IN THE CASE OF:	   

		BOARD DATE:	  14 January 2015

		DOCKET NUMBER:  AR20140013231 


THE BOARD CONSIDERED THE FOLLOWING EVIDENCE:

1.  Application for correction of military records (with supporting documents provided, if any). 

2.  Military Personnel Records and advisory opinions (if any).


THE APPLICANT'S REQUEST, STATEMENT, AND EVIDENCE:

1.  The applicant, the daughter of a deceased former service member (FSM), requests that the Silver Star (SS) posthumously awarded to the FSM be upgraded to the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC).

2.  The applicant states she has designated counsel to take all actions necessary related to the submission of her request.  

3.  The applicant provides a self-authored letter, her Certificate of Live Birth, and a Medical Examiner's Certificate documenting her mother's death.  

COUNSEL'S REQUEST, STATEMENT AND EVIDENCE:

1.  Counsel requests an upgrade of the FSM's posthumous SS to the DSC.  

2.  Counsel describes the conditions under which the FSM's regiment, the 116th Infantry Regiment (a subordinate unit of the 29th Infantry Division), served from 
D-Day (6 June 1944) through 17 July 1944, the date he was killed in action.  He states:

	a.  One of the key objectives during the Normandy campaign was to capture the village of St. Lo, a major road hub located 20 miles inland from Omaha Beach.  Capture of this objective was necessary to facilitate the First Army's future operations to drive enemy forces from the Cotentin Peninsula and Brittany and ultimately free all of France, and then attack into Germany.  Planners envisioned a quick capture of St. Lo, but the German high command had determined that St. Lo was to be held at all costs.  Consequently, the battle for St. Lo became one of the most difficult and bitter battles of the war in Europe.  The struggle was the headline on every newspaper in America, and casualty counts soared during what became known as the "Battle of the Hedgerows."  The enemy's defense was so strong that additional Army divisions had to be allocated to the XIX Corps to support the 29th Infantry Division, which was already attacking to capture St. Lo.  

	b.  The first drive to St. Lo lasted from 7 to 18 June 1944 and cost the 29th Infantry Division over 2,000 casualties.  The second attempt to capture St. Lo began on 11 July 1944.  Attacks over the next 5 days failed to gain control of St. Lo at a cost of over 2,400 more casualties for the 29th Infantry Division and several thousand more among four other divisions.

	c.  After 40 days of heavy combat, Major General (MG) Gerhardt, the Commanding General (CG) of the 29th Infantry Division, decided to make one last all-out attack to seize St. Lo.  On 15 July 1944, the division's units attacked down the Martinville Ridge, but, except for the 2nd Battalion, 116th Infantry Regiment, a German counterattack halted the advance.  The 2nd Battalion advanced after flanking units had halted and soon found itself perilously isolated a mile forward of the other division units.  

	d.  The 2nd Battalion was at less than 50 percent strength, it was behind German lines, ammunition was low, its food was gone, and there were 35 wounded Soldiers who had to be evacuated or they would soon die.  Eventually several did die because they could not be evacuated.  

	e.  On 16 July 1944, MG Gerhardt bypassed the commander of the 116th Infantry Regiment and went personally to the FSM, who was the commander of the 3rd Battalion, 116th Infantry Regiment.  He assigned the mission to capture St. Lo to the FSM's battalion.  Strangely, MG Gerhardt did not directly order the relief or rescue of the 2nd Battalion, 116th Infantry Regiment, in the mission assigned to the FSM's battalion, but the FSM and his men were already keenly aware of the plight of the 2nd Battalion.  The FSM had been in command of his battalion since 13 July 1944, 3 days before the attack on St. Lo.  

	f.  The FSM determined a night attack was the only way he stood a chance of successfully accomplishing the assigned mission.  He would have to attack by stealth to offset the disadvantages posed by extremely difficult terrain and well-entrenched, heavily armed German paratrooper units that had been preparing their defense for several days.  The mission became even more difficult when Adolf Hitler ordered his senior commander to defend St. Lo to the last man.  This resulted in stiffening and reinforcement of enemy defenses in and around St. Lo.  The pressure on the FSM intensified exponentially when the CG told him there would be no division units in reserve to reinforce his battalion if the attack could not break through the German defenses.  

	g.  Beginning on 16 July 1944, the FSM planned a night attack by stealth against the Soldiers of the German 3rd Falschirmjaeger (FJ) Division, one of several well-armed and highly-motivated units of the Seventh German Army defending St. Lo.  In preparation for this attack, the FSM imposed extreme restrictions on return of small arms fire by his men so the enemy would not be alerted and would not be able to determine the size of his force or the direction of its movement.  Specifically, the FSM ordered that his men could only attack German positions with bayonets and hand grenades.  

	h.  Early on 17 July 1944, the FSM embarked on the mission with a battalion that was below half strength, fully aware of the difficulty of a night assault.  He personally led the battalion down the Martinville Ridge single file over extremely rough terrain without benefit of preparatory artillery fires so the enemy would not be alerted to the pending attack.  

	i.  Throughout the battalion's movement and especially as it neared its intermediate objective, it came under intense enemy fire.  The FSM and his men fought through enemy positions with only bayonets and grenades.  Early on the morning of 17 July 1944, the battalion broke through the German defenses east of St. Lo.  This was a feat that the XIX Corps with four infantry divisions and an armored division had not been able to accomplish in over 40 days of combat.  

	j.  After breaching the 3rd FJ Division's defenses, the FSM's battalion linked up with the 2nd Battalion, 116th Infantry, which had been in an isolated defensive position a mile forward of the 29th Infantry Division's front line for 2 days, had exhausted its supplies, and had suffered casualties.  The commander of the 116th Infantry Regiment had planned for the 2nd Battalion to lead the attack into St. Lo; however, after linking up, the FSM and the 2nd Battalion's commander agreed the 2nd Battalion was in no condition to perform this mission.  The regimental commander requested the FSM's battalion continue the attack alone.  The FSM responded, "Will do.  See you in St. Lo."

	k.  Later, on the morning of 17 July 1944, the FSM had issued his operations order and was starting the attack into St. Lo when he was killed during an enemy mortar barrage.  

	l.  The success of the night attack by the 3rd Battalion, 116th Infantry, caused enemy units defending positions east of St. Lo to withdraw to defensive positions in St. Lo.  This attack also caused the well-entrenched enemy defenders of St. Lo to reorient their primary defenses eastward in anticipation of an attack from the east by the 3rd Battalion.  The repositioning of enemy forces allowed the 29th Infantry Division to mount a successful operation by a hastily-formed combined arms unit named Task Force C.  Task Force C entered St. Lo virtually unopposed from the northeast and rapidly took control of the town.  

	m.  The capture of St. Lo was directly attributable to the extraordinarily heroic leadership, personal bravery on the battlefield, and intrepidity of the FSM and his battalion.  British General Bernard Montgomery and the commander of Task Force C both publicly acknowledged that the FSM's extraordinary heroism and that of his Soldiers was solely responsible for the 29th Infantry Division's capture of St. Lo, thereby allowing the breakout of 21 Army divisions from the Normandy beachhead.  

	n.  As a symbol of respect and acknowledgement of the FSM's sacrifice, 29th Infantry Division Soldiers carried his flag-covered body into what remained of St. Lo and placed it atop the ruins of a church.  By chance, a Life Magazine photographer came by and photographed it.  Because the photographer would not reveal the FSM's name, he captioned it "The Major of St. Lo."  The picture went around the world and became a visible symbol of valor and sacrifice.

	o.  Sometimes those who view an action from afar lend credibility to the bravery and sacrifice performed.  For them, the FSM's courage was evidence of what he and his troops had achieved.  The victory at St. Lo was recognized in many other ways.  The President of the United States ordered an American aircraft carrier named the St. Lo.  The Government of France awarded the FSM the Legion of Honor (France's highest military decoration).  France has lionized the FSM by a monument and a bridge named for him.  Each year the French honor him as the Major of St. Lo.  At The Citadel's parade ground, there is a carillon that bears his name.  These expressions are a testimony that gave life to his valor and achievement, which are a legacy to succeeding ages.  As this case is undergoing review, the FSM's daughter and only child is the guest of the citizens of St. Lo at ceremonies recognizing the 70th anniversary of the village's liberation by the FSM and the Soldiers of his battalion.  

3.  Regarding the processing of a recommendation for award of the DSC to the FSM, counsel states:

	a.  MG Gerhardt submitted a recommendation, dated 20 July 1944, for posthumous award of the DSC to the FSM for his actions in driving German forces from St. Lo.  

	b.  On 27 July 1944, MG Corlett, the CG, XIX Corps, reviewed the DSC recommendation, recommended approval, and forwarded it to Headquarters, First Army, for approval.  On 30 July 1944, the recommendation was received by the Adjutant General, Headquarters, First Army.  

	c.  Between 12 and 18 August 1944, the DSC recommendation was circulated at Headquarters, First Army, to be considered by the First Army Decorations Board.  The officers who reviewed the recommendation found that, although meritorious, the FSM's actions were insufficient for award of the DSC.  The disapproved recommendation was returned to MG Gerhardt for him to award the SS, the next lesser award for valor below the DSC.  He approved award of the SS for the FSM's heroism on 17 July 1944.  

4.  There is substantial evidence demonstrating that there were errors, omissions, and injustice in the preparation and processing of the recommendation to award the DSC to the FSM.  

	a.  The degree of the FSM's heroism and personal bravery on the battlefield were understated in the recommendation for award of the DSC:

* the SS citation is worded more strongly than the DSC recommendation forwarded to First Army
* MG Gerhardt submitted four witness statements, of which only two substantively addressed the FSM's actions and the degree of his heroism
* the shortcoming in the recommendation was likely due to MG Gerhardt's belief that his personal recommendation was sufficient for approval of the DSC

	b.  The significance of the operation to wrest control of St. Lo from German forces and the critical nature of the FSM's contribution to the success of the Allied invasion of France were not clearly apparent or emphasized at the time his award was considered by the First Army Decorations Board.  The FSM's extraordinary heroism must now be described and placed in proper perspective based on consideration of new evidence, military reports, and research by noted authors and historians gathered well after the DSC recommendation was submitted.  The new evidence provided in support of this request conclusively proves that the FSM's heroism in the face of well-armed, firmly-entrenched, and numerically-superior German forces merits an upgrade of his SS to a DSC.

	c.  There is evidence that the DSC recommendation was considered at Headquarters, First Army, by staff officers who lacked the combat experience necessary to render a full, fair, and impartial decision.  There is also compelling evidence that LTG Hodges, who was the CG, First Army, and the award approval authority for the DSC, did not personally act on the recommendation of the First Army Decorations Board.  

5.  On 6 June 2012, a team of former military officers and civilian officials completed a request to upgrade the FSM's SS to the DSC.  

	a.  The request was assembled based on significant substantive errors, omissions, and injustices apparent in the preparation, processing, and decision-making resulting in denial of a posthumous award of the DSC.  The request consisted of more than 75 pages presenting facts and 49 tabs containing evidentiary exhibits.  

	b.  The request was forwarded by a Member of Congress for consideration by the Secretary of the Army as required by Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 1130 (10 USC 1130).  The Secretary of the Army forwarded the request to the Awards and Decorations Branch, U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC), Fort Knox, KY, for review by the Army Decorations Board (ADB).  

	c.  On 15 October 2012, The Adjutant General wrote to the Member of Congress on behalf of the Secretary of the Army regarding the request.  The letter stated that "his experts" found no new factual information that was not otherwise available to the "original approval authority."  The Adjutant General further stated that reconsideration may only be done once and that the ADB's decision is considered conclusive.  The Adjutant General offered the assistance of the Chief, Awards and Decorations Branch, to "discuss the review process; provide examples of the types of documentation that would qualify as new information; and assist in reviewing any additional documentation that may be gathered in support of the upgrade."  

	d.  The Chief, Awards and Decorations Branch, provided guidance in an email and a telephone call to counsel.  Essentially, the guidance restated governing awards regulations, advised counsel on how to structure a new submission, and stated a new submission would allow the ADB to compare the full information against the original award recommendation.

	e.  A new submission was completed on 20 May 2013 for consideration by the ADB.  The document consisted of a six-page narrative, a two-page award recommendation and citation, and 48 pages of documentary evidence.  On 28 June 2013, a Member of Congress forwarded the new submission to the Secretary of the Army for consideration by the ADB.  

	f.  By letter, dated 3 December 2013, the Secretary of the Army informed the Member of Congress that the ADB had again found that the FSM's actions did not meet the criteria for the DSC and that the SS was the appropriate award for his actions.  The Secretary of the Army also provided several reasons behind the decision to deny an upgrade of the FSM's SS to a DSC.  

	g.  The evidence conclusively demonstrates egregious errors, injustice, and omissions during the consideration of the FSM's award at Headquarters, First Army.  The ADB's decision to deny the upgrade is in error and unjust.  

6.  Factors adversely affecting the award process and resulting in denial by the First Army Decorations Board included:

* shortcomings in the original recommendation for the DSC
* General (GEN) Omar Bradley's promotion and reassignment to command the 12th Army Group
* exigencies of war and the unprecedented operation tempo at Headquarters, First Army, during the period 25 July to 18 August 1944
* the level of combat experience of the members of the First Army Decorations Board
* flawed operations of the First Army Decorations Board
* lack of action by the DSC approval authority at First Army
* inequitable treatment with regard to approval of awards of the DSC for Soldiers of the 29th Infantry Division
* adversarial relationships between the MG Gerhardt, MG Corlett, and LTG Hodges

   a.  MG Gerhardt did not provide all of the available evidence of the FSM's heroism on 16 and 17 July 1944, either due to the belief that his personal recommendation was sufficient or due to the exigencies of war.  

		(1)  Approximately 400 Soldiers of the 3rd Battalion, 116th Infantry Regiment, participated in the night attack on 16 and 17 July 1944.  However, MG Gerhardt submitted only four witness statements in support of the recommendation for award of the DSC to the FSM.  Only two of those statements substantively addressed the FSM's actions and the degree of his heroism on the battlefield.  It is undeniable that more witness statements attesting to the FSM's extraordinary heroism and leadership under fire would have provided the impetus necessary to assure approval of the DSC.

		(2)  There is no evidence that MG Gerhardt prepared a statement in support of the FSM's award.  Paragraph 11 of the award recommendation merely refers to the attached statement of a captain.  

		(3)  Historians who have studied MG Gerhardt have found him highly imperialistic.  If he made a request, he expected it should be granted solely because he was making the request as a division commander.  This may have led to his failure to submit a greater number of eyewitness statements or his own statement to assure approval of award of the DSC to the FSM.  

	b.  The assertion that the DSC recommendation submitted by MG Gerhardt understated the FSM's heroism is proven by his own words in the SS Citation he signed.  The wording of this citation is much stronger than the award recommendation he submitted to First Army.  He also failed to credit the FSM with the rescue of the 2nd Battalion, 116th Infantry Regiment, which had been isolated forward of the division's front lines and under constant fire for 2 days.  

	c.  Effective 1 August 1944, GEN Bradley, who had been in command of First Army, was promoted and assumed command of the 12th Army Group.  The timing of this event had a profound impact on the final decision on the degree of recognition the FSM should receive.  GEN Bradley more than any other commander knew the necessity of capturing St. Lo.  It was he who delayed the breakout from the Omaha Beachhead until St. Lo had been secured.  British General Montgomery had publicly attributed the capture of St. Lo to the FSM's actions, so GEN Bradley knew the FSM was responsible.  The recommendation to award the DSC to the FSM stood the best chance for approval with then-LTG Bradley who owed the success of his breakout plan to the FSM and the Soldiers of the 3rd Battalion, 116th Infantry.  

	d.  The members of the First Army Decorations Board lacked combat experience and the expertise of MG Gerhardt and MG Corlett.  They were unqualified to overrule the judgment and military experience of those commanders.  

	e.  The operational tempo adversely affected consideration of the FSM's award.  The DSC recommendation was prepared and considered amid the turmoil created by the breakout from the Normandy Beachhead, activation of the 12th Army Group, reallocation of Army divisions into the new Third Army and First Army areas of operations, and commitment of all First and Third Army divisions to the battle to trap the German Seventh Army in the Argentan-Falaise Pocket.  

	f.  Amid the operational turmoil, the processing of the FSM's award was not accorded the highest priority in terms of the personal attention of key First Army staff officers or LTG Hodges.  

		(1)  Two of the four appointed members of the First Army Decorations Board did not vote on the recommendation to award the DSC to the FSM.  Records created at the time show the Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) did not receive the recommendation.  The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, had been reassigned a week earlier, and it appears another officer took action on the recommendation.  

      (2)  Further, there is no evidence that LTG Hodges, who was the DSC approval authority, reviewed or personally acted on the recommendation.  
      
      (3)  The processing of the recommendation failed to meet the standards published by the Adjutant General, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA).  Specifically, there is no evidence that a recorder was appointed for the First Army Decorations Board, that the board members sought additional information regarding the recommendation, or that anyone at Headquarters, First Army, investigated the recommendation.  

	g.  Approval rates for award of the DSC for the 29th Infantry Division and the 1st Infantry Division varied greatly.

		(1)  The 29th Infantry Division was a National Guard division with no World War II fame.  The 1st Infantry Division was a Regular Army division with a storied history in World War I and in World War II during Mediterranean Theater campaigns prior to D-Day.  

		(2)  Both divisions were assigned to First Army and provided the assault forces for Omaha Beach on D-Day.  From D-Day onward to 1 August 1944, both divisions were located either adjacent to each other or in close proximity in the same area of operations.  

		(3)  After D-Day until the breakout, the 1st Infantry Division maintained a defensive posture in a relatively quiet sector of the beachhead and did not see the level of protracted and intense combat experienced by the 29th Infantry Division as it attacked relentlessly to St. Lo.  

		(4)  A review of World War II DSC citations revealed that for the period 6 June to 1 August 1944, 103 awards of the DSC were given to Soldiers of the 29th Infantry Division and 1st Infantry Division.  Of these, 76 awards were given to Soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division and 27 were given to Soldiers of the 29th Infantry Division.  Either there was a bias against the National Guard division on the part of the members of the First Army Decorations Board, who were Regular Army, or MG Gerhardt properly controlled recommendations for the DSC so that only the most deserving received it.  In the former case, disapproval of the DSC was patently unfair.  If the latter situation existed, then MG Gerhardt had good reason to believe his recommendations would receive favorable consideration.  

	h.  Newly-discovered information contained in a book published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History confirms that the relationships between MG Corlett (CG, XIX Corps) and LTG Hodges (CG, First Army) and their staffs were adversarial.  Excerpts from the book illustrate this, and it was also reported that LTG Hodges had a falling out with MG Gerhardt over adverse treatment of LTG Hodges's nephew who was a member of MG Gerhardt's division.  Had GEN Bradley been the decision authority, the recommendation to award the DSC to the FSM would have had a markedly better chance of approval than it did with LTG Hodges.  

	i.  The First Army Decorations Board did not ensure that recommended awards were mutually consistent as required by ETOUSA instructions.  

		(1)  A lieutenant received the DSC (approved by then-LTG Bradley) for his foray to capture German soldiers for interrogation.  Although heroic, this is not equal to or consistent with the actions of the FSM, his degree of heroism, or the personal risk to which he was exposed.  

		(2)  The First Army Decorations Board failed to recognize or consider critical factors of the mission the FSM was ordered to undertake with his under-strength battalion.  The FSM accepted the risk of death, demonstrated extraordinary heroism in the face of heavy enemy fire, and motivated an under-strength unit to attack a heavily armed, numerically superior enemy in fortified positions in order to rescue the 2nd Battalion, 116th Infantry Regiment, and to continue on to capture St. Lo.  The decision to award the DSC to the lieutenant met First Army policy to be as liberal as is consistent with the obligation to maintain the prestige and value of the decorations.  The First Army Decorations Board applied a different standard in the FSM's case.  

7.  The standard for award of the DSC, as stated then and now, focuses on two requirements:  extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations against an armed enemy and acts of heroism so notable and involving risk of life so extraordinary as to set an individual apart from his comrades.  

	a.  An indorsement signed by a captain in the position of Assistant Adjutant General, Adjutant General Division, First Army, stated the FSM's acts did not justify award of the DSC.  The indorsement should have but did not address both standards.  

	b.  The officers who considered and rejected MG Gerhardt's recommendation lacked military experience, seasoned judgment, and critical information.  Based on his direct knowledge of events leading to and including the period in question, MG Gerhardt was in the best position to determine that the FSM's actions met the criteria for award of the DSC.  Further, MG Corlett's knowledge and experience gave him an understanding of the requirements for award of the DSC to act effectively as a recommending official.  

	c.  The CG, First Army, and his Chief of Staff, who were the two most seasoned and experienced officers in the headquarters, did not apply their experience and judgment on award decisions.  Another staff officer routinely approved and authenticated awards at First Army.  In effect, colonels voted to downgrade a recognition recommended by general officers.  

	d.  A historian's account of the terrain the FSM's battalion had to traverse during the period in question shows that the FSM had to expose himself to ferocious enemy fire to maintain control, direction and organization of the attacking forces.  Further, a captain and a noncommissioned officer attested to the heavy enemy fire and to the fact that the FSM repeatedly exposed himself to enemy fire to inspire his men.  His efforts led to successful accomplishment of the mission.  

	e.  The evidence shows the FSM's actions on 17 July 1944 met the standard for the DSC and still do today.  

8.  After receiving guidance from the Chief, Awards and Decorations Branch, on 28 June 2013, a Member of Congress forwarded a submission to the Secretary of the Army for consideration by the ADB.  On 3 December 2013, the Secretary of the Army advised the Member of Congress the CG, HRC, had disapproved the DSC based on the ADB's recommendation and reaffirmed that the SS was the appropriate award for the FSM's actions.  In his letter, the Secretary of the Army stated:

* The strategic significance of the Battle of St. Lo cannot be used as justification to reconsider previously-approved valor awards
* The FSM's actions during the attack were commensurate with those the Army expects of a battalion commander
* The Army places trust and confidence in the decisions made by commanders in the field as they possess the greatest view, knowledge and perspective of the significance of individual contributions
* LTG Hodges, as Deputy CG, First Army, at the time of the FSM's actions, and then as CG, First Army, and approval authority for the DSC, possessed the insight, knowledge and perspective to render a well-informed decision on the FSM's award

9.  Review of the most recent consideration of the FSM's case and the Secretary of the Army's response shows errors, injustices, and omissions that have not yet been satisfactorily addressed.  Further, new issues have been raised which cast doubt on the fairness, equity, and impartiality of the ADB's consideration of the FSM's case and perhaps other cases.  

	a.  The ADB did not receive documents originally submitted in 2012.  Instead, the ADB reviewed only a portion of numerous pages of documentary evidence.  

	b.  The ADB has the same shortcomings as the First Army Decorations Board.  The ADB consists of colonels, lieutenant colonels (promotable), and sergeants major assigned to HRC.  No members of the ADB could have had Vietnam War, Korean War, or World War II experience, nor could any members have been decorated for heroism during those periods.  A decorations board considering the FSM's case should meet qualifications equal to or greater than the officers recommending the decoration.  The officers on the ADB lacked experience and knowledge equal to or greater than MG Gerhardt or MG Corlett.  

	c.  Awards statistics show that, beginning with the first Persian Gulf War, the Medal of Honor and DSC have been awarded at rates much lower than the previous three major conflicts.  This shows that the current award environment is very different from that of the World War II era.  As such, the current environment in which the ADB considered the FSM's award is adversely prejudicial, unjust, and inequitable when compared to the award environment in which he performed his acts of extraordinary heroism and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty. 

	d.  The response signed by the Secretary of the Army did not provide any information on how the ADB or the CG, HRC, concluded that the FSM's actions did not meet the criteria for the DSC, did not frame the denial of the award on the bases of the regulatory standards, and did not state any facts relative to guidance from the Chief, Awards and Decorations Branch, which stated the ADB would compare the submission to the original award recommendation.  

	e.  The Secretary's statement that the strategic significance of the Battle of St. Lo cannot be used as justification to reconsider a valor award is contradicted by the conclusive evidence of the importance of capturing St. Lo.  The mission was carried out under the risk of death and without reinforcements, and the FSM was killed carrying out that mission.  Others, such as Charles Lindberg, Commander Richard Byrd, and GEN Douglas MacArthur have received the Medal of Honor for carrying out missions of military and political significance.  

	f.  The Secretary's statement that the FSM's actions are commensurate with those the Army expects of a battalion commander is opposed to the purpose of the awards program in effect in 1944 and today.  It is equivalent to stating that battalion commanders will not or should not be decorated or do not deserve awards for heroism because everything they do is expected of them.  

		(1)  The purpose of the awards program as stated in an ETOUSA letter in 1944 is to use awards as incentives to greater effort and as instruments to build and maintain morale.  

		(2) Army Regulation 600-8-22 (Military Awards), the current awards regulation, states the goal of the Army awards program is to foster mission accomplishment by recognizing excellence of both military and civilian members of the force and motivating them to high levels of performance and service.  

		(3)  Stating that the FSM's actions were expected is true from the perspective of his superiors, but to state that he should not receive the DSC because he was doing what was expected is false logic.  His actions are a perfect example of why the DSC should be awarded:  to inspire other leaders to lay down their lives, if necessary, to accomplish their missions.

	g.  The Secretary's statements that the Army places trust and confidence in the decisions made by commanders in the field and that LTG Hodges possessed the knowledge and perspective to render a well-informed decision is flawed.

		(1)  The ADB and the CG, HRC, failed to place trust and confidence in MG Gerhardt and MG Corlett.  These commanders possessed the greatest view, knowledge, and perspective in the FSM's case.  

		(2)  Instead, the ADB placed a higher degree of trust in the officers of the First Army Decorations Board, none of whom had combat command experience.  Further, these officers were located far from the front lines and had no personal knowledge of the FSM's actions.

		(3)  LTG Hodges did not review or otherwise act on the recommendation.  Historical records show he was not present at the First Army's main and rear echelons where the recommendation was processed.  

10.  A panel of decorated officers with combat command experience was assembled to consider the FSM's award.  The panel consisted of seven retired Army general officers and one retired U.S. Marine Corps MG, all of whom had combat experience in Vietnam.  Collectively, these officers had received two DSC's, 12 SS's, eight Distinguished Flying Crosses, 17 Bronze Star Medals with "V" Device, over 110 Air Medals (many for heroism), two Army Commendation Medals (ARCOM) with "V" Device, and four Purple Hearts.  During their service in Vietnam they were recommending officials for decorations ranging from the Medal of Honor to the ARCOM with "V" Device.  Later in their careers, they were award approval authorities.  Further, one panel member served as an executive officer to the Secretary of the Army whose duties included making recommendations to the Secretary regarding approval and disapproval of awards of the Medal of Honor and DSC.  

	(1)  The panel members possessed military qualifications and experience which exceeded that of the members of the First Army Decorations Board and the ADB.

	(2)  Each recommended approval of the DSC and some proposed that he should have received the Medal of Honor.  

	(3)  The Army Board for Correction of Military Records must rely on the recommendations of this panel, not the decision of the ADB.  

11.  Counsel provides documents identified in an annotated index.

CONSIDERATION OF EVIDENCE:

1.  The available records show the FSM was a commissioned officer in the Virginia National Guard who was called to active duty with his unit in 1941.  He participated in the invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944, and, on or about 13 July 1944, he assumed command of the 3rd Battalion, 116th Infantry Regiment, 29th Infantry Division.  

2.  Counsel has provided numerous documents, including maps, statements, and unit journals, that confirm the account he has provided of the FSM's unit's operations in connection with the Battle of St. Lo.  

3.  On 17 July 1944, the FSM was killed when enemy fire hit his command post.  

4.  On 20 July 1944, MG Gerhardt, CG, 29th Infantry Division, submitted a recommendation for posthumous award of the DSC to the FSM.  The recommendation was routed through the CG, XIX Corps, to the CG, First Army.  

	a.  In paragraph 11 of the recommendation form, the recommender was to enter a detailed description of the incident.  This paragraph shows the entry "See statement of Capt. [CPT] W______ H. P________, attached."  

	b.  The attached statement is as follows:

On the night of 16 June 1944, this battalion…conducted an attack in the area of Martinville.  The men were instructed not to fire, but to drive the enemy from their prepared positions at bayonet point and with hand grenades.  The attack pushed off and after limited progress had been made was met by fierce enemy fire from the front and both flanks.  At this point, contact had not yet been established with the 2d Battalion which was on our left, although [the FSM] had attempted to contact the [commanding officer]….When the men were fired on, there was a tendency to slow down and seek cover, since they could not fire back.  As soon as [the FSM] noticed this inclination, he went from unit to unit in the forward elements and encouraged the men to continue the attack.  He was out there in front at all times, pushing the attack, and by his own example, inspiring the men to greater efforts.  After we reached our objective, there was still considerable fire from our left flank, but [the FSM] kept the battalion moving.  By this time it was daylight and "Jerry" began pouring deadly accurate observed mortar fire in on us.  [The FSM] was still looking out for the welfare of his men when he was killed by a mortar burst.  He went beyond the normal call of duty to see that his men were safe, physically going from man to man under heavy fire.  He was a fine man and a wonderful leader.  He was largely responsible for the success of this mission, and for other accomplished by this battalion.

	c.  A second attached statement, from CPT F____ L. R_____, is as follows:

[The FSM] was continually going from company to company of the forward elements checking on the situation.  He would not get in one place and stay down where he would be safe.  We had the 2d Battalion on our left, but physical contact had not been made.  When contact was made, [the FSM and the 2d Battalion's commander] tried to coordinate their plans for holding the area.  They had no battalion aid station, so they improvised one for the aid men that were on hand.  [The FSM] was always on the move looking out for the welfare of his men.  He had a bodyguard, but never waited to take him along.  He could have gone into a shelter, but refused to do so while his work was needed.  

	d.  A third attached statement, from CPT M_____ G. S____, is as follows:

I joined this battalion shortly before the engagement in which [the FSM] was killed.  In that short time, I learned to respect him as a leader and a fighting man.  In this attack, he never once considered his own personal safety – all his efforts were devoted to the accomplishment of the mission, and the successful performance of his battalion.   

	e.  A fourth attached statement, from Technical Sergeant R_____ S. W____, is as follows:

On 16 June 1944, I was acting as [the FSM's] S-1, when he received the battalion order and called a Staff Meeting.  [The FSM] was very anxious to start as he hoped to catch the Germans unawares.  He even made plans to start early in order to accomplish this.  His orders were that no man was to fire a shot, and he also said, "Don't let any man turn back."

As we crossed the line of departure, "K" Company was in the lead with "L" Company, Headquarters, "M," and "I" following in that order.  [The FSM] left the column repeatedly and braved enemy fire in order to bring stragglers back to the column, and to guide men who had become separated from their units.

When we reached Martinville, [the FSM] ordered some men to cover him and approached the buildings alone with only a pistol for protection.  After he was satisfied that there was no resistance left there, he ordered the advance to be resumed.

[The FSM] remained with the forward elements of the battalion and guided them to be sure they were on the right azimuth.  He also maintained contact with the rest of the battalion and kept them advised of the progress of "K" Company.

When we hit the objective, [the FSM] contacted the Regimental [Command Post] and reported that everything was O-Kay and then called the members of his staff together and congratulated them on a job well done.

About this time we received word to proceed to the secondary objective.  [The FSM] called the [commanding officers] together and told them they were going to take this position.  He didn't say "try," he said we would "take it."  Shortly after this, he was killed.

5.  On 31 July 1944, the recommendation was received by the First Army G-1.  On 8 August 1944, it was referred to the First Army Awards and Decorations Board for consideration.  

6.  A First Army Awards and Decorations Board form shows a narrative and board proceedings and that the FSM was recommended for a posthumous award of the DSC.  

	a.  The narrative states:

On the night of 17 July 1944 [the FSM's] battalion made an attack in the area of Martinville.  The men were instructed not to fire but to drive the enemy from their prepared positions at bayonet point and with hand grenades.  The attack moved off and after limited progress had been made it was met by heavy enemy fire from the front and both flanks.  When the men were fired on there was a tendency to slow down and seek cover.  As soon as [the FSM] noticed this he went from unit to unit in the forward elements and encouraged the men to continue to attack.  He was continuously with the foremost elements inspiring the men to greater efforts.  After they reached their objective there was still considerable fire from the left flank, but [the FSM] kept the battalion moving.  At daylight the enemy began pouring intense accurate mortar fire on the men, however, [the FSM] remained with the foremost elements and was killed by a mortar burst.  

	b.  The board proceedings section of the form shows two votes for a lesser award and shows the entry "SS" in two places.  

7.  A memorandum, dated 14 August 1944, from Headquarters, First Army, to the CG, 29th Infantry Division, shows that, by command of LTG Hodges, the recommendation to award the DSC to the FSM was not favorably considered.  The memorandum notes the Awards and Decorations Board's finding that the acts described, while meritorious, were insufficiently so to justify the award for which recommended.  The signature block bears the stamp of the Assistant Adjutant General.  

8.  The available records show the FSM was subsequently awarded the SS by MG Gerhardt.  The citation for the award of the SS follows:

[FSM] 116th INF, U S Army, for gallantry in action against the enemy in Normandy, France.  On 16 July 1944, the 3d Battalion, 116th Infantry, commanded by [the FSM] launched a night attack against the enemy in the vicinity of Martinville.  The troops were instructed not to fire upon the enemy, but to drive them from their prepared positions with the bayonet and hand grenades.  After making limited progress against the enemy, the battalion was met by intense enemy fire from its front and flanks.  Noting that the progress of the advance had been adversely affected by the enemy fire, [the FSM] moved to and remained with the forward elements of his battalion where by personal example and words of encouragement he instilled confidence and esprit in the hard-pressed troops to such a degree that the mission was successfully accomplished.  Shortly after day break while still directing operations against the enemy, [the FSM] was mortally wounded by mortar fire.  The unquestionable courage, intrepidity, and exemplary devotion to duty displayed by [the FSM] reflect great credit upon himself and the Military Service.

9.  Counsel provides numerous documents describing the importance of capturing St. Lo and the heavy fighting required to capture the objective.  

10.  On 15 October 2012, The Adjutant General informed a Member of Congress that the Office of the Secretary of the Army had directed a priority examination of materials provided in support of a recommendation to upgrade the FSM's SS to the DSC.  The Adjutant General stated the review included a comparison of the documents provided with information contained in the original award recommendation to determine if any new, substantive or material information existed that was not previously considered.  After extensive analysis, no new factual information was found that was not otherwise available to the original approval authority.  The Adjutant General noted that, in accordance with Department of Defense policy, reconsideration of the award could only be done once.  He stated he had directed the Chief, Awards and Decorations Branch, to provide assistance.  

11.  In an e-mail, dated 12 March 2013, the Chief, Awards and Decorations Branch, provided the regulatory guidance for reconsideration to counsel.  

12.  On 3 December 2013, the Secretary of the Army informed a Member of Congress that the ADB had reviewed a recommendation in its entirety, to include all previous submissions, and determined that the FSM's actions did not meet the criteria for the DSC.  The Secretary's letter states, in part:

	a.  "Based on the ADB's recommendation, the CG, HRC, acting on the Secretary's behalf, disapproved the award and reaffirmed that the SS was the appropriate award for [the FSM's] actions."  

	b.  "The strategic significance of the Battle of St. Lo cannot be used as justification to reconsider previously approved valor awards.  [The FSM's] actions during the attack, as reflected by the witness statements with his original award request from 1944, are commensurate with those the Army expects of a Battalion Commander."

	c.  "Additionally, the Army places trust and confidence in the decisions made by commanders in the field as they possess the greatest view, knowledge and perspective of the significance of individual contributions.  General Courtney H. Hodges, as the Deputy Commanding General, First United States Army at the time of [the FSM's] actions, and then Commander and approval authority for [the FSM's] award when it was processed, possessed the insight, knowledge and perspective to render a well-informed decision on [the FSM's] award." 

13.  During the processing of this case, Case Management Division, Army Review Boards Agency, obtained a transcription of the ADB vote sheets for award of the DSC to the FSM.  The transcription shows that, by unanimous vote, the ADB recommended disapproval of the award.  

	a.  Board members "A" and "B" stated the FSM's services were outstanding, but not to the extent required for the proposed award.  Board member "A" commented that "the board that convened during that time supported the Senior Commander's recommendation.  New evidence didn't support the upgrade."  Board member "B" commented that "no new additional information was available to warrant upgrade.  Board at the time of original award was conducted and they approved lower award."  

	b.  Board member "C" stated there was "insufficient evidence of risk of life to warrant proposed award.  Services were outstanding, but not to the extent required for the proposed award."  Board member "C" further commented, in part, that there was a lack of any additional or new eyewitness accounts or testimony that indicated the initial approval authority made a mistake in his determination.  He also commented that there was no evidence from any witness statements that the FSM's level of valor rose to that required by the criteria for the DSC.  

14.  The applicant was provided a copy of the transcription of the ADB vote sheets for review and comment.  She asks that this transcript, the ADB's recommendation, and the decision by the CG, HRC, be rejected in their entirety.  She states, in effect, that the absence of substantive comments by board members "A" and "B" belie the Secretary of the Army's statement, in his letter of 3 December 2013, that the ADB had reviewed the recommendation in its entirety, to include all submissions.  

	a.  Board member "A" commented that a board convened at the time supported the senior commander's recommendation.  This is contrary to fact.  MG Gerhardt and MG Corlett recommended award of the DSC and LTG Hodges never saw or acted on the FSM's award.  Denial of the award at Headquarters, First Army, was effected by three colonels who had never commanded in combat without review by either the CG or his Chief of Staff.

	b.  Board member "B" commented that no additional information was available to warrant upgrade and a board convened at the time approved a lower award.  These comments essentially repeat what was stated by board member "A."  

	c.  Board member "C" is the only board member who put forth the effort to present a detailed review of the case.  This board member also erred in his or her assessment.  Contrary to this board member's comments, the evidence conclusively shows that all of the FSM's heroic actions were not comprehensively described in MG Gerhardt's recommendation, but were addressed in detail in more recent submissions.  

	d.  If the recommendation to deny award of the DSC by the ADB members is flawed, then the decision by the CG, HRC, is in error and should be overturned.  

15.  Army Regulation 600-45 (Personnel - Decorations), in effect at the time, provided the criteria for the DSC and other military awards.  It stated:

	a.  The DSC is awarded to persons who, while serving in any capacity with the Army, distinguish themselves by extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations against an armed enemy.  To warrant an award of the DSC, a person must have performed an act or acts of heroism so notable and involving a risk of life so extraordinary as to set him apart from his comrades.  

	b.  The SS is awarded to persons who, while serving in any capacity with the Army, distinguish themselves by gallantry in action not warranting the award of the Medal of Honor or DSC.  

16.  Army Regulation 600-8-22, currently in effect, states:

	a.  The DSC is awarded to a person who, while serving in any capacity with the Army, distinguishes himself or herself by extraordinary heroism while engaged in action against an enemy of the United States not justifying award of the Medal of Honor.  The act or acts of heroism must have been so notable and have involved risk of life so extraordinary as to set the individual apart from his or her comrades.
	b.  The SS is awarded to a person who, while serving in any capacity with the U.S. Army, is cited for gallantry in action against an enemy of the United States while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force, or while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in armed conflict against an opposing armed force in which the United States is not a belligerent party.  The required gallantry, while of a lesser degree than that required for the DSC, must nevertheless have been performed with marked distinction.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS:

1.  Counsel has provided a detailed explanation of how he believes the recommendation to award the FSM the DSC was improperly addressed at Headquarters, First Army.  At this late date, it is not possible to determine with any degree of certainty whether or not LTG Hodges, the DSC approval authority in the FSM's chain of command, personally reviewed the recommendation.  Although it appears this may not have happened, that fact alone would not be a basis for upgrading the FSM's SS.  

2.  Counsel's and the applicant's issues with the decision of the ADB and the composition of that board are noted.  None of these issues are tied to the basic issue in this case, which is whether or not the actions for which the FSM received the SS warrant award of the DSC.  

3.  Although the First Army Awards and Decorations Board and the ADB could have more thoroughly stated their reasoning in the FSM's case, a review of the FSM's actions described in the available records supports the findings of both boards.  This review also supports the Secretary of the Army's statement that the FSM's actions during the attack were commensurate with those the Army expects of a battalion commander.  He successfully motivated his men under extreme conditions and his unit achieved its objective.  These are the actions expected of any commander in combat.  Further, as the Secretary of the Army has already stated, the strategic significance of the Battle of St. Lo cannot be used as justification to reconsider previously approved valor awards.  

4.  A decision to upgrade a previously-approved valor award must be based on evidence showing the original award failed to properly recognize the degree of heroism displayed by the recipient.  In this case, the considerable amount of information provided by counsel confirms that the SS was the appropriate award for the FSM's actions.  There is simply no documentary evidence showing that the FSM's acts of heroism were so notable and involved risk of life so extraordinary as to set him apart from his comrades.  The SS he received appropriately recognizes his actions.  

5.  In view of the foregoing, there is an insufficient basis upon which to grant the requested relief.  

BOARD VOTE:

________  ________  ________  GRANT FULL RELIEF 

________  ________  ________  GRANT PARTIAL RELIEF 

________  ________  ________  GRANT FORMAL HEARING

____X____  ____X____  ___X_____  DENY APPLICATION

BOARD DETERMINATION/RECOMMENDATION:

1.  The evidence presented does not demonstrate the existence of a probable error or injustice.  Therefore, the Board determined that the overall merits of this case are insufficient as a basis for correction of the records of the individual concerned.

2.  This recommendation in no way diminishes the FSM's heroic and honorable service to our Nation in a time of great need.  



      _______ _   ___X____   ___
               CHAIRPERSON
      
I certify that herein is recorded the true and complete record of the proceedings of the Army Board for Correction of Military Records in this case.



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ABCMR Record of Proceedings (cont)                                         AR20140013231



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