IN THE CASE OF:	  

		BOARD DATE:	  15 January 2015

		DOCKET NUMBER:  AR20140006210 


THE BOARD CONSIDERED THE FOLLOWING EVIDENCE:

1.  Application for correction of military records (with supporting documents provided, if any).

2.  Military Personnel Records and advisory opinions (if any).


THE APPLICANT'S REQUEST, STATEMENT, AND EVIDENCE:

1.  The applicant requests, in effect, an upgrade of his award of the Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC) to the Medal of Honor.

2.  In the alternative, if the criterion fails to meet that standard, he requests an upgrade of his DFC to the Distinguished Service Cross.

3.  The applicant states:

   a.  An "adverse" command influence letter was written to the Chief of the Army Awards Branch (Lieutenant Colonel Sxxxxxx Sxxxxxxxxx), U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) on 23 September 2010, pointing out that his chain of command was remiss in conferring with the pilots and crew of his flight or with the 5th Special Forces' Soldiers under siege from Detachments A-333 Chi Linh, Vietnam, on 14 May 1967.  This admission calls into question the completion of the details pertaining to "Valor," not the Act of Valor.  

   b.  For example, the size of the enemy force encountered was listed three ways -- "well armed enemy force"; "numerically superior enemy force"; and "heavily armed force."  The original affidavit from Captain (CPT) WJ (former Commander,  A-333, U.S. Special Forces Camp, Cau Song Be/Chi Linh, from March to August 1967) alluded to 500 enemy personnel also not known in 1967.  He flew for the II Field Force and CPT S and CPT D flew for the 118th Assault Helicopter Company.  Their citations were written without cross referencing specifics.  The 1967 DFC, as well as the 2009 Awards Branch submission does not reflect the significant number of enemy forces encountered.  This level of intrepidity as well as the risk of life increased as the perimeter continued to decease.  It is incumbent to this review that the Board reconsiders the "size of the enemy force" as significant in the review for the Medal of Honor.

   c.  The process began on 13 April 2007, through a Member of Congress, and continued through 4 April 2013.  CPT JG, the Flight Detachment S-3, admitted to the chain of command's duplicity in failing to follow-up with him or the crew due to a "misunderstanding."  Legislative losses in 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2012 placed serious responsibility and uncertainty on the next Member of Congress in answering questions from the Army Awards Branch.  Each was direct in seeking the reasons for "why and what measure was used to determine declination as to the criteria for the Medal of Honor."  The responses offered no insight and in particular the 3 January 2012 letter from Army Secretary referred to "comparing [Applicant's] package to other awards from the same timeframe."  How did they compare?  What exactly did they look for?"  For Army rotary aviation there were only seven Medal of Honor conferrals and none compared to each other.

   d.  The Board will see highlights of each of the seven Medal of Honor conferrals and underline to emphasize those aspects pertinent to each.  His proposed Medal of Honor citation is underlined for emphasis to draw attention to his unique mission…he did in fact use his main rotors to successfully create a landing zone.  He did in fact exit the aircraft on two occasions firing his weapons to speed the advancement of the ground troops.  Neither of these two points of "intrepidity" is stated in any of the other Medal of Honor citations.

   e.  On 2 September 2009, the Awards Branch Chief disallowed reconsideration of the use of the main rotors as it was previously submitted.  It is his request that consideration of the use of the main rotors be accorded to him as the off-duty co-pilot in an unarmed helicopter, performing this procedure defying aeronautical odds with five separate rescue extractions as well as overwhelming enemy fire.  To dismiss its relevance discounts the Act of Valor not seen at the time.  

   f.  General (GEN) FW (Commanding General, II Field Force, and then Chief of Staff, Army), in 2008 and 2009 was contacted by a Member of Congress and given an opportunity to be briefed on what actually occurred.  GEN FW began to rethink his DFC recommendation in October 2008 to the Silver Star.  Over the next 6 months as more disclosure came to his attention, by July 2009 he wrote an uncharacteristic letter to then Major General GJ, Legislative Liaison (GEN FW held that position from 1962-1964) citing "Uncommon Valor" as it pertained to all five participants.  He requested the Department of the Army to review the case for a higher award.  His intent 7 months before he passed was attested to by JL that he knew the case would have to be adjudicated in the future due to his declining health which is being done now with this submission.  The original intent may have been lost when the paperwork was destroyed; however, this Board needs to consider and weigh the evidence he saw prior to October 2008 and then up to July 2009 as a basis for reconciliation.  GEN FW passed away in February 2010.

   g.  He was aware of the risks and still volunteered to go in with his unarmed helicopters to commence a rescue.  He shared the flight duties and encountered multiple issues adding to the level of heroism not known at the time.  The enemy force was "more than heavily armed"; it was later attested to be a battalion size or greater.  The helicopter he flew had no armament or flack vests.  The piloting required maneuvering without armament in a tall, tight space, while purposefully descending and damaging the main rotor being mindful of the vulnerability of their precarious tail rotor.  This mission was an act of heroism deemed "above and beyond what would be expected of their peers."  The decision to descend down through the trees is a unique procedure done accidentally by many but deemed questionable if done on purpose.

   h.  Further complicating the extraction were the targeted troops being wounded while trying to get on the helicopter and in the cargo bay.  This goes to the conditions that existed on the ground.  His actions of exiting the aircraft were to speed the evacuation process in part due to battlefield conditions First Lieutenant C attested to within the perimeter of defense.  This action is worthy of consideration of a higher award recommendation up to and including the Medal of Honor.  Therefore, both the air and ground conditions which he dealt with set Cau Song Be apart from other missions.

   i.  He has been recommended for the Medal of Honor by the one person who was witness to "two" multiple acts of "conspicuous gallantry" not known at the time by GEN FW.  Warrant Officer (WO) B, the command pilot, after that mission had a week remaining in his tour of duty.  WO B was leaving for home lucky to be alive and appreciative that he had risked his life, allowing WO B to do so.  

4.  The applicant provides copies of the following:

* General Orders (GO) Number 1011
* orders for all of his awards
* DD Form 214 (Armed Forces of the United States Report of Transfer or Discharge)
* Medal of Honor upgrade consideration and reconsideration package submitted to HRC (Member of Congress requests letters, statements, and affidavits)
* four letters from the Military Awards Branch, HRC
* DD Form 215 (Correction of DD Form 214)
* brother's statement of support
* A Tribute to GEN FW article

CONSIDERATION OF EVIDENCE:

1.  The applicant requests an upgrade of his DFC to the Medal of Honor.  In the alternative, he requests an upgrade of his DFC to the Distinguished Service Cross. 

	a.  Paragraph 2-5, Section II, Army Regulation 15-185, the regulation under which this Board operates, states that the Board will not consider any application if it determines that an applicant has not exhausted all administrative remedies available to him/her.  

	b.  The applicant submitted a request for an upgrade of his award of the DFC to the Medal of Honor.  This issue was addressed by HRC and is the subject of this Record of Proceedings.  

	c.  However, the issue to upgrade this award to the Distinguished Service Cross was never raised, submitted, or discussed.  There is no evidence that the applicant has submitted his request to the Commander, HRC, Army Decorations Board, to upgrade his award to the DFC, and his request was denied.  As such, he has not exhausted his administrative remedies and this portion of his request will not be discussed further in this Record of Proceedings.

2.  The applicant was appointed in the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), as a second lieutenant, on 2 June 1963.  He served as a Rotary Wing Aviator.  He was ordered to active duty and entered active duty on 2 February 1964.  

3.  He served in Vietnam from 18 November 1966 through 10 November 1967, during two campaigns.  He was assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, II Field Force Vietnam and performed duties as a helicopter pilot.  

4.  GO Number 1011, issued by Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam on 24 June 1967, awarded him the DFC for heroism in Vietnam on 14 May 1967.  The orders stated:

[Applicant] distinguished himself by heroism while participating in aerial flight evidenced by voluntary action above and beyond the call of duty in the Republic of Vietnam on 14 May 1967 while serving with the Aviation Detachment, 11 Field Force Vietnam.  On this date, [Applicant] was pilot of an unarmed helicopter transporting the II Field Force Vietnam Staff Chaplain to Special Forces camps in the III Corps area for Sunday services.  Arriving at Cau Song Be Special Forces Camp, he learned that a Civilian Irregular Defense Group company was engaged in heavy fighting with a numerically superior Viet Cong force a few miles away.  Disregarding his own safety, [Applicant] volunteered his services to fly in reinforcements and evacuate wounded personnel. To successfully land on a narrow dirt road flanked by bamboo thickets and heavy foliage, [Applicant] had to use his rotors to cut through the dense underbrush, an extremely hazardous undertaking.  Reinforcing troops were unloaded and the casualties were placed on the aircraft.  Again using the rotors to clear a path for takeoff, [Applicant] brought the wounded Soldiers safely back to Cau Song Be.  Upon landing, he was asked to return to evacuate the entire company.  [Applicant] again courageously volunteered his services, disregarding his own safety.  Sharing the flying responsibilities with the aircraft commander, he made four trips.  The danger increased with each lift, not only because of the reduced number of personnel left to protect the perimeter against an intensified enemy attack, but because radio contact had been lost with the tactical air support aircraft and the helicopter had to be maneuvered through friendly air support fire and artillery fire flanking their flight path.  Through the valiant efforts of [Applicant], the Civilian Irregular Defense Group company was rescued and their casualties evacuated successfully.  His exemplary professional skill and determination in the face of hostile fire and extreme danger to his own safety were instrumental in the successful accomplishment of the aircraft's mission.  

5.  He was honorably released from active duty in the rank of CPT on 12 October 1969 and he was transferred to the USAR Control Group (Reinforcement).  He was credited with completing 5 years, 8 months, and 11 days of net active service.  His DD Form 214 lists the:

* National Defense Service Medal
* Army Aviator Badge
* Vietnam Service Medal
* Vietnam Campaign Medal
* Air Medal with 25th Oak Leaf Cluster (OLC) with "V" Device
* Bronze Star Medal
* DFC
* Purple Heart with 2nd OLC
* Valorous Unit Award
* one overseas service bar


6.  He provides:

   a.  A letter, dated 2 April 2009, wherein the Chief, Military Awards Branch, HRC, in response to a Member of Congress concerning upgrade of the DFC to the Medal of Honor for Mr. (WO) B for his action on 14 May 1967 in Vietnam, advised the following:

		(1)  The request for consideration could not be submitted to the Army Decorations Board for consideration.  Their office had not received narrative addressing terrain and weather of the area in which the action took place; enemy conditions, to include morale, proximity, firepower, casualties, and situation prior to, during, and after the act and the degree of their participation in the act; if the act occurred in aerial flight, the type and position of the aircraft and the individual's crew position; the degree to which the act was voluntary; the degree to which the act was outstanding and exceeded what was normally expected of the individual; all unusual circumstances; and overall effect or results of the act.  

		(2)  It remained unclear what, among those statements and other submitted materials, the recommender intended to include specifically in support of the recommendation for upgrade of the DFC to the Medal of Honor for Mr. B for his actions on 14 May 1967.

   b.  A letter, dated 17 September 2009, wherein the Chief, Military Awards Branch, HRC, in response to a Member of Congress concerning the applicant's desire to have his award of the DFC upgraded to the Medal of Honor, advised that they had reviewed the applicant's official military personnel file (OMPF) and located the GO authorizing award of the DFC.  He should assemble the rest of the required documentation as outlined in their previous response.  Once they received a request for reconsideration with all required documentation, they would be pleased to forward it to the Army Decorations Board for consideration.

   c.  A letter, dated 21 February 2010, wherein the Chief, Military Awards Branch, HRC, advised the applicant, in response to his letter seeking clarification on requirements regarding his pending request to have the DFC upgraded to the Medal of Honor, of the following:

		(1)  Regarding the award narrative that must be submitted, this should be a detailed description of the specific events and his actions for which the award was being considered.  It would be similar to the award citation, with the award citation being a more condensed version of the award narrative.

		(2)  With respect to his question regarding the submittal of additional information, the letter of justification could not exceed two pages.  However, he could submit supporting documentation beyond two pages.  They therefore recommended that he provide in the letter of justification a summary of the new information that he wished to be considered, referencing any amount of additional documentation that he wished to submit.  HRC recommended that he continue to forward materials through the Member of Congress.

		(3)  After review of the information available to that officer, HRC determined his entitlement to the following awards not listed on his DD Form 214: the Vietnam Service Medal with two bronze service stars, the Meritorious Unit Commendation, and the Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm Unit Citation.

		(4)  The enclosed DD Form 215, issued on 21 February 2010, amended his DD Form 214 to reflect his entitlement to those awards.  That information had been forwarded to the National Personnel Records Center for inclusion in his OMPF.  

7.  He further provided copies of the following:

   a.  A Statement and Affidavit, dated 22 July 2010, wherein WO B stated:

		(1)  He personally observed the applicant's actions on 14 May 1967 in South Vietnam.  He and the applicant were told the area was involved in an active firefight, but that evacuation was critical.  No other aircrafts were available to perform that mission.  They were informed that one helicopter already attempted the evacuation, damaging its rear tail rotor and had to withdraw to a safe landing area.

		(2)  He and the applicant volunteered to attempt the mission.  Upon arrival, they couldn't see the embattled Civilian Irregular Defense Soldiers.  The applicant was in contact with their "on the ground" Special Forces Advisor.  It looked impenetrable in all directions as far as they could see.  It was obvious that no suitable landing zone was available for them to land the aircraft in a normally-accepted safe manner.

		(3)  Each side of the trail was covered with 30-foot high bamboo forest that extended away from the trail for several thousand meters.  Visual contact with the friendly troops was not made, but the advisor stated their aircraft was directly over their position.  He and the applicant decided that the only way to land was to "create" a landing zone using the main rotor blades to cut through the bamboo. 

		(4)  While he landed the aircraft, the applicant was assessing the tactical situation, staying close to the controls communicating with the ground forces and being ready to provide their only suppressive fire support with his personal weapon.  The landing zone was in an active firefight with casualties being inflicted in close proximity to the aircraft.  After successfully landing, CPT J and SP5 D exited the aircraft and assisted with loading the wounded.  After all of the wounded were loaded, they departed to the Cau Song Be Camp and medical facility.

		(5)  During this departure, the applicant was able to see and ascertain that the perimeter of the encircled forces was very small.  That would be critical in their success later that day.  During their trip back to the camp, they received a call to be prepared to evacuate the entire force if they would agree to do it.  Due to the applicant's observations and experience during previous ground assignments they all agreed to attempt the rescue of approximately 100 additional troops.  The applicant's leadership, knowledge, and situational awareness of the ground tactical situation were invaluable.  Without it, successful completion of that mission was not likely.

		(6)  The applicant flew the third and fifth trips into the landing zone.  Due to the friendly troops' movement, he had to cut through new bamboo in order to land close to them and remain inside the shrinking perimeter.  He witnessed that the applicant, in total disregard for his own well-being and safety, exited the aircraft on the fifth and sixth landings with his personal weapons to assist in rallying the troops left on the ground.  He was totally exposed to small arms fire on both of these courageous initiatives.  They were outside of his normal duties of a pilot, but showed bravery beyond the call of duty.

		(7)  The active participation of the applicant resulted in the rescue of over 80 allied troops and one Special Forces Advisor.  His ground tactical experience and knowledge, plus his aviation expertise, were invaluable to the successful outcome of the mission.  In his opinion, the applicant's courage, aggressiveness, determination, and leadership under extreme conditions warrant an upgrade from the DFC to the Medal of Honor.  Had the details of the mission been known to the II Field Force Headquarters at the time such a recommendation for the Medal of Honor would probably have been made.

   b.  A letter, dated 18 April 2011, wherein the Chief, Awards and Decorations Branch, HRC, advised a Member of Congress of the following:

		(1)  On 13 January 2011, the Army Decorations Board considered a recommendation to upgrade the applicant's award of the DFC to the Medal of Honor.  The Army Decorations Board determined that the degree of action and service rendered did not meet the strict criteria for the proposed award, reaffirming that the previously-approved award of the DFC was the appropriate award for the applicant's actions.

		(2)  If the applicant felt that the decision made by the Army Decorations Board was unfair or unjust, he had the right to appeal.  To do so, he must submit a DD Form 149 (Request for Correction of Military Record) to the Army Board for Corrections of Military Records (ABCMR), the highest authority for adjudicating these matters. 

   c.  A letter, dated 27 July 2011, wherein the Vietnam Veterans of America requested the Secretary of the Army's review of the 14 May 1967 rescue mission at Cau Song Be to determine if the applicant, WO B, and others were deserving of higher awards for valor.

   d.  A letter, dated 5 October 2011, wherein a Member of Congress requested the Secretary of the Army personally review a case involving a constituent who clearly met the Army's criteria for being awarded the Medal of Honor for his brave actions that save Soldiers' lives during intense combat in South Vietnam in May 1967.

   e.  A letter, dated 3 January 2012, wherein the Secretary of the Army advised a Member of Congress of that the Army Decorations Branch reviewed a recommendation for an upgrade of the applicant's DFC to the Medal of Honor on 13 January 2011.  The board did not recommend an upgrade to the Medal of Honor because it determined that the applicant's package, compared to other award packages from the same time frame, did not merit the awarding of the Medal of Honor.  The Commanding General, HRC, reviewed the board's recommendation and reaffirmed that the previously-approved award of the DFC was the appropriate award for the applicant's actions.  If he or the applicant had additional evidence not previously considered, he could submit the evidence to HRC, Awards Branch.

   f.  A letter, dated 22 May 2012, wherein a Member of Congress requested the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs' personally review their recommendation to upgrade the military decorations of the applicant, WO B, and WO S, received for their heroic actions in service on 14 May 1967.

   g.  A letter, dated 17 August 2012, wherein the Chief, Awards and Decorations Branch, HRC, advised a Member of Congress that the Army Decorations Board reviewed a recommendation to upgrade the applicant's award of the DFC to the Medal of Honor on 13 January 2011.  The board determined that the degree of action and service rendered did not meet the strict criteria for the proposed award.  Based on their recommendation, the Commanding General, HRC, on behalf of the Secretary of the Army, disapproved award of the Medal of Honor.  The applicant's entitlement to the DFC was reaffirmed and retained.  

   h.  A concluding thoughts by the researcher for the applicant’s memorandum, dated 24 March 2014, wherein the applicant's brother stated that WO B the command pilot attested that the applicant exiting the aircraft twice firing his weapons to speed the ground troops.  That added to the already piloting risk the applicant placed on himself and the mission "above and beyond the call of duty." A pilot though trained for that was in desperate straits and was not equipped to do so unless taking extreme measure to save their own lives.  Herein it was done to save others.  A rotary wing pilot was not a combatant.  On 14 May 1967, the applicant flew an unarmed helicopter which was not equipped for combat and voluntarily chose to go on that rescue mission when asked.  He was not authorized to attempt a blade strike to chop his way into a nonexistent loading zone which, if unsuccessful, would have compromised the mission.

   i.  An Affidavit from JL, Jr., submitted by request for a narrative description of the events and activities that took place in a Member of Congresses' office pertaining to the activities on 14 May 1967.

   j.  Several letters submitted to HRC pertaining to his request to an upgrade to the Medal of Honor.

   k.  A Tribute to GEN FW article published after his death on 10 February.

9.  Army Regulation 600-8-22 (Military Award) states:

   a.  The Medal of Honor is awarded by the President in the name of Congress to a person who, while a member of the Army, distinguishes himself or herself conspicuously by gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his or her life above and beyond the call of duty while engaged in an action against an enemy of the United States; while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force; or while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in an armed conflict against an opposing armed force in which the United States is not a belligerent party.  The deed performed must have been one of personal bravery or self-sacrifice so conspicuous as to clearly distinguish the individual above his comrades and must have involved risk of life.  Incontestable proof of the performance of the service will be exacted and each recommendation for the award of this decoration will be considered on the standard of extraordinary merit.

   b.  The DFC is awarded to any person who, while serving in any capacity with the Army of the United States, distinguished himself or herself by heroism or extraordinary achievement while participating in aerial flight.  The performance of the act of heroism must be evidenced by voluntary action above and beyond the call of duty.  The extraordinary achievement must have resulted in an accomplishment so exceptional and outstanding as to clearly set the individual apart from his or her comrades or from other persons in similar circumstances.  

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS:

1.  The evidence of the record shows the applicant served in Vietnam from November 1966 to November 1967.  He was awarded several distinguished awards for valor, including the DFC.  In 2011, the Army Decorations Branch denied several requests submitted on his behalf for upgrade of his DFC to the Medal of Honor.  

2.  His contentions and the documentation he submitted were carefully considered.  However, by regulation, for award of the Medal of Honor and/or Distinguished Service Cross, the extraordinary achievement must have resulted in an accomplishment so exceptional and outstanding as to clearly set the individual apart from his/her comrades or from other persons in similar circumstances.  

3.  His orders for the DFC stated, "sharing the flying responsibilities with the aircraft commander, he made four trips."  Through his determination and courageous actions, he undoubtedly rescued and saved the lives of several individuals.  Unfortunately, his actions in Vietnam on 14 May 1967 did not clearly set him apart as those of aircraft commander who also risked his life through the valiant efforts during extreme danger to his own safety in rescuing the Civilian Irregular Defense Group and their casualties.  

4.  Army policy allows any Soldier to recommend another Soldier for an award.  The Army's awards program relief on those with first-hand knowledge of a Soldier's heroic or valorous action to recommend the Soldier for the appropriate award.  Award recommendations are sent up through the Soldier's chain of command to company, battalion, brigade, division, and corps commanders.  Commanders at every level of review can recommend approval or upgrade of the award based upon their authority.  Commanders with authority to approve awards also have the authority to downgrade or disapprove awards based on their judgment, knowledge, and the criteria established for the award.  Command involvement is critical for program success.

5.  His willingness and dedication to duty during his period of service in Vietnam under extremely hazardous conditions is acknowledged and applauded.  However, it appears his wartime chain of command and approval authority recommended and approved him for the DFC.  It is not the Board's position to second guess those with first-hand knowledge of his heroic actions in comparison to his comrades.  

6.  In the absence of evidence that conclusively shows his actions so notable as to set him apart from the other individuals, there is insufficient evidence to support granting him the requested relief.  In making this determination, he and all others concerned should know that this nation in no way diminishes the sacrifices made by him in service to our Nation.  The applicant and all Americans should be justifiably proud of his service in arms.

BOARD VOTE:

________  ________  ________  GRANT FULL RELIEF 

________  ________  ________  GRANT PARTIAL RELIEF 

________  ________  ________  GRANT FORMAL HEARING

___x____  ___x____  ___x____  DENY APPLICATION

BOARD DETERMINATION/RECOMMENDATION:

The evidence presented does not demonstrate the existence of a probable error or injustice.  Therefore, the Board determined that the overall merits of this case are insufficient as a basis for correction of the records of the individual concerned.



      ___________x______________
                  CHAIRPERSON
      
I certify that herein is recorded the true and complete record of the proceedings of the Army Board for Correction of Military Records in this case.



ABCMR Record of Proceedings (cont)                                         AR20140006210





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ABCMR Record of Proceedings (cont)                                         AR20140006210



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