promotion.  To improve your potential for
increased responsibilities, I encourage you to seek  a  Reserve  or
Air National Guard assignment which would allow your  participation
on a regular basis.”  The applicant states that  this  was  not  an
option for him because of his medical status.

Up to the time of the accident, he had a  stellar  career  with  no
flaws inside or out of the cockpit.  Besides being a  distinguished
graduate of Air Force Undergraduate Pilot Training, he  is  also  a
graduate of the Army Rotary-Wing Course.  During his career in  the
Army and Air Force, he never failed a check ride or had a bad OPR.

There is a major cover-up  regarding  this  incident.   A  terrible
injustice has occurred to many service men and  women  involved  in
the crash, and for that matter, to their families.   The  applicant
states that he and  his  counsel  have  tried  to  deal  with  this
incident at the lowest possible level.  The command has refused  to
listen and has decided to cover-up the persons directly responsible
and to use him as the sacrificial lamb.

The applicant provides what he calls a list of  facts  included  in
his application taken from the accident  investigation  report  and
the Flying Evaluation Board:

      1.  Training Folders do not support supervisor involvement in
the training of the aircraft commander of this flight.

      2.  The pilot was improperly listed  as  experienced  on  the
Squadron Pilot Letter of Certification.

      3.  Sworn Affidavits  that  outline  the  pilot’s  disturbing
flight history.

       4.   Sworn  Affidavits  that  identify  the  commanders  and
individuals who knew of the pilot’s disturbing flying background.

       5.   A  statement  from  a  Lockheed  Martin  engineer  that
identified that the aircraft could have stopped in  2,968  feet  if
the pilot had applied fully reverse and maximum braking immediately
upon landing.

The applicant states that the  aircraft  commander  had  only  55.8
hours of aircraft commander experience when he was  required  under
the Air  Mobility  Command  Airfield  Suitability  and  Restriction
Report to have at least 300 hours for the mission  they  flew  (See
Tab ASSR).

Because of a lack  of  response  by  the  aircraft  commander  upon
touchdown, he identified that the aircraft commander had lost total
situational awareness.  He then took the aircraft from the aircraft
commander, placed the throttle  in  reverse,  and  applied  maximum
braking.  If he had not taken the controls, the  plane  would  have
departed the runway at a much higher airspeed and no one would have
survived.

The  applicant  has  provided  a  copy  of  the  aircraft  accident
investigation report (See Tab Report at Exhibit A), a copy  of  the
summary of the FEB and his explanation of the findings(See Tab  FEB
at Exhibit A.)

Applicant’s complete submission is at Exhibit A.
__________________________________________________________________

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

The applicant’s personnel records reflect his career start date  as
21 Jan 83 and his Total Federal Commission Service Date (TFCSD)  as
12 May 1985.  He was appointed a first lieutenant in the Air  Force
Reserve on 25 July 1991 after an  interservive  transfer  from  the
Army  Reserves.   He  completed  undergraduate  pilot  training  on
14 August 1992 as a Distinguished Graduate.

He was considered and not selected for promotion to  major  by  the
Fiscal Years 1999 and 2000 Reserve of the Air Force Major Selection
Boards.  Due to his two-time nonselection  for  promotion,  he  was
separated from the Reserves on 8 February 2000.

The applicant was the co-pilot on a C-130H mission involved  in  an
accident at Toncontin International Airport (IAP) on 1 April  1997.
According to a copy of the aircraft accident  investigation  report
provided by the  applicant,  the  mishap  aircraft  (MA)  made  two
attempts at landing and on the second attempt departed the prepared
surface of the runway, struck a culvert, crashed through a fence on
the airfield boundary, and fell down an embankment before impacting
a highway interchange, approximately 225 feet  from  the  departure
end of the runway.  The crew consisted of  six  flight  crewmembers
and four  maintenance  personnel.   Three  personnel  were  fatally
injured.

In the statement of opinion issued by  the  accident  investigation
board president, there were multiple causes for the accident.   The
aircrew committed the majority of the errors.  …Contributing to the
mishap was the lack  of  an  experienced  aircraft  commander  with
questionable   qualifications    for    assault–type    operations.
Supervisory personnel at the deployed location failed to ensure the
aircrew had viewed the training video for  the  airfield.   Mission
planning procedures contributed to the aircrew being  placed  in  a
situation to maneuver a high gross weight aircraft into an airfield
with  known  terrain  and  obstacle   hazards   requiring   precise
airmanship to effect a safe landing.

The Numbered Air Force  (NAF)  commander  convened  a  FEB  from  6
through 8 February 1998 for the purpose of considering the evidence
concerning the applicant’s professional qualifications as  a  pilot
and to make recommendations concerning his  future  performance  of
flying  duties.   The  FEB  considered  the  following  allegations
against the applicant with the indicated findings:

      1.  That he did exhibit a lack of proficiency by his lack  of
knowledge of the following flying directives:

          a.  Air Force Manual  11-217,  Volume  1,  paragraph  8.6
This was not confirmed due to lack of sufficient evidence.

          b.  24th Wing Flight Crew Bulletin, dated 1 October 1996.
 Confirmed.  Testimony from the  Intelligence  NCO  confirmed  that
mission planning was not done in accordance  with  this  directive.
The applicant failed  to  review  the  airfield  familiarity  tapes
according to his own testimony.  Also, according to his  testimony,
he was unfamiliar with the type or amount of cargo to  be  unloaded
at the accident airport location.

          c.  The 440th Air Wing Flight Crew Information File 96-20
and  97-06.   Confirmed.   The  applicant  failed  to   adhere   to
instructions  outlined  in  Wing  regulations  that  directed   all
aircrews to use airfield suitability reports (ASRs) for  pre-flight
planning.  The applicant’s testimony indicates a lack of  knowledge
of the ASR for the accident location.
2.  That he did exhibit a lack  of  proficiency  by  his  negligent
violation of the following procedures:

           a.  AFI  11-206,  paragraph  5.9.6.    Confirmed.    The
applicant failed to make the proper gear down calls  to  the  tower
after the landing gear was  extended  and  prior  to  crossing  the
runway threshold.

          b.  Multi Command Regulation 55-130, volume 1, paragraphs
5.20.3 and 6.51.2.  Confirmed.   Applicant  failed  to  review  and
compare  the  computed  total  landing  distance,   actual   runway
distance.

          c.  Tech Order 1B-130H-1.  Violations  under  Chapters  2
and 5 were confirmed.  Under  Chapter  2,  “Checklist  Usage,”  the
applicant failed to  complete  the  descent  checklist,  failed  to
complete the before landing checks with the  response  of  the  co-
pilot in accordance with dash 1 directives, failed to inquire as to
which checklist to administer during the Visual Flight Rule pattern
on touch and go landing checks and on the normal landing check, the
applicant finding that 50 percent flap landing was selected, failed
to notify the Aircraft Commander (AC)  of  the  normal  parameters.
Finally, the applicant failed to advise the AC of downwind  and  to
run  the  full  landing  checklist.   Under  Chapter  5,   airspeed
limitations, the applicant  did  not  advise  the  AC  of  numerous
“Airspeed  Limitation  Calls.”   Under   Chapter   9,   “Instrument
Procedures,” the allegation that the applicant failed  to  estimate
approaches was not confirmed due to insufficient evidence.

      3.  That he did exhibit a lack of judgement as a professional
pilot in the following areas which resulted in the loss of a C-130H
aircraft and the deaths of three crew members:

           a.  Not  effectively  performing  all  required  mission
preflight-planning  procedures.   Confirmed  as  evidenced  by  the
findings above.

           b.  Not  advising  the  pilot  flying  of  an  incorrect
aircraft landing configuration on final approach, and allowing  the
pilot flying to land with 50 percent flaps in lieu of  100  percent
flaps without trying to initiate go-around.  Confirmed.

          c.  Not advising the pilot flying of  a  steep  and  fast
final approach, and allowing the pilot flying to  land  excessively
long and fast without trying to initiate go-around.  Confirmed.

          d.  Not advising the pilot flying of a bad approach,  and
allowing the pilot flying to land from  the  bad  approach  without
trying to initiate go-around.  Confirmed.

          e.  Not advising the pilot flying  of  a  long  and  fast
touchdown, and allowing the  pilot  flying  not  to  use  available
propeller reversing in a timely manner.  Confirmed.

Based on the allegations and findings, the FEB recommended that the
applicant be removed from flying status.  A legal review by the NAF
staff judge advocate found the FEB record legally sufficient.   The
NAF  commander  recommended  to  the  MAJCOM  commander  that   the
applicant be permanently disqualified from aviation service.  After
the MAJCOM staff judge  advocate  also  found  the  record  legally
sufficient, the MAJCOM commander concurred on 18 Apr  98  with  the
NAF commander, the convening authority, to  permanently  disqualify
the applicant from aviation service.  The applicant was permanently
disqualified from  aviation  service  effective  8  April  1998  by
Aeronautical Order 65, dated 9 June 1998.

___________________________________________________________________

AIR FORCE EVALUATION

The Air Force Reserve Command (AFPC) Military  Personnel  Division,
AFRC/DPM  evaluated   this   application.    They   addressed   the
applicant’s request for reconsideration for promotion and recommend
denial of the applicant’s request.

Although member was in a nonparticipating status  when  nonselected
for  promotion,  he  still  met  the   eligibility   criteria   for
consideration.

The complete evaluation is at Exhibit C.

The  Director  of  Operations,   AFRC/DO,   also   evaluated   this
application    and    addressed    the    applicant’s     permanent
disqualification from flying status.  They recommend denial of  the
applicant’s request to be reinstated to flying status.

AFRC/DO finds the transcript of the FEB to be factually correct and
agrees with the Board’s recommendation to remove the applicant from
flying status.

The complete evaluation is at Exhibit D.

AFRC/DOTV provided  an  additional  advisory  along  with  the  FEB
record.  In the advisory, they made further comment  regarding  the
applicant’s claim that the crew of the accident  aircraft  was  not
bound by the Airfield Suitability Report and  Summary  of  Airfield
Restrictions because it was published by a different command.  They
reference and provided a  copy  of  a  message  that  they  believe
contradicts this allegation.

The complete evaluation is at Exhibit E.

__________________________________________________________________
APPLICANT'S REVIEW OF AIR FORCE EVALUATION

Copies  of  the  Air  Force  evaluations  were  forwarded  to   the
applicant’s counsel on 4 Feb 00 for review and  comment  within  30
days.  As of this date, this office has received no response.

The additional advisory along  with  new  copies  of  the  original
advisories were forwarded to the applicant’s counsel on 7 September
2000 for review and comment within 30 days.  To date,  no  response
has been received.

_________________________________________________________________

THE BOARD CONCLUDES THAT:

1.  The applicant has exhausted all remedies provided  by  existing
law or regulations.

2.  The application was timely filed.

3.  Insufficient  relevant   evidence   has   been   presented   to
demonstrate the existence of probable error or injustice.  We  took
notice of the applicant's complete submission in judging the merits
of  the  case;  however,   we   agree   with   the   opinions   and
recommendations of the Air Force offices of primary  responsibility
and adopt their rationale as the basis for our conclusion that  the
applicant has not  been  the  victim  of  an  error  or  injustice.
Therefore, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we  find  no
compelling basis to recommend granting the relief  sought  in  this
application.

4.  The applicant's case is adequately documented and  it  has  not
been shown that a personal appearance with or without counsel  will
materially  add  to  our  understanding  of  the  issues  involved.
Therefore, the request for a hearing is not favorably considered.

___________________________________________________________________

THE BOARD DETERMINES THAT:

The applicant be notified  that  the  evidence  presented  did  not
demonstrate the existence of probable material error or  injustice;
that the application was denied without a personal appearance;  and
that the application will only be reconsidered upon the  submission
of newly discovered relevant  evidence  not  considered  with  this
application.

___________________________________________________________________

The following members of the Board considered this  application  in
Executive Session on 26 October 2000, under the provisions  of  AFI
36-2603:

      Henry Romo, Jr., Panel Chair
      Laurence M. Groner, Member
      John E. Pettit, Member

The following documentary evidence was considered:

    Exhibit A.  DD Form 149, dated 26 Oct 99, w/atchs.
    Exhibit B.  Applicant's Master Personnel Records.
    Exhibit C.  Memorandum, AFRC/DPM, dated 11 Jan 00, w/o atchs.
    Exhibit D.  Memorandum, AFRC/DO, dated 7 Jan 00.
    Exhibit E.  Memorandum, AFRC/DOTV, dated 31 Aug 00, w/atch.
    Exhibit F.  Letter, SAF/MIBR, dated 4 Feb 00; Letter, AFBCMR,
                dated 7 Sep 00.




                                   HENRY ROMO, JR.
                                   Panel Chair