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ARMY | BCMR | CY2015 | 20150005433
Original file (20150005433.txt) Auto-classification: Denied

		IN THE CASE OF:  	  

		BOARD DATE:  27 October 2015	  

		DOCKET NUMBER:  AR20150005433 


THE BOARD CONSIDERED THE FOLLOWING EVIDENCE:

1.  Application for correction of military records (with supporting documents provided, if any).

2.  Military Personnel Records and advisory opinions (if any).


THE APPLICANT'S REQUEST, STATEMENT, AND EVIDENCE:

1.  The applicant requests an upgrade of his previous award of the Army Commendation Medal (ARCOM) with "V" Device, which was upgraded by the Army Decorations Board, U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) in January 2000 to an award of the Bronze Star Medal (BSM) with "V" Device, to the Medal of Honor (MOH).

2.  The applicant states the combat action described by the witnesses and endorsed by the wartime chain of command rise above the level of the initial award. 

3.  The applicant provides:

* Congressional letter from Member of Congress KS
* Letter, dated 20 January 2015 from HRC to Member of Congress KS
* Nomination letter from Colonel (COL) (Retired) PBP
* Letters, dated 1 August 2014, from COL PBP to HRC and Member of Congress GW
* DA Form 638 (Recommendation for Award)
* Letter, dated 29 May 2013, from HRC to the Member of Congress GW
* Explanation to HRC of discrepancies in the original submission
* Eyewitness statements from Mr. W--- Sta---- (WS), Mr. B-- Bie-- (BB, and Mr. Du-- Swa---- (DS)
* Proposed Narrative and Citation
* DA Forms 1594 (Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officers Log) 
* Operation Summary and Maps, Aerial Views, and Panorama Views of where the action occurred, and Statement of Enemy Morale

CONSIDERATION OF EVIDENCE:

1.  The applicant's records show he enlisted in the Nebraska Army National Guard Regular on 7 February 1966.  He entered active duty on 18 March 1968 and held military occupational specialty 11B (Light Weapons Infantryman). 

2.  He served in Vietnam from on or around 15 October 1968 to 14 October 1969.  He was assigned to 

* Company B, 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry, 9th Infantry Division (ID), from 25 October 1968 to 23 June 1969
* Company D, 2nd Battalion, 39th Infantry, 9th ID, from 24 June 1969 to 15 October 1969 

3.  He was honorably released from active duty on 16 October 1969 and he was transferred to the U.S. Army Reserve Control Group to complete his remaining service obligations.  His DD Form 214 (Armed Forces of the United States Report of Transfer or Discharge) shows he completed 1 year, 6 months, and 
29 days of active service.  It also shows he was awarded or authorized the: 

* National Defense Service Medal
* Vietnam Campaign Medal
* ARCOM (2nd Oak Leaf Cluster)
* Vietnam Service Medal
* Combat Infantryman Badge
* Purple Heart
* Air Medal (1st Oak Leaf Cluster)

4.  On 15 July 1985 and 5 April 2000, he was issued DD Forms 215 (Correction to DD Form 214) that added awards of the:

* Vietnam Service Medal with 4 bronze service stars
* Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal with 1960 Device
* Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm Unit Citation
* Purple Heart (2nd Oak Leaf Cluster)
* Expert Marksmanship Qualification Badge with Machine Gun Bar (M-60)
* Sharpshooter Marksmanship Qualification Badge with Automatic Rifle Bar 
* Bronze Star Medal

5.  General Orders (GO) Number 4467, issued by Headquarters, 9th ID, on 14 April 1969, awarded the applicant the ARCOM with "V" Device for heroism in connection with military operations against a hostile force in Vietnam on 3 April 1969.  Although the recommendation and/or citation are not available for review with this case, based on other evidence in his record, a summary of the events is as follows: 

On 3 April 1969, B Company, 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry was involved in a raid at Dai Phuoc, Vietnam.  During the withdrawal, his helicopter was shot down and several personnel on board were injured, including the commander.  Despite his own injuries and despite being under attack, the applicant rallied the survivors and took charge of the situation.  As the enemy closed in, he engaged the enemy with his sniper rifle and killed several enemy soldiers.  When supporting helicopters landed to evacuate survivors, he provided covering fire to both gunships and repelled the enemy until all fellow Soldiers were rescued.  

6.  GO Number 4324, issued by Headquarters, 9th ID, on 10 April 1969, awarded him the Purple Heart for wounds received in action on 3 April 1969.

7.  On 29 November 1999, following his petition to HRC, the Army Decorations Board upgraded his award of the ARCOM with "V" Device to an award of the BSM with "V" Device for heroism on 3 April 1969.  The BSM with "V" Device citation reads: 

For valorous performance of duty on 3 April 1969, while serving with Company B, 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry. On this date, while a member of a night raiding party, he defended his fellow Soldiers and the crew of a helicopter that was shot down during the team extraction.  His courage and leadership resulted in the rescue of the entire group.  During the action, he singlehandedly defended his fellow Soldiers from the assault of the enemy platoon.  Under fire, and suffering from multiple wounds, he supervised the evacuation of the team and crew member by AH-1 gunships.  When it appeared that all U.S. personnel had been evacuated, he boarded the final gunship.  He then discovered that his wounded company commander had been left behind.  With no thought for his own safety, he leapt from the departing helicopter and dashed to the side of his severely wounded commander.  With little hope for rescue, he shielded his commander and killed two approaching enemy soldiers before he and his commander were extracted, under fire by another helicopter.  


8.  On 25 March 2000, he petitioned this Board (Docket Number AR2000042256) for an upgrade of his already-upgraded award of BSM with "V" Device to an award of the Silver Star.  With his request, he provided: 

* An eyewitness statement from Mr. WMP, former company commander
* An eyewitness statement from COL PBP, former battalion commander (and current recommender)

9.  On 1 February 2001, the Board thoroughly reviewed his petition and determined that he received the appropriate award.  The Board voted unanimously to deny him relief.

10.  It appears on 10 May 2013, he submitted a request to HRC to upgrade his BSM with "V" Device to an award of the MOH.  HRC responded on 19 May 2013 to his Member of Congress, Representative GQ, and stated: 

	a.  This letter is in response to the applicant's desire to be awarded the MOH in lieu of the BSM with "V" Device.  HRC is unable to process this request at this time.  HRC acknowledges receipt of a partial original recommendation with proposed citation, letter of justification, DA Form 638 for the MOH with proposed citation, unit report, maps and eyewitness statements.  However, a request for reconsideration of a previously approved award has several regulatory requirements not met by the documentation provided.  HRC requires a legible copy of the DA Form 638 for the MOH, Block 1 must show our office address: HRC, Block 2 must show the appropriate address; Block 3 must include the date of submission; Block 12b should be marked "NO" as the BSM with "V" Device was not authorized as an interim award, and Block 19 must be signed by the recommender and not on a separate DA Form 638.

	b.  Additionally, the letter of justification does not present any new, substantive and material information.  Therefore, HRC requires that the additional justification for reconsideration note any omissions or errors contained in the original recommendation for award or supporting documents directly pertaining to [Applicant's] actions.  Also required are new endorsements from his former wartime chain of command.  If these endorsements cannot be obtained, information regarding the steps taken to locate them must be provided and included on page two of the DA Form 638.  As such, HRC requires a complete copy of the original recommendation for award with proposed narrative and endorsements from [Applicant's] former wartime chain of command, together with a new proposed citation and narrative.  The provided proposed citation is too extensive.  Therefore, HRC recommends that the proposed citation be listed as the proposed narrative and a new citation be composed.  The proposed citation is a brief descriptive narrative and limited to 19 lines in length.
	c.  The proposed narrative must be methodically written with consistency detailing the terrain and weather of the area in which the action took place; enemy conditions, to include morale, proximity, firepower, casualties and situation prior to, during and after the act; the effect of the act on the enemy; the action of comrades in the immediate vicinity of the act and the degree of their participation in the act; the degree to which the act was voluntary, outstanding and exceeded what was normally expected of [Applicant]; all unusual circumstances; and overall effects or results of his actions.  HRC also points out that the new proposed citation and narrative must include the new, substantive and material information.  Additionally, the unit report does not provide any pertinent information concerning the incident in question.  Therefore, HRC requires additional official unit reports detailing the event, and that the maps and diagrams are in color.  Should the recommendation with required supporting documentation be received, it would be forwarded to the Army Decorations Board.  One time reconsideration by the award approval authority shall be conclusive.   

11.  It appears the recommending official (COL PBP) corrected some of the discrepancies and/or explained others, as requested by HRC, and resubmitted the recommendation.  In response, HRC sent a letter on 20 January 2015 to his Member of Congress, Representative KS and stated:

	a.  This is concerning the applicant's desire to be awarded the MOH in lieu of the BSM with "V" Device.  The Army Decorations Board cannot facilitate the request. As stated in a previous correspondence from the Chief, Soldier Programs and Services Division, to the recommending officer (COL PBP, Retired) on 8 September 2014, that based on a review of all previous award submissions to the Awards and Decorations Branch on behalf of [Applicant] and consultation with the branch's policy section, he has exhausted his one-time reconsideration by the award approval authority and therefore, cannot be reconsidered for any additional awards for this action.  It is noted that on 29 May 2013, HRC provided guidance regarding reconsideration of the BSM with "V" Device to the MOH; however, the Army Decorations Board did not realize that the applicant's award had previously been considered for upgrade.  

	b.  On 20 January 2000, the Army Decorations Board considered his request for upgrade from the ARCOM with "V" Device to the Silver Star, and determined that his actions warranted the BSM with "V" Device.  The Commanding General (CG), HRC, acting on behalf of the Secretary of the Army (SA), approved the award of the BSM with "V" Device.  Accordingly, a second reconsideration for the same action cannot be granted, as regulation stipulates one-time reconsideration by the Army Decorations Board shall be conclusive.  Should the applicant consider this response unfair, his final administrative option is to petition the ABCMR and provide a copy of this correspondence to demonstrate that he has exhausted his administrative remedy.

12.  COL PBP, the former commander of the 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry, recommends an upgrade of the applicant's award of the BSM with "V" Device to an award of the MOH.  His nomination packet contains: 

	a.  DA Form 638, dated 24 July 2014, which shows COL PBP recommended the applicant for award of the MOH for valor on 3 April 1969.  His former company commander, then Captain (CPT) Wil--- M. Per-- (WMP) recommended approval and stated "absolutely merits the MOH; he was prepared to die with me rather than leave me behind."  His former battalion commander, COL PBP, also recommended approval and stated "without his valor and sustained aggressive action, that night raid with only 10 men on the ground would have been a disaster; I was there and saw what he accomplished firsthand, risking his own life; he saved many others."

	b.  Recommended citation that reads "[Applicant] is cited for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty. On the night of 3 April 1969, [Applicant] was a member of a small raiding party at Dai Phuoc, Vietnam.  During the withdrawal, his helicopter was shot down and all aboard were injured, many seriously.  Badly injured and under automatic weapons fire, he rallied the survivors and took charge when the commander was seriously injured and trapped in the wreckage.  With the enemy platoon closing in, he climbed upon the overturned, burning aircraft and fired his badly damaged sniper rifle at the assaulting enemy.  With all the other weapons damaged or lost in the mud, he alone stood between the aggressive enemy and his wounded, weaponless comrades.  Painfully wounded twice, he killed at least 7 enemy soldiers.  When two supporting Cobra gunships ran out of ammunition and landed to evacuate survivors, he provided covering fire for the first one until it departed.  Believing all were rescued, he ran to the second Cobra and as he helped a wounded comrade he saw his commander lying helpless next to the crashed aircraft.  Jumping from the departing helicopter he ran to the officer. Shielding the wounded man with his own body, he killed 2 enemy soldiers who rushed him.  Another .helicopter landed under fire to rescue him, but was boarded by injured survivors, who unknown to him and the rescuers, remained at the crash.  As the rescuing aircraft was too overloaded to take off, he selflessly remained behind.  Displaying great courage, a gunship pilot brought him out. [Applicant's] heroism saved the lives of 10 of his comrades.  His extraordinary courage and devotion to duty were in the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Army."

	c.  Narrative Statement that reads:
		(1)  During the evening of 3 April 1969, elements of Company B, 3rd Battalion. 60th Infantry, conducted a night airmobile raid near Dai Phuoc, Vietnam.  Led the by the company commander, the mission of the 10 man raiding party was to locate and destroy an enemy radio transmitter. It was a clear, hot evening as the raiding party landed in 2 UH-I helicopters at about 2145 hours less than 50 meters west of the target hamlet.  Their search revealed only children and the aged--no radios.  As the raiding party moved to the pickup zone about 150 meters to the northwest from the hamlet, a large group of armed men moving towards them from the wood lines to the north and south of the hamlet.  The commander notified the helicopters that they needed to be picked up immediately.  However, they did not arrive for 15 minutes as they were refueling. By that time the enemy force had moved within 100 meters and despite helicopter gun ship support, the helicopters were raked by crew served automatic weapons fire and small arms as they landed.  Despite the heavy fire, the ships lifted out the troops, each sustaining multiple hits while the door gunners and the ground party returned fire. 

		(2)  The company commander made a headcount and learned 1 man was missing from the 2nd aircraft.  He was quickly spotted, lying in a ditch at the pickup zone.  The commander ordered that aircraft to pick him up, with his aircraft following in support.  That helicopter landed and the man sprung aboard but as he did so, another soldier jumped from the other side as the aircraft took off.  The company commander witnessed the situation and quickly ordered his pilot to pick up the stranded man.  As the aircraft headed towards him, at about 30 feet altitude, it was hit by automatic weapons fire on the left side, the pilot receiving two bullet wounds.  The crippled aircraft pitched up and to the right.  As it crashed, it pinned the company commander underneath.  [Applicant], though painfully injured, pulled himself from the wreckage and began pulling others out. Realizing the company commander was trapped underneath, he directed the survivors as they rocked the wreckage and pulled him free.  He then noticed that enemy tracers were striking near him.  He saw about 30 of the enemy moving along 2 parallel dikes about 50 meters apart, leading to the downed helicopter. 

		(3)  The enemy moved aggressively, supported by several crew served automatic weapons and firing rocket propelled grenades.  Without hesitation he mounted the burning helicopter, lying on its right side, the bottom facing the general direction of the enemy.  Armed only with his damaged sniper rifle, equipped with a Starlight Scope, he began placing accurate fire on the enemy. Aside from one M-16, all other rifles and machine guns of the aircraft and raiding party were either damaged or buried in the mud, with only a few pistols remaining among the group.  He alone was fighting the enemy--one man against 30.  The rest of the party treated the wounded and moved behind a low paddy dike, shielding them from much of the enemy fire.  Several times a crew member tossed the M-16 to him and he placed automatic fire on the closing enemy. He then tossed it down to be reloaded.  Then he continued calmly shooting his sniper rifle, killing at least 7 of the enemy.  Twice he was hit, including a piece of shrapnel that opened a gaping wound on his chin.  

		(4)  Two Cobra gunships provided covering fire, but soon expended their ammunition.  Vietnamese artillery provided sporadic illumination as [Applicant's] ammunition was also running low.  The 2 gunships landed one by one 10 meters east of the crash, to take out survivors.  With their tails towards the enemy and enemy tracers marking their location, the pilots waved survivors towards them.  A few ran to the first Cobra and were taken out, hanging to the canopy and ammunition doors.  [Applicant] continued shooting at the enemy as the first gunship landed and departed, but thinking that all the survivors were being taken out by the Cobras, [Applicant] moved off the downed aircraft to be taken out by the second Cobra.  As he loaded a badly wounded comrade aboard, he saw his company commander lying wounded and helpless next to the crashed helicopter. He leaped from the departing aircraft and ran to the side of the officer, yelling to the inquiring pilot, "I won't leave the old man to die alone."  Shielding the wounded man with his own body, he killed 2 enemy soldiers at pointblank range as they tried to rush him.  The battalion commander in the command helicopter, told of Eaton's return to the crash, ordered his pilot to land.  As they landed, 6 previously unseen survivors, lying under the tail of the crashed aircraft, boarded the aircraft.  Enemy soldiers fired at the rescue helicopter, the battalion commander engaging one at close range with his pistol.  The overloaded helicopter could not take off, so [Applicant] stepped off, giving his seat to a wounded comrade.  For the second time, he surrendered his safety to help a comrade.  Two soldiers were ordered to stay with him as the rescue helicopter departed but a gunship landed, under fire, and took him and his companions to safety.  He had only 5 rounds of ammunition left.  

		(5)  One man alone, the [Applicant], held off a platoon of over 30 enemy soldiers as he defended 10 injured, and virtually unarmed men.  Against overwhelming odds, with a damaged rifle, from atop burning wreckage, he killed nearly a third of his attackers and held the rest at bay until the survivors could be rescued.  His extraordinary leadership and undaunted courage transformed tragedy into survival for 11 American Soldiers.

	d.  Multiple diagrams of the area where the action occurred, broken down into five phases; map of southern Vietnam showing the location of the operation; aerial panorama of the site; and four aerial views of the site. 

	e.  Statement of enemy morale, authored by the recommending officer, COL PBP, who states that in May 2000, during a visit to Vietnam, he personally met with a Vietnamese officer whom he opposed on 3 April 1969.  He learned from that officer that his troops had high morale.  

	f.  DA Form 1594, dated 3 April 1969, pertaining to 2nd Brigade, 9th ID.  An entry is made regarding the 3rd Battalion's involvement in combat operations, that there was a helicopter crash with 4 Soldier from B Company injured. 

	g.  DA Form 1594, dated 4 April 1969, pertaining to the 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment.  Entries are made in relation to a downed helicopter that had been evacuated; three M-60 Machine Guns were missing and all ammunition and smoke were gone. 

	h.  Declassified Operational Summary, dated 4 April 1969, from the S-3, 3rd battalion, 60th Infantry, to the S-3, 2nd Brigade.  It states the raid ambush resulted in 7 enemy soldiers killed in action by B Company and that B Company had one helicopter shot down at specified grid coordinates.

	i.  Witness statement, dated 27 October 2011, from Mr. DS who said he served with the applicant in 1969 with Company B, 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry, 9th ID.  He describes what occurred on 3 April 1969 as follows: 

		(1)  On 3 April 1969, [Applicant] asked for volunteers to accompany Jim and CPT WMP, the company commander, on a night raid.  After their briefing at the airstrip in Dong Tam they took off and in a little while we landed in a rice paddy about 100 meters from a small village. After the 2 helicopters left, the captain and [Applicant] lead them into the village.  They made an extensive search but found no enemy males.  The captain made the decision to end the search and led them back to the landing zone.  They waited some minutes in that exposed paddy while the helicopters flew off to refuel. Meanwhile they detected movement and noises in the tree line and ditches on 3 sides of the paddy, about 100 meters away.  When the helicopters returned, they turned on the strobe light to mark our location and began to receive some fire. The captain told them that when the helicopters landed to get in immediately.  As they landed the wood lines opened up with numerous muzzle flashes.  They were ablaze, but they got in and took off.   

		(2)  When they were at altitude and out of range of the Viet Cong fire, the captain called for a head count in their aircraft and the other helicopter.  He was told that a man from the other helicopter was missing.  Their aircraft and the other one went back in to get him.  As they made their approach, he could see many muzzle flashes and tracer fire and the sound of the small arms got louder as we got closer to the village.  He was on his seat near the door, holding his    M-79 grenade launcher and the tracers were getting closer.  They got hit and the aircraft pitched up and turned on its side and he fell out.  He hit the mud as the aircraft fell on top of him and he ended up in the same door he had fallen from. He believes he must have been knocked out and as he regained consciousness he could see stars out the other door, above him.  He freed his arm that was buried in the mud, but then an excruciating pain hit him and he could not use his right arm at all.  He heard rifle fire and rounds hitting the aircraft.  He realized that he had to get out and saw no one inside and that the aircraft was smoking.  He crawled through the cockpit door and as he did a rifle was stuck in my face.  He thought it was a Viet Cong, but it was [Applicant].  He touched his injured arm to help him out but he screamed in pain and so he told him get out of the cockpit and sit next to him so he could keep track of him.  He then resumed firing at the tree line.  He asked if he had any M-16 ammunition as he was getting low on ammunition.  He didn't because he had been carrying the M-79 and a.45 pistol, but had lost both in the crash.  

		(3)  He watched him aim and take his time as he was shooting, making every shot count.  He was the only one of our group firing back at the many muzzle flashes.  He was very calm and deliberate as he looked for targets.  He was one man against many.  In a few minutes he (the author) moved toward a noise towards the tail of the crashed aircraft and found someone who seemed to be caught under the fuselage.  He tried to help him out using his un-injured left arm.  He thought it was the captain but wasn't sure.  Shortly afterwards the pain got so bad that he passed out.  When he awoke, [Applicant] was loading him on a Cobra gunship.  He awoke again as it landed at the MASH hospital landing zone.  [Applicant] had strapped him to the side of that gunship with his belt.  While he was conscious, he observed [Applicant] as he single handedly defended the survivors of the crash.  He knew that [Applicant] was keeping them away from them, but they were closing in because their muzzle flashes were getting closer.  It was his courage and determination that kept them from being overrun by the enemy.  He risked his life for us and merits the highest award of the United States Army.  Because of his selfless courage and skill as a marksman, he owes his life to [Applicant].

	g.  Witness statement, dated 11 November 2011, from Mr. BB who also states he served with the applicant.  He de4scribes the events as follows: 

		(1)  On 3 April 1969, he participated in a night raid Company B.  He served as the radio operator for CPT WMP, the raid leader.  During the briefing they were told that they were to capture prisoners, documents or weapons at a site where it was suspected that NVA soldiers were located.  After landing in 2 helicopters, their small raiding party moved into several bamboo hooches and found no males but a number of women and children and a few documents.  The orbiting helicopters radioed that they had taken some fire and he had heard some male voices near one of the hooches.  He reported this to the captain and suggested they move towards the pickup zone in a rice paddy. He agreed and told him to call the helicopters.  But they had to refuel and they waited at the pickup zone for some time until they returned.  As the helicopters landed, they received heavy automatic weapons fire from the area they had left and ditches near the paddy.

		(2)  Both helicopters managed to take off but when they reached altitude the other helicopter radioed that a man was missing.  The captain told the other helicopter to go back in and get him and our helicopter would follow in support.  A few minutes later he saw the captain tap one of the pilots on the shoulder and motion to go down and pick up the man on the ground.  As they approached the ground, their aircraft received fire and a pilot was wounded and they pitched up, fell sideways and crashed.  When it swung up, he fell out and the aircraft landed on its side about 20 meters behind him.  When he got up he saw about 10 enemy soldiers moving toward him from the hooches.  He tried to fire his rifle but it wouldn't work.  At that moment the 2 Cobra gunships opened fire and forced them back.  He moved to the helicopter and saw that [Applicant] had pulled some from the wreckage.  Then, [Applicant] began firing at the enemy and he crawled up on the skid of the overturned aircraft and began firing at the enemy.  They were receiving a lot of small arms fire.  But [Applicant] was the only one who was firing back.

		(3)  The Cobras had been making gun runs very close to them because the enemy was closing in.  But he thinks the gunships ran out of ammunition because one landed a few meters away and took away some of the men in their group.  Meanwhile [Applicant] continued to fire at the enemy from his perch on the skid of their crashed helicopter.  He (the author) believes another Cobra landed but he was too busy moving around and trying to help the wounded that he did not see it.  He continued to hear [Applicant] shooting but he moved to the rear of the crashed aircraft away from the incoming fire because he had no weapon.  There, he saw some of the helicopter crew, apparently wounded.  Shortly afterward, COL PBP's helicopter and a Cobra landed and the gunner from the Cobra jumped out and helped him haul the captain away from the crashed helicopter.  [Applicant] was still firing but had moved down near the captain.  The Cobra gunner then ran back to his aircraft and got back in.  He saw the [Applicant] run to that Cobra along with 2 other men and they took off-with the 3 men standing on the skids.  He took off in the COL's helicopter, along with the captain and several others.  He believes they were the crew of the downed helicopter.  They landed at Dong Tam hospital and he was checked by the medics and learned he had sustained a cracked vertebrae.  [Applicant's] fire kept the enemy away from them.  Once the gunships ran out of ammo, he was the only one that kept the enemy at bay.  Single-handedly he held off an enemy platoon and saved the lives of 3 helicopters and 6 infantrymen. 

	h.  Witness statement, dated 3 July 2011, from Mr. WS, who participated in the events that took place on 3 April 1969.  He describes those events as follows: 

		(1)  On 3 April 1969, he participated on a night raid in Kien Roa province in South Vietnam with his unit, Company B, 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry, 9th ID.  The company commander, Captain WMP, asked for 9 volunteers and specifically asked him to be the machine gunner on the raid.  He didn't want to volunteer but when he asked him, he agreed.  After a briefing at the operations room of the helicopter unit, they departed and after a long flight, the 2 troopships landed at night next to a small hamlet.  He followed the captain and then ran to the left with [Applicant] where he grabbed a woman hiding in a hole but was told to let her go. He then turned towards where Captain WMP was about 75 feet to my right near 3 bamboo hooches.  Right then a guy ran out of hooch but the captain told him not to shoot him because identification was difficult in the dark and he may have been an unarmed older boy.  

		(2)  Shortly after, the captain told the raiding party to return to the paddy and reform for extraction.  He ran with him back along a dike and then to the paddy.  The mud was very thick and it was difficult to move but we split into 2 chalks, one for each helicopter.  He was with CPT WMP and [Applicant] in the first chalk.  The captain told them all that when the helicopters landed, to board immediately because they could hear Vietnamese in the wood line to one side of the paddy and near the hamlet to our front.  As the helicopters landed, Cobra gunships strafed near the wood line and hooches, but the enemy opened up on them with many automatic weapons and their tracers turned the world green that night.  Their ship got into the air and he sat in the middle of the helicopter.  The captain took headcount and then told them that a man from the other helicopter was missing.  They made an approach back toward the LZ from the opposite direction and he faced left, towards the wood line.  He sat next to the aircraft gunner and the gunner told him to take his place if he was hit.  As they neared the ground, he couldn't see what was happening ahead but he could see automatic weapons fire coming from hooch.  He began firing at it and hit it because it began to burn from his tracers.  He tried to continue to fire but noticed that the floor in front of him was rising and he had to depress the muzzle lower and lower.  Then he realized that the helicopter was rolling over and then it hit.  He let go of the M-60 and ended up between the pilots in the cockpit and followed one of them out as he climbed through the broken Plexiglas. 

		(3)  He heard a muffled cry and crawled across legs sticking out from under the aircraft.  He didn't know who it was.  He tried to find someone to help him.  Then he heard someone firing and it was [Applicant] firing at the enemy.  He asked him to help but not sure if he did because he was firing and was the only to do so.  Four or five of them began to rock the airplane and he grabbed the legs and pulled the man out from under the aircraft.  It was the captain and he was in bad shape but was talking.  Meanwhile, [Applicant] crawled up on the left skid and began firing at the enemy who were getting closer and whose firing was increasing.  But [Applicant's] firing was keeping them from overwhelming them.  He couldn't find his M-60 Machine Gun and he only had his .45 pistol.  He tried to treat the captain and eventually got him a few feet further from the aircraft.  The gunships made a couple of gun runs but they soon ran out of ammunition and only [Applicant] was firing at the enemy.  One of the gunships landed to their front, with his tail towards the enemy and the pilot motioned to them.  Green tracers came toward them but several ran toward the aircraft and climbed up on the winglets.  He tried to carry the captain but he told him leave him and get out.  He set him down but went back toward the tail of our downed aircraft.  

		(4)  The gunship left with several of the party.  [Applicant] continued to fire and then when a second gunship came he ran to it.  But as it turned to depart, he jumped down and ran back to the captain and stayed with him.  He (the author) heard him shoot after he was beside the captain and believes he hit several enemy soldiers who came near the aircraft. He was back near the tail with a couple from the aircraft crew.  He does not think that [Applicant] or the captain knew we were there.  He was determined not to leave the captain but was trying to stay behind cover near him, because enemy fire was hitting all over the aircraft and in the area near [Applicant] and the captain.  Soon another Huey landed and the colonel and someone else jumped out and dragged the captain to that helicopter and also loaded on the wounded pilot and the door gunner.  Just before it left Iran up to the colonel and asked if he (the author) should go out with him.  He told him to get on a Cobra gunship that had just landed near them. He got on one side and the gunner held him as he stood on the skid.  He thinks [Applicant] and someone else were standing on the skid on the other side.  They flew them to a rearming point about 20 minutes flying time away.  Later, he was flown to Dong Tam and rejoined the company.  He never saw the captain again.

		(5)  [Applicant] demonstrated the highest order of heroism as he fought off the enemy.  He was the only one firing back because most of rifles and all the machine guns had been lost or damaged in the crash.  He fought them off and they all survived because of extraordinary heroism.

13.  The MOH, Title 10, U.S. Code, section 3741, was established by Joint Resolution of Congress on 12 July 1862 (amended by acts in 1918 and 1963).  The MOH is awarded by the President in the name of Congress to a person who, while a member of the Army, distinguishes himself or herself conspicuously by gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his or her life above and beyond the call of duty while engaged in an action against an enemy of the United States, while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force, or while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in an armed conflict against an opposing armed force in which the United States is not a belligerent party.  The deed performed must have been one of personal bravery or self-sacrifice so conspicuous as to clearly distinguish the individual above his comrades and must have involved risk of life.  Incontestable proof of the performance of the service will be exacted and each recommendation for the award of this decoration will be considered on the standard of extraordinary merit.

14.  Army Regulation 600-8-22 provides for the following awards:

	a.  The Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) is awarded to a person who, while serving in any capacity with the Army, distinguished himself or herself by extraordinary heroism while engaged in action against an enemy of the United States not justifying award of the Medal of Honor.  The act or acts of heroism must have been so notable and have involved risk of life so extraordinary as to set the individual apart from his or her comrades.

	b.  The Silver Star is awarded for gallantry in action against the enemy.  The required gallantry (spirited and conspicuous acts of heroism and courage) must have been performed with marked distinction.  As with all personal decorations, formal recommendations, approval through the chain of command, and announcement in orders are required.

	c.  The BSM is awarded in time of war for heroism and for meritorious achievement or service, not involving participation in aerial flight, in connection with military operations against an armed enemy, or while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing armed force in which the United States is not a belligerent party.  As with all personal decorations, formal recommendations, approval through the chain of command, and announcement in orders are required.  

	d.  The ARCOM may be awarded to any member of the Armed Forces of the United States who, while serving in any capacity with the Army after 6 December 1941, distinguishes himself or herself by heroism, meritorious achievement, or meritorious service.  As with all personal decorations, formal recommendations, approval through the chain of command, and announcement in orders are required.

	e.  The bronze "V" device indicates acts of heroism involving conflict with an armed enemy and authorizes the device in conjunction with awards of the ARCOM, the Air Medal, and the BSM.  

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS:

1.  The Army awards system recognizes and reacts to distinguishing acts of valor and bravery for Soldiers.  The commander on the ground acts as a steward to ensure the proper recognition of our brave men and women.  The Army has always been fully committed to the responsibility of properly recognizing Soldiers for their valor, heroism, and meritorious service through a fair and consistent decorations and awards policy and process.

	a.  Awards and decorations are very important to Soldiers.  Equally important is the governance of the awards program.  For the awards program to be credible to the Soldiers and the American people, it must ensure that it recognizes individuals with a military award worthy of their accomplishments and acts of valor.  It must ensure the integrity of the award is maintained through strict procedures and proper justifications.  Finally, it must place trust and confidence in commanders to properly execute the program.

	b.  The criteria for military awards are set forth in statutes, executive orders, and appropriate regulations.  The criteria for the three highest valor awards are established by law and have not changed from what they were in past conflicts.  Army regulation and policy establish the standards by which those awards are processed, approved, and presented.  This consistency upholds the heritage of the awards and the legacy of the heroes who have earned them.

	c.  Army policy allows any Soldier to recommend another Soldier for an award.  The Army's awards program relies on those with first-hand knowledge of a Soldier's heroic or valorous action to recommend the Soldier for the appropriate award.  Award recommendations are sent up through the Soldier's chain of command to company, battalion, brigade, division, and corps commanders.  Commanders at every level of review can recommend approval or upgrade of the award based upon their authority.  Commanders with authority to approve awards also have the authority to downgrade or disapprove awards based on their judgment, knowledge, and the criteria established for the award.  Command involvement is critical for program success.

2.  The highest awards for valor are, in descending order, the MOH, the DSC, and the Silver Star.

	a.  MOH –The MOH of Honor is awarded by the President in the name of Congress to a service member who distinguishes himself or herself conspicuously by gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his or her life above and beyond the call of duty while engaged in action against an enemy of the United States, while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force, or while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in an armed conflict against an opposing armed force in which the United States is not a belligerent party.  The deed performed must have been one of personal bravery or self-sacrifice so conspicuous as to clearly distinguish the individual above his or her comrades and must have involved risk of life.  Incontestable proof of the performance of the service is required and each recommendation for the award of this decoration will be considered on the standard of extraordinary merit.  Again, only the President can award the MOH.

	b.  DSC – The second highest award bestowed upon a Soldier for valor.  The DSC is awarded to a Soldier who distinguishes himself or herself by extraordinary heroism not justifying the award of a Medal of Honor while engaged in an action against an enemy of the United States, while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing/foreign force, or while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in an armed conflict against an opposing Armed Force in which the United States is not a belligerent party.  The act or acts of heroism must be so notable and have involved risk of life so extraordinary as to set the individual apart from his or her comrades.  

	c.  Silver Star – Finally, the third highest award for combat heroism is the Silver Star.  The Silver Star is awarded to a Soldier who is cited for gallantry in action against an enemy of the United States while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force or while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in armed conflict against an opposing armed force in which the United States is not a belligerent party.  The required gallantry, while of a lesser degree than that required for award of the DSC, must nevertheless have been performed with marked distinction.

3.  As evidenced by the above descriptions, there exists a very fine distinction between "conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity," "extraordinary heroism," and "gallantry in action."  Oftentimes, the degree of heroism required for a particular award is blurred and subject to personal interpretation.  What is not subject to interpretation is the selfless sacrifice demonstrated by all recipients of these three highest awards for valor.  All recipients are, without doubt, true American heroes.

4.  The applicant's valor and courage on 3 April 1969 under extremely hazardous conditions are acknowledged and applauded; he is truly an American hero.  However, it is extremely difficult to make the necessary distinctions as to whether a particular act constitutes "conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity," "extraordinary heroism," or "gallantry in action."  Here, the applicant's record shows he was clearly cited for heroism in action against an enemy of the United States while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force in Vietnam.  A decision was made to initially award him the ARCOM with "V" Device.

5.  In the late 1990s, it appears someone petitioned the Army Decorations Board to upgrade the applicant's award to a Silver Star.  The petitioner felt his actions warranted a higher award.  Upon further review, the Army Decorations Board, consisting of senior commissioned officers in the grade of Colonel and a senior enlisted Soldier in the grade of E-9 determined that his actions rose above that required for the ARCOM to the level of the BSM.  His award was staffed through the Army Decorations Board and the award of the BSM with "V" Device was ultimately approved in recognition of his heroism on 3 April 1969.

6.  The decision of whether to award an individual a decoration and which decoration to award is a judgment call made by the commander having award approval authority in the theater of operations.  Commanders at the time of the act, or shortly thereafter, determined the applicant's actions were so noteworthy as to warrant award of the ARCOM with "V" Device.  The Army Decorations Board determined the degree of action and service rendered by the applicant did not meet the criteria for award of the Silver Star.  Based on the board's recommendation, the CG, HRC, on behalf of the SA, disapproved award of the Silver Star and awarded him the BSM with "V" Device.  

7.  There is no change in the account of the applicant's actions in April 1969 or new evidence presented that is so much different from the previous evidence submitted during the upgrade of the ARCOM with "V" that it would suggest an error or an injustice was committed by all three echelons of the Army, tactical (9th ID chain of command), operational (U.S. Army Vietnam), or strategic (HRC Army Decorations Board).  As such, after a thorough review of the applicant's actions and the three statements he now submits, it appears BSM with "V" Device remains the appropriate award.








BOARD VOTE:

________  ________  ________  GRANT FULL RELIEF 

________  ________  ________  GRANT PARTIAL RELIEF 

________  ________  ________  GRANT FORMAL HEARING

____X___  ____X___  ____X___ DENY APPLICATION

BOARD DETERMINATION/RECOMMENDATION:

1.  The evidence presented does not demonstrate the existence of a probable error or injustice.  Therefore, the Board determined the overall merits of this case are insufficient as a basis for correction of the records of the individual concerned.

2.  The applicant is a true American hero; his selfless act of bravery and devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service.  In making this determination, the applicant and all others concerned should know this action in no way diminishes the sacrifices made by the applicant in service to our Nation.  All Americans should be justifiably proud of his service in arms.



      ____________X____________
                  CHAIRPERSON
      
I certify that herein is recorded the true and complete record of the proceedings of the Army Board for Correction of Military Records in this case.



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