RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
             AIR FORCE BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS

IN THE MATTER OF:      DOCKET NUMBER:  99-00479
            INDEX CODE:  134.02

       (DECEASED)      COUNSEL:  E. Roy Hawkens

            HEARING DESIRED:  YES

This application for correction of the military records of was  submitted
by (father).

APPLICANT REQUESTS THAT:

The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) report concerning the crash of a U-
2 aircraft (AC) that resulted in his son’s death be amended to include:


    Two (2) experts’ opinions in  the  AIB.   One  expert,  who  at  the
    direction of the Air Force provided an independent opinion regarding
    accident cause; and a senior U-2 pilot  and  the  Commander  at  the
    accident scene, who provided an opinion regarding accident cause  in
    light of the Air Force’s new evidence.


    A significant new fact regarding accident cause;  namely,  that  the
    Air Force has officially determined that the old Hung Pogo Procedure
    was dangerous and flawed.

The “Statement of Opinion” in the Accident Report be revised to  indicate
that the accident was caused by several substantial contributing factors,
including   flawed   procedures,    supervisory    errors,    operational
deficiencies, and pilot error.

In the alternative, the Air Force amend the Accident  Report  to  include
the expert opinions of Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel,  and  (2)  expunge
the Report's erroneous concluding sentence (i.e.,  "In  my  opinion,  the
primary cause of the accident was pilot error") (see Exhibit E (Counsel’s
Reply, pg. 10).

APPLICANT CONTENDS THAT:

As a direct result of his son’s accident, the Air  Force  for  the  first
time assessed the safety and efficacy of the lawful technique that led to
his death.  Concluding that this technique is neither safe nor effective,
the Air Force revised its Hung Pogo Procedure to expressly bar it.   This
new evidence is very significant, because it may fairly be  characterized
as an acknowledgment by the Air Force that the old  Hung  Pogo  Procedure
was seriously flawed in permitting U-2 pilots to  perform  a  futile  and
dangerous maneuver.   Fundamental  fairness  compels  that  the  Accident
Report be amended to include this new evidence, as  well  as  the  expert
opinions of two highly qualified U-2 pilots who have examined the  record
in light of this new evidence and determined  that  the  Accident  Report
warrants revision.  It is a painful and unjust affront to have his  son’s
reputation marred by an official finding that is  not  based  on  a  full
record, is not supported by a fair consideration of all the evidence, and
falls far short of the high standards mandated in the governing Air Force
instruction.

In support of the application, the applicant provided a brief by  counsel
expanding on the foregoing contentions, a personal  statement,  documents
and correspondence associated with the events under review, and  the  two
opinions cited in his requests.  The applicant’s complete  submission  is
at Exhibit A.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

The following facts were extracted from the  applicant’s  submission  and
documents contained in the available military records.

The former member was a  graduate  of  the  Air  Force  Academy  who  was
appointed a second lieutenant in the Regular Air Force on  28  May  1986.
He  was  thereafter  entered  into  Undergraduate  Pilot  Training   and,
following his successful completion of  the  training,  was  awarded  the
aeronautical rating of pilot.  He was progressively promoted to the grade
of captain, effective and with a  date  of  rank  of  28  May  1990.   He
performed duties as an  instructor  pilot,  Assistant  Flight  Commander,
Runway Supervisory Unit Monitor,  and,  finally,  as  a  U-2  pilot.   He
received ten Officer Performance Reports  (OPRs)  in  which  the  overall
evaluations  were  “Meets  Standards”  and  his  duty   performance   was
consistently  described  as  (in  his  early  report)   exceptional   and
outstanding, and, (in his later reports) superior and superb.

On 29 August 1995, the former member, piloting a U-2  aircraft,  departed
RAF Fairford at 0627 Zulu hours.  He was scheduled to conduct  operations
at high altitude along a classified route, and return  to  the  departure
point the same day.  Sortie supervision for the mission was  provided  by
the Mobile Officer, the Supervisor, and the Detachment Commander who were
all rated U-2 pilots.  All sortie personnel maintained radio contact with
the pilot and were on the flightline at the time of the mishap.   Weather
was above minimums required for the mission.

The pilot's preflight was typical and the Mobile  Officer  completed  the
walk-around and preflight cockpit  setup,  which  is  standard  operating
procedure for high-altitude U-2 missions.  The mobile officer recalled no
inconsistency on the preflight inspection.  The aircraft was loaded  with
the maximum amount of allowable fuel  and  started  engines  weighing  20
pounds under the aircraft’s maximum gross  weight  (40,000  pounds).   No
problems were noted during engine start and taxi by the pilot, the mobile
officer, or ground support personnel.  The  mission  was  launched  using
standard  Operating  Location  (OL)  minimum  communication   procedures.
According to the Investigating Officer (IO), overall mission  preparation
was adequate.  On takeoff roll, the left Pogo, a removable wheel used  to
stabilize a U-2 during ground operations, taxi,  and  takeoff  (the  Pogo
normally falls from the aircraft on takeoff) did not  release  free  from
the aircraft.   The  aircraft  continued  the  takeoff  and  leveled  off
approximately 500 feet above the airfield.  The mission was halted  until
the hung Pogo could be released.

The aircraft initiated a left turn to go back to the field for  a  visual
approach to the runway.  The pilot maneuvered the aircraft to  execute  a
low approach to the runway and slowed the aircraft to approximately  full
flap in an effort to detach the Pogo assembly.  The aircraft was  leveled
over the runway threshold  at  200-300  feet  above  ground  level  (AGL)
according to the most expert witness.  The precise airspeed could not  be
determined; however, the  Commander  estimated  the  airspeed  was  above
threshold speed (minimum speed  required)  as  the  aircraft  passed  the
runway threshold.  The  mobile  officer  confirmed  the  Pogo  was  still
attached to the aircraft.  The Commander suggested the pilot try to "rock
your wings  and  kick  your  rudders;"  however,  the  Commander's  radio
transmission was partially blocked by the mobile  officer's  radio  call.
Over the runway, the pilot initiated  a  succession  of  wing  rocks  and
yawing actions to release the Pogo.  The aircraft speed slowed during the
maneuvers  and  the  pilot  initiated  small  pitch  changes  and   power
corrections.  The aircraft was visibly slow as  the  aircraft  approached
the  hangars  located  2,500  feet  down  the  runway  and  the  aircraft
maintained a shallow descent.  At the same time  as  the  maneuvers,  and
3,500 feet from the approach end of the runway,  the  aircraft  began  to
develop a sink rate and a nose high attitude in an apparent  stall.   The
aircraft altitude was estimated at  100-200  feet  AGL  as  the  aircraft
passed the hangars.  The Mobile advised "Watch  your  airspeed"  and  the
Supervisor directed a "go-around."  The pilot  initiated  the  go-around;
however the aircraft continued to descend and roll  42  degrees  of  left
bank.  Conditions after the stall placed the pilot in a position where go-
around was not likely.  The left wing dropped and  impacted  the  runway,
breaking off the left wing tip at the folding joint.  The aircraft veered
left off the runway and skipped across a  grass  infield.   Approximately
2,000 feet from  the  runway,  the  aircraft  tail  section  impacted  an
electrical transformer building and a concrete perimeter  post  with  the
nose of the aircraft.  The pilot ejected immediately after  striking  the
concrete post and before the impact with the  transformer  building.   At
the point of ejection, the bank angle of the aircraft was estimated at 20
degrees left, with a slight nose low  attitude,  and  significant  yawing
motion to the left.   Ejection  was  initiated  outside  the  performance
envelope of the ejection system.  Ejection trajectory reached 80-100 feet
above the ground.  The drogue chute deployed but the  mainchute  did  not
have time to open.  The pilot landed approximately 150 feet east  of  the
wreckage.  U-2R Technical Order (1C-U-2R-1) indicates the ejection system
is considered safe for ejection at zero altitude and airspeed as long  as
the aircraft is in a level attitude.  The  pilot  sustained  unsurvivable
multiple injuries secondary to blunt force trauma due to impact with  the
ground.  The remainder of  the  mishap  aircraft  continued  through  the
airfield’s perimeter chain link fence.  The aircraft came to  rest  in  a
farmer’s field (outside the airbase boundary) and burst  into  flames  at
approximately 0633Z, 13 seconds after it departed the runway.

After the aircraft accident, Warner Robins Air Logistics Center conducted
an engineering assessment of the Pogo assembly and  the  socket  assembly
from the left wing of the mishap aircraft.  The  results  show  the  Pogo
assembly was within established tolerances.  The analysis of  the  socket
assembly indicates the inside bore diameter was smaller than the  minimum
diameter allowed.  This resulted in zero/minimum  clearance  between  the
Pogo assembly and the socket.  The Lockheed Corporation provides the Pogo
housing to the Air Force.

This aircraft had two instances of "Hung Pogo"  during  the  nine  months
preceding the mishap.  Maintenance actions were accomplished on the  Pogo
housing following the last incident on 24 Mar 95.

Air Force Technical Order (AFTO) Form 781 Series records dating  back  to
Apr 95, were reviewed for unscheduled maintenance actions.  According  to
the IO, one discrepancy was noted that could have  been  related  to  the
mishap.  On the previous sortie, the pilot reported  a  heavy  left  wing
because of unequal fuel feeding into the fuselage sump tank.  Maintenance
specialists and contractor personnel inspected the fuel  transfer  system
before the mishap sortie and could not duplicate the discrepancy.

On 28 Feb 96, the applicant received a copy of the  AIB  report  and  was
briefed on its findings.  The IO's "Statement  of  Opinion"  found  that,
while supervisory errors and the performance of high-risk  maneuver  were
significant causes and factors in the mishap, the primary  cause  of  the
accident was pilot error.

On 27 Jul 96, the applicant sent correspondence to the Secretary  of  the
Air Force with recommendations regarding air safety in the Air Force  and
the investigation of air accidents.

On 12 Dec 96, USAF/SE, Chief of Safety, responded to the applicant's  Jul
96 letter, and stated that SE agreed with the IO's opinion.
On 24 Feb 97, the applicant sent correspondence to the President  of  the
US requesting  that  he  direct  the  Air  Force  to  take  into  account
additional factors, and to amend the concluding sentence in the  Accident
Report.

On 8 Apr 97, SAF/LLI, Chief, Congressional Inquiries Division, Office  of
Legislative Liaison,  on  behalf  of  the  President,  responded  to  the
applicant’s request.  LLI stated the applicant’s  request  to  amend  the
IO's conclusion in the Aircraft Accident Investigation  Report  had  been
previously reviewed by the Air Force Chief of Safety (SE) and that  after
careful study of the report, SE agreed with the IO's conclusion that  the
pilot deviated from the “Hung Pogo” procedures (altitude  and  airspeed),
thus allowing the aircraft to stall and get in a condition from which  it
could not be recovered.  LLI advised the applicant that  his  request  to
amend the Aircraft Accident  Investigation  Report  was  forwarded  to  a
Numbered  Air  Force  Headquarters,  which  had  convened  the   accident
investigation, and they (convening authority) would review his request.

On 2 May 97, the Commander of a Numbered Air Force, sent a letter to  the
applicant advising him that two separate legal  reviews  determined  that
the IO’s conclusion as to the primary cause was adequately  supported  by
the  evidence.   The  Commander  stated  that  absent  new  evidence,  or
significant errors or irregularities in the original report,  he  had  no
basis for changing the well-founded and independent opinion of the IO.

On 25 Sep 97, the applicant wrote a letter to the Secretary  of  the  Air
Force requesting the Air Force revise  the  concluding  sentence  of  the
Aircraft Investigation Report based on  new  evidence.   He  contended  a
change in the U-2 Technical Order, which increases the  minimum  altitude
and restricts aircraft maneuvering when performing "Hung Pogo,"  warrants
the revising of the Report's final sentence, which  he  asserted  was  no
longer valid.

On 10 Oct 97, the IO met with the family and summarized  the  purpose  of
the aircraft investigation, provided an overview of  the  mishap  events,
and responded to questions.

On 6 Nov  97,  AFLSA/JACT,  Acting  Chief,  Tort  Claims  and  Litigation
Division responded to the applicant's 25 Sep 97 letter to  the  Secretary
of the Air Force.   JACT  addressed  the  applicant's  assertion  of  new
evidence i.e. the  recent  change  in  the  U-2  Technical  Order,  which
increases the minimum altitude and restricts  aircraft  maneuvering  when
performing "Hung Pogo."  JACT  stated  that  the  IO  stressed  that  the
previous "Hung Pogo" procedure, performed  at  the  proper  airspeed  and
altitude, can be safely  executed.   The  Accident  Investigator  further
stated that while the procedures existing at the time of the  mishap  may
involve a greater risk, the pilot had the opportunity  to  recognize  the
situation and take appropriate actions.  JACT acknowledged that witnesses
did observe the pilot making power adjustments during the low approach in
an  apparent  attempt  to  maintain  airspeed.   JACT  pointed  out  that
according to the IO, the pilot significantly deviated from the prescribed
altitude for the "Hung Pogo" procedure(s).  JACT  stated  the  IO,  after
meeting with the applicant and thoroughly  discussing  the  case  of  the
accident, did not find sufficient justification to amend his report.

On 6 Jun 98, the applicant submitted another request to  revise  the  AIB
report.  He pointed to new evidence consisting of information acquired by
the  Air  Force  when  it  performed  a  post-accident  risk   management
assessment of  its  'Hung  Pogo'  procedure.   He  stated  this  required
changing the Statement of Opinion to reflect a  finding  that  "a  flawed
procedure, not pilot error, was the principal cause of the accident."

On 3 Aug 98, AF/CVA (Air Force  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff)  selected  a
senior officer who was an experienced U-2 pilot, to review facts  of  the
accident, evaluate the AIB  report,  meet  with  the  applicant  and  his
family, and provide an independent opinion of the cause of the accident.

On 18 Aug 98, the reviewing officer (RO) completed his report.

On 6 Oct 98,  AF/CVA  notified  the  applicant  by  letter  that,  having
considered the concerns of the applicant, and the RO's opinion, he  (CVA)
found no new evidence or errors in the preparation of the AIB report that
would require the convening authority to  reopen  the  investigation,  or
modify the opinion of the AIB president.

On 19 Oct 98, the applicant's son, wrote a letter  to  AF/CVA  expressing
displeasure that the Air Force had proceeded without  affording  him  and
the applicant the opportunity to review and comment on the RO's report.

On 25 Nov 98, AF/CVA provided a copy of the RO's  report  under  a  cover
letter stating: (1) that its conclusions differed from the  IO's  opinion
only by placing stronger emphasis on the  supervisory  deficiencies  that
contributed to the accident,  (2)  the  RO  did  not  reach  a  different
conclusion as to the primary cause of the accident,  and  (3)  that  "[a]
difference of opinion between two  well  qualified  Air  Force  officers,
about the significance of one of several factors that contributed to this
accident, is not sufficient basis for altering the AIB report.”

AIR FORCE EVALUATION:

AFLSA/JACT reviewed  this  application  and  recommends  the  applicant's
request be denied.  After summarizing the available evidence in the case,
JACT states there were no errors or irregularities in the preparation  of
the  AIB  report  and  the  IO  fully  complied   with   all   applicable
instructions.  JACT maintains the fact that the Air Force modified its U-
2 Hung Pogo procedures following the mishap does not rise to the level of
"new" evidence.  JACT points out the IO was also aware  that  the  mishap
pilot could have  safely  performed  the  maneuver  even  under  existing
procedures if he had maintained sufficient altitude and airspeed and  the
IO specifically noted "sufficient thrust was available to maintain a safe
airspeed," and the pilot descended 200 to  300  feet  below  the  minimum
altitude established by the existing procedure, which placed the airplane
at or below the minimum altitude required for normal stall recovery.

JACT stated that the opinions of the RO and applicant's  expert  also  do
not  rise  to  the  level  of  "new"  evidence  requiring  reopening  the
investigation or changing the Statement of Opinion to include operational
and procedural errors as primary causes of the accident.   JACT  contends
the RO's report differs from that of the IO only in degree  of  emphasis,
finding a greater cause role for supervisory and  procedural  errors  but
without contradicting the finding of pilot error as the primary cause.

JACT notes that the applicant’s expert admits that  his  opinion  is  the
result  of  three  and  one-half  years  of  contemplation  benefited  by
hindsight.  The IO did not have that luxury.  By law, the IO had only  30
days to set forth his opinion as to the cause of the  accident  following
his receipt of the factual portion of the  Safety  Investigation  Board’s
report.

JACT is of the opinion that there is no injustice for the Board to remedy
in this case.  JACT does not agree  with  the  applicant  that  the  IO’s
findings were a stain on his deceased son’s honor.  There is  nothing  in
the IO’s report  that  reflects  negatively  upon  his  son’s  character,
devotion to duty and value to the Air Force.  It  is  merely  recognition
that his son was human and susceptible to making  mistakes.   A  diligent
search of the facts  of  each  such  incident  would  undoubtedly  reveal
actions by others that contributed in some way to the near tragedy.   The
fact remains that the pilot is at  the  controls  and  has  the  ultimate
responsibility for safe operation of his or her aircraft.

A complete copy of this evaluation, which includes portions of  the  AIB,
extracts of the  pertinent  laws  and  instructions,  and  correspondence
related to the matter under review, is at Exhibit C.

APPLICANT'S REVIEW OF AIR FORCE EVALUATION:

Applicant reviewed the advisory opinion and indicates that AFLSA errs  in
asserting that the new evidence does not warrant amending and  correcting
the Accident Report.  There is now an official Air Force finding that the
then-permissible technique performed by his son  is  so  ineffective  and
dangerous that no pilot shall perform it.

Applicant states any conclusion in the Accident Report must be based on a
consideration of all the  relevant  evidence.   Applicant  maintains  the
governing Air Force Instruction permits an accident to be attributed to a
primary cause  only  based  on  "clear  and  convincing"  evidence  --  a
stringent standard of proof  that  requires  compelling  and  unequivocal
support in the record and contends the record  does  not  permit  such  a
conclusion.  It shows rather that there is  disagreement  among  the  Air
Force’s three experts as to whether pilot error was the primary cause  of
the accident.

The applicant indicates AFLSA  fails  to  address  whether  the  Accident
Report meets this stringent standard of proof.  They instead  argue  that
this Board should not "second  guess"  the  conclusion  in  the  Accident
Report based on the post-accident opinions  of  the  two  experts.   This
argument  misses  the  mark  for  two  reasons.   First,  AFLSA  errs  in
suggesting that the opinions of the two experts should  not  be  accorded
evidentiary weight on the ground that they are extrinsic to the  accident
investigatory process.  As he has shown, the  Air  Force  Assistant  Vice
Chief of Staff personally selected Colonel W.

The applicant indicates that the purpose of  the  Accident  Board  is  to
assist the Secretary of the  Air  Force  in  accurately  determining  the
causes of an aircraft accident.  In a unique  case  like  this,  however,
where the Air Force improperly declines to include pertinent new evidence
in the Accident Report which reveals that the Report contains  an  error,
then this Board -- which also acts on behalf of the Secretary of the  Air
Force has the authority and, they respectfully submit, the duty  to  both
identify and correct the error.

Finally, AFLSA's suggestion that there is no  injustice  in  refusing  to
correct the Accident Report fails to appreciate  the  circumstances  that
have prompted this formal request to correct his son's record.   Both  he
and his  family  have  a  keen  interest  in  his  son’s  reputation  for
competence, skill, and military professionalism.   An  erroneous  finding
that his son was primarily at fault in causing the accident is an  unjust
stain on his reputation and exacerbates his  immeasurable  grief  at  the
loss of his son.  The injustice in this case is that the  Air  Force  (1)
refuses to amend the Accident Report to include significant new  evidence
that bears on  accident  causation,  and  (2)  maintains  a  stigmatizing
finding that pilot error was the "primary" cause of the  accident,  which
is at odds with all the available evidence and fails to  conform  to  the
rigorous  standard  of  proof  required  by  the  governing   Air   Force
Instruction.

Applicant’s complete response to the advisory is at Exhibit E.

THE BOARD CONCLUDES THAT:

1.  The applicant has exhausted all remedies provided by existing law  or
regulations.

2.  The application was timely filed.

  3.   Sufficient relevant evidence has been presented  to  demonstrate  the
     existence of probable injustice warranting a  change  to  the  Accident
     Investigation Board (AIB) report, to include  adding  of  two  opinions
     conducted after the AIB.  The Investigating Officer’s (IO’s)  findings,
     about the cause of the aircraft accident in question, were conducted in
     30 days or less and under the circumstances at that time;  we  find  no
     error in his  findings.   However,  after  reviewing  the  two  reports
     conducted by senior Air Force officer’s with U-2 experience, we believe
     that AIB should be amended  to  include  new  findings  concerning  the
     aircraft accident in question.  While we recognize that the findings in
     the two reports were conducted several years after the AIB, we  believe
     that an amendment to the AIB is warranted based on the addition of  new
     factors.  It is important to note that these reports do not state  that
     it was not pilot error but that there were other contributing  factors.
     Therefore, we recommend that the Statement of Opinion contained in  the
     AIB be amended to show that the cause of the accident was a combination
     of flawed procedures, supervisory errors and  operational  deficiencies
     as well as pilot error.  In addition, we recommend that the two reports
     conducted be added to the AIB  report.   As  stated  above,  under  the
     circumstances and with the facts as they existed at that  time,  we  do
     not believe that the IO findings were in error.  In view of the current
     facts and in recognition of the member’s devoted  service,  we  believe
     that the additional statements and opinions should be added to the  AIB
     for the reasons recommended below.

THE BOARD RECOMMENDS THAT:

The pertinent military  records  of  the  Department  of  the  Air  Force
relating to the service member be corrected to show that the Statement Of
Opinion attached to the Aircraft Accident Investigation: U-2R, 29  August
1995, OL-UK 9 RW, RAF Fairford, UK, dated 2 January 1996, be  amended  on
page 16, para 3, by deleting the last sentence and adding  the  following
sentence, “The U-2 aircraft accident was caused  by  several  substantial
contributing factors including  flawed  procedures,  supervisory  errors,
operational deficiencies, as well as pilot error.”

      It is further recommended that the attached statements from dated 3
February 1999, be, and hereby are, included in the offical record of  the
accident investigation dated, 2 January 1996.

The following  members  of  the  Board  considered  this  application  in
Executive Session on 20 July 2000, under the provisions of AFI 36-2603:

      Mr. Richard A. Peterson, Panel Chair
      Mr. E. David Hoard, Member
      Mr. Jackson A. Hauslein, Member

All members voted to correct the records, as recommended.  The  following
documentary evidence was considered:

     Exhibit A.  DD Form 149, dated 18 Feb 99 w/Atchs.
     Exhibit B.  Applicant's Master Personnel Records.
     Exhibit C.  Letter, AFLSA/JACT, dated 17 May 99 w/Atchs.
     Exhibit D.  Letter, SAF/MIBR, dated 1 Jun 99.
     Exhibit E.  Letter, Applicant, dated 23 Jul 99 w/Atch.




                                   RICHARD A. PETERSON
                                   Panel Chair

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

      Having received and considered the recommendation of the Air Force
Board for Correction of Military Records and under the authority of
Section 1552, Title 10, United States Code (70A Stat 116), it is directed
that:

      The pertinent military records of the Department of the Air Force
relating be corrected to show that the Statement Of Opinion attached to
the Aircraft Accident Investigation: U-2R, 29 August 1995, OL-UK 9 RW,
RAF Fairford, UK, dated 2 January 1996, be amended on page 16, para 3, by
deleting the last sentence and adding the following sentence, “The U-2
aircraft accident was caused by several substantial contributing factors
including flawed procedures, supervisory errors, operational
deficiencies, as well as pilot error.”

      It is further directed that the attached statements from dated 3
February 1999, be, and hereby are, included in the offical record of the
accident investigation dated, 2 January 1996.






  JOE G. LINEBERGER

  Director

  Air Force Review Boards Agency




Attachments
1.  Statement of Opinion, Col Wilson
2.  Statement of Opinion, Col Gardner