IN THE CASE OF:	  

		BOARD DATE:	  30 March 2011

		DOCKET NUMBER:  AR20100025429 


THE BOARD CONSIDERED THE FOLLOWING EVIDENCE:

1.  Application for correction of military records (with supporting documents provided, if any).

2.  Military Personnel Records and advisory opinions (if any).

3.  Formal Hearing Case Summary.

4.  Live testimony and any evidence introduced during the hearing.  The applicant did appear before the Board and was represented by counsel.

THE APPICANT’S REQUEST, STATEMENT, AND EVIDENCE:

1.  The applicant, the daughter of a deceased former service member (FSM), requests reconsideration of her earlier request for the FSM's posthumous award of the Silver Star (SS) to be upgraded to the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC).

2.  The applicant states the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR) rubber-stamped the earlier decision by the Army Decorations Board (ADB) and made no attempt to discern the truth about what occurred on 17 October 1967 when her father was killed in action in Vietnam.  The ABCMR dismissed command influence as an issue and the Board voted for denial based on the analyst's predisposition not to question the actions of the ADB.  She adds that the Board gave little weight to the views of retired General Officers who served in Vietnam in comparison to those who could not have possibly served in Vietnam or observed the awards process there.  Furthermore, the analyst used unsubstantiated information from the internet to discredit statements from Soldiers who were at the scene.  The current climate of unwillingness to approve awards of the Medal of Honor (MOH) and the DSC is prejudicial in her case.

3.  The applicant defers submission of documentary evidence to counsel.


COUNSEL'S REQUEST, STATEMENT, AND EVIDENCE:

1.  Counsel requests reconsideration of the applicant's earlier request for the deceased FSM's award of the SS to be upgraded to the DSC.

2.  Counsel states the FSM was killed as a result of hostile action at the Battle of Ong Thanh, Vietnam, on 17 October 1967.  He was awarded the SS.  The brigade commander wanted to recommend him for the DSC but the Commanding General (CG), 1st Infantry Division (1st ID), prohibited submission of awards higher than the SS.  This command influence denied him the opportunity to be considered for the DSC.  On 22 March 2007, the ADB considered a request for an upgrade of the SS to DSC but found the FSM's actions did not meet the criteria for the proposed award.  On 1 July 2008, a request for reconsideration was submitted.  However, on 24 July 2008, the Secretary of the Army (SA) denied the request for reconsideration based on false statements from the Chief, Military Awards Branch (MAB) at the U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) that all the information submitted with the request for reconsideration had been previously considered.  The documents submitted with the request for reconsideration contained statements from six decorated and retired General Officers (one four-star, four 3-star, and one         1-star), all of whom served in Vietnam.  This error created a huge injustice.  Nevertheless, on 9 July 2009, the request was submitted to the ABCMR which denied the request for an upgrade on 29 September 2009.  Counsel adds that the ABCMR's analysis revealed substantive errors, failure to address key issues, flawed logic, and presentation of irrelevant information.  Counsel specifically argues:

* Command influence by the CG, 1st ID
* The current award environment is hostile and adversely prejudicial to the case
* An independent panel of 6 General Officers recommended the FSM's SS be upgraded
* The ADB and ABCMR did not explain why the FSM's actions are not worthy of a DSC

3.  Counsel provides a binder that contains Tabs A through K which are responses to selected paragraphs in the Discussion and Conclusions (D&C) of the ABCMR's Record of Proceedings (ROP) as follows:

* Tab A, responds to paragraph 3 of the D&C, ROP
* Tab B, responds to paragraph 4 of the D&C, ROP
* Tab C, responds to paragraph 5e(1) of the D&C, ROP
* Tab D, responds to paragraph 5 of the D&C, ROP
* Tab E, responds to paragraphs 5a through 5d of the D&C, ROP
* Tab F, responds to paragraph 5e(1) and 5e(2) of the D&C, ROP
* Tab G, responds to paragraph 6a and 6b of the D&C, ROP
* Tab H, responds to paragraph 6a of the D&C, ROP
* Tab I, responds to paragraph 6a(2) of the D&C, ROP
* Tab J, responds to paragraph 6a(3)b and 6a(3)b and c of the D&C, ROP
* Tab K, responds to paragraph 6a(3)d of the D&C, ROP

4.  Counsel also provides Tabs 1 through 22 as follows:

* Tab 1, Vietnam award process
* Tab 2, printout from the HRC website, awards statistics
* Tab 3, article from the Army Times regarding the MOH
* Tab 4, email from the Army Times regarding the MOH
* Tab 5, article from the Army Times regarding MOH under review
* Tab 6, letters and correspondence with the Office of the General Counsel
* Tab 7, DA Form 638 (Recommendation for Award) and allied documents
* Tab 8, statement from a former combat medic
* Tab 9, statement from a former company commander
* Tab 10, citation of the SS, First Lieutenant (1LT) ACW
* Tab 11, citation of the DSC, 1LT ACW
* Tab 12, MOH listing and citations of various individuals
* Tab 13, citation of the DSC, Lieutenant Colonel TDA
* Tab 14, listing of persons interviewed after the Battle of Ong Thanh
* Tab 15, extract of Department of the Army General Orders Number 9
* Tab 16, General Orders Number 4592 awarding the FSM the SS
* Tab 17, military history of General JRD (Retired) and his vote
* Tab 18, military history of Lieutenant General (LTG) CWB (Retired) and his vote
* Tab 19, military history of LTG HEE (Retired), and his vote
* Tab 20, military history of LTG TNG (Retired) and his vote
* Tab 21, military history of General JWM (Retired) and his vote
* Tab 22, military history of Brigadier General (BG) JCB (retired) and his vote

5.  Counsel for the applicant subsequently provided the support documents (two volumes) from the original consideration of the case.

6.  In addition, on 4 March 2011 two original documents were provided.  The 27 July 2010 letter from the Office of the Inspector General (DAIG) is completely new.  The letter dated 21 June 2010 to the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 is not new, but this copy has a handwritten annotation on it.
7.  Also, an additional award order (Silver Star) pertaining to personnel who participated in the Battle of Ong Thanh on 17 October 1967 (Specialist Four TMH, medical aidman) was located and has been added.

CONSIDERATION OF EVIDENCE:

1.  Incorporated herein by reference are military records which were summarized in the previous consideration of the applicant's case by the ABCMR in Docket Number AR20090011871 on 29 September 2009.

2.  The applicant and her counsel submit a statement from a former unit member as well as a new argument which were not previously reviewed by the ABCMR.  Therefore, although not received within 1 year of the original ABCMR's decision, they are considered new evidence and as such, as an exception to policy, warrant consideration by the Board.

3.  The FSM was appointed as a Regular Army infantry second lieutenant (2LT) and he entered active duty on 1 June 1956.  He was promoted to the rank of major (MAJ) on 31 March 1966.  

4.  The FSM arrived in Vietnam on 20 July 1967 and he was assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 1st Brigade, 1st ID, with duty as the S-3 (Operations Officer) on 23 July 1967. 

5.  In October 1967, the 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry (2/28th Inf), temporarily under the operational control of the Commander, 1st Brigade, 1st ID, had been operating west of the village of Chon Thanh since 8 October 1967, conducting "search and destroy" operations in an area known to be occupied by large Viet Cong forces.  Only 4 of the battalion's 5 companies (HHC, A, B, and D) were involved; C Company was providing fire base security for the supporting artillery unit.  On the morning of 17 October 1967:

	a.  A Company led out from the night defensive position (NDP) on a recon-in-force with the battalion command group and D Company in trail.  B Company was left to secure the NDP where the heavy weapons platoon and reconnaissance platoon were to secure/screen the NDP.  Sporadic contact occurred throughout the morning.  

	b.  Around noon, A Company was engaged by a large enemy force and 
D Company deployed in support.  The situation deteriorated as both companies became more or less beleaguered.  The brigade commander and the FSM, his S-3, who had been orbiting the area to coordinate air and artillery support, lost radio contact with the battalion commander and landed to take control of the situation.  

	c.  By the time the remaining forces, B Company, and the reconnaissance platoon could deploy in support of the engaged troops, the battalion command group and both A and D Companies had sustained very heavy casualties.  The battalion commander, battalion sergeant major, and the FSM were among the fatalities.  C Company was air-lifted in to assist and by late afternoon the area was secured as the Viet Cong forces withdrew.

	d.  The fighting resulted in 55 men being killed in action, 2 men missing in action, and 75 or more men wounded.  All 65 men in A Company had been killed or wounded; D Company was a little better off; and the battalion commander and those with him were killed. 

6.  On 27 October 1967, the FSM was posthumously awarded the SS for gallantry in action against a hostile force on 17 October 1967 in Vietnam.  General Orders (GO) Number 7720, issued by Headquarters, 1st ID, cited the following actions: 

[FSM] was serving as brigade Operations Officer while accompanying his Brigade Commander in the aerial supervision of ground elements.  At approximately 1100 hours, the 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry became heavily engaged with elements of two Viet Cong battalions.  The fire of the well positioned enemy caused a loss of key personnel, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the friendly unit.  The Brigade Commander elected to command the embattled battalion from the ground and landed his helicopter.  They then moved forward to reestablish effective command and control of the unit.  With complete disregard for his personal safety, [FSM] first braved the vicious enemy fire to move through the ranks of the fighting and wounded Soldiers, offering them words of encouragement and helping to establish orderly evacuation for the casualties.  Then, when the intensive sniper fire began to impede the evacuation of the wounded, [the FSM] unhesitatingly moved forward to reconnoiter the main evacuation route.  He refused to seek cover from the deadly volleys of insurgent sniper fire and continued to assay the enemy situation until he was mortally wounded by the heavy ground fire. His tremendous courage and poise in the face of overwhelming odds had a stabilizing effect on his men and was instrumental in saving many lives.  
7.  Along with the posthumous SS, the FSM was also posthumously awarded the Soldier's Medal, the Bronze Star Medal (BSM) (1st and 2nd Oak Leaf Cluster with "V" Device for heroism), and the Air Medal (1st through 8th Oak Leaf Cluster) with a "V" Device for heroism.

8.  Counsel submits two new statements with the current application.  These statements, together with the various documents previously submitted, are summarized as follows: 

	a.  A statement, dated 30 October 2009, from specialist four (SP4) SG, a former member of HHC, 2/28th Infantry and eyewitness at the Battle of Ong Thanh that indicates while picking up wounded Soldiers on that day he carried a wounded Soldier to safety.  He then became separated from his sergeant and/or captain but continued to bring the wounded to safety.  He witnessed two Soldiers trying to take cover in an open area.  He tried to assist them despite the continuous light to medium sniper fire.  One of the two Soldiers was a medic who was trying to bandage and tend to another wounded Soldier.  He found out later that the wounded Soldier was the FSM.  He opines that the FSM was gallant to run out in the middle of enemy fire to help fellow Soldiers.  He made the ultimate sacrifice to help other Soldiers.

	b.  A statement, dated 6 April 2010, from LTC ACW, a former lieutenant with D Company, indicates he met the FSM twice before 16 October 1967.  One time he asked him for material and later they discussed the destruction of a rice cache.  He remembers the FSM as a big, smiling, and quiet man, who carried his own radio.  He states that he tried to discourage the battalion commander the previous night from taking a specific course of action related to the battle but the battalion commander would not listen to him.  The lieutenant opines that there were tactical mistakes committed by the chain of command in relation to this battle and that he read reports that confirmed his feelings that there was only one man who went to the sound of the guns and tried to help D Company.  That man was the FSM.  

	c.  A document listing the pertinent award authorities governing this case alleges the CG, 1st ID, improperly influenced awards authorized for the Battle of Ong Thanh and sets forth evidence that the CG, 1st ID's intervention in the awards process unjustly precluded the FSM's consideration for award of the DSC.  This portion also shows:

		(1)  The Deputy CG, U.S. Army Vietnam (USARV), was the award approval authority for awards of the DSC to personnel assigned to USARV, and the CG, 1st ID, was the award approval authority for awards of the SS to personnel assigned to 1st ID.

		(2)  On 17 June 2002, the former Adjutant, 1st Brigade, 1st ID, in a statement in support of award of the MOH to 1LT ACW, [then] Commander, Company D, 2/28th Infantry, for actions on 17 October 1967 in Vietnam, stated "the fact that his [1LT ACW's] battalion was not working for its parent brigade further militated against any valor award recommendation being submitted"; "I only processed awards for the 1st Brigade personnel who had been involved - the Brigade Commander, the Brigade S3 [the FSM], and the Brigade S2"; "based on eyewitness reports, for instance, I submitted my Brigade Commander, COL GEN, for the DSC for his actions at Ong Thanh on 17 October 1967"; "Division HQ returned that recommendation without action with the note that the Division Commander believed that no more than one DSC should be awarded for what was in essence an ambush, and that he had decided the deceased 2/28th Infantry battalion commander [LTC TDA] should be the recipient of that one DSC"; and "I am providing this statement so that members of any award review board process can concentrate on weighing the facts available regarding the actions of 1LT ACW as the commander of Company D, 2/28th Inf at Ong Thanh on 17 October 1967 and not be influenced by the lapse of time between action and award recommendation or by the failure of the 1st ID chain of command to take appropriate awards action immediately after the battle."

		(3)  On 16 February 2006, a former The Judge Advocate General (TJAG) opined that the Division Commander's directive to award only one DSC for the Battle of Ong Thanh and to specify who would receive that award was improper. 

		(4)  On 17 July 2006, the former CG of Central Command (during the first Gulf War) reviewed the matter and concluded that the statement of the CG, 1st ID was clearly unlawful command influence regarding who should be recommended for the DSC.

		(5)  On 27 February 2008, the (then) former Commander, 1st Brigade, 1st ID, stated, in pertinent part, "[i]n the case of the Battle of Ong Thanh on 17 October 1967, Division Headquarters (HQ) made the decision as to who and what awards would be made.  I did not have the opportunity to recommend the FSM for the DSC at that time; if I had the opportunity, I would have recommended him for the DSC, then as I do now." 

   d.  Counsel provides a recount of the actions taken to redress the injustice done to the individuals present at the Battle of Ong Thanh and to the deceased FSM when the Division Commander precluded submission of certain awards.  It also describes perceived errors by the MAB during the processing of the request and reconsideration request to upgrade the FSM's award of the SS to a DSC.  This document states:

		(1)  On 30 September 2005, a recommendation to upgrade the FSM's SS to the DSC was submitted and, on 16 November 2005, the Chief, MAB, provided information with respect to the type of additional essential documentation and evidence that was required to support the recommendation being fully and fairly considered.  Accordingly, on 10 July 2006, an updated DA Form 638 requesting an upgrade of the FSM's SS to a DSC was submitted.

		(2)  A copy of page 5 of the Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log for HQ, 1st Brigade, 1st ID, for the period 0001 hours, 17 October 1967 to 2400 hours, 17 October 1967 was added, as well as a narrative account of the death of the FSM based on interview statements from three individuals, including the 1st Brigade commander.

		(3)  HQ, 1st ID, Combat After Action Interview Report, dated 31 March 1968, on the Battle of Ong Thanh, 2/28th Inf Meeting Engagement 17 October 1967, with Special Intelligence Estimate to 1st ID Intelligence Summary (INTSUM).  This document is silent with respect to the actions of the FSM. 

		(4)  A statement from the Senior Military Archivist, Modern Military Records, National Archives and Records Administration, dated 13 January 2006, stated, in pertinent part, "[u]ntil 1969, Army awards case files were routinely disposed of after final action was taken."

		(5)  A narrative description with an expanded summary of action [from that of the original SS award order] and proposed citation for the DSC, along with a letter from the former Commander, 1st Brigade, 1st ID, and four eyewitness statements.

		(6)  Two explanatory notes that were added by an unidentified individual to the 17 June 2002 statement submitted by the former Adjutant, 1st Brigade, 1st ID.  The first note stated that the deceased battalion commander was the son of the famous and "revered" MG [name omitted], World War II CG of the 1st ID; and the second note explained:  'True to the Division Commander's word [at that time], no 1st ID Soldier who participated in the Battle of Ong Thanh received a decoration higher than the SS."

		(7)  The ADB recommended disapproval of the DSC and the CG, HRC, disapproved award of the DSC to the FSM.

		(8)  Additional eyewitnesses were sought, there was further research into documentation on the Battle of Ong Thanh, and in February 2008 a panel of senior Army retired General Officers was formed by the applicant's counsel to consider and make comment on the recommendation for award of the DSC to the FSM.  These senior and retired General Officers had previously served in Vietnam in staff or leadership positions, had previously participated in combat, and had previously held key leadership positions, leading and commanding troops, or staff positions that affected approval or disapproval of awards.  This panel unanimously recommended upgrade of the FSM's posthumous award of the SS to a posthumous award of the DSC.  Each General Officer provided personal notes supporting posthumous award of the DSC to the FSM.  

   e.  A summary of evidence that the FSM has been improperly and unjustly denied award of the DSC through command influence by the CG, 1st ID, in September 1967 and errors by the MAB and ADB.  The summary also explains why the decision of the ADB not to upgrade the deceased FSM's award of the SS was flawed, in error, and unjust; and sets forth evidence purported to have been not previously considered by the Army.  This document, in pertinent part, states: the Chief, MAB's assertion that all of the information submitted had previously been reviewed by the ADB on 22 March 2007 is not correct; the ADB determination that "the degree of action and service rendered did not meet the strict criteria for the proposed award" is not cited as a criteria for award of the DSC; the membership and qualifications of the ADB is at issue (i.e., field grade officers or General Officers; staff officers or combat commanders, recent combat experience versus Vietnam era); and the denial of reconsideration precluded the votes and valuable insights provided by six distinguished senior Army retired General Officers.

	f.  A copy of the initial award recommendation submitted, dated 30 September 2005, along with all enclosures.  On 16 November 2005, the Chief, MAB, HRC, advised, "there is insufficient documentation in this request to submit to the ADB for consideration" and offered information with respect to the type of additional essential documentation and evidence required to support the recommendation being fully and fairly considered.  

	g.  A copy of the revised award recommendation based on instructions from the MAB, HRC.  On 10 May 2007, the Chief, MAB, advised that "on 22 March 2007, the ADB determined that the degree of action and service rendered did not meet the strict criteria for the proposed award.  Based on the board's recommendation, the CG, HRC, on behalf of the SA, disapproved award of the DSC, reaffirming that the previously-approved award of the SS was the appropriate award for the FSM's heroism."

	h.  Revised award recommendation, dated 14 March 2008, submitted as a reconsideration request.  On 24 July 2008, the SA advised, "I have been informed by the Chief, MAB, that all of the information you submitted with your letter of 1 July 2008 was previously considered by the ADB when it reviewed the FSM's case on 22 March 2007.  Their determination, based on that information, was that the SS is the appropriate award.  As you know, DOD and Army policy dictates that one-time reconsideration by the award approval authority shall be conclusive, unless new and substantive information is provided."

9.  A search of the HRC, Awards and Decorations Computer Assisted Retrieval System, for the Vietnam Conflict was conducted for award orders pertaining to key personnel who participated in the Battle of Ong Thanh on 17 October 1967.  This search produced copies of the following award orders:

	a.  Headquarters, Department of the Army, GO #74, dated 20 November 1969, posthumously awarded 2LT HBD, then forward observer, Battery C, 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery, 1st ID, the Medal of Honor.

	b.  USARV, GO #6615, dated 26 December 1967, posthumously awarded LTC TDA, [then] Commander, 2/28th Inf, the DSC.

	c.  1st ID, GO #189, dated 8 January 1968, awarded COL GEN., [then] Commander, 1st Brigade, 1st ID, the SS.

	d.  1st ID, GO #504, dated 20 January 1968, awarded Private First Class (PFC) JJC, [then] assigned to Company A, 2/28th Inf, the SS.

	e.  1st ID, GO #4592, dated 19 May 1968, awarded Specialist Four TMH, [then] assigned to Company A, 2/28th Inf, the SS.  

10.  In further connection with the processing of this case, a search of the Department of the Army Publications and Forms website (www.army.mil/usapa/) was conducted for award orders pertaining to key personnel who participated in the Battle of Ong Thanh on 17 October 1967.  This search produced copies of the following award orders.

	a.  DAGO #40, dated 22 July 1970, awarded CPT (then 1LT) ACW [then] assigned to Company A, 2/28th Inf, the SS (1st Oak Leaf Cluster).

	b.  DAGO #9, dated 18 November 2005, awarded 1LT ACW, [then] assigned to Company A, 2/28th Inf, the DSC.

11.  Army Regulation 600-8-22 (Military Awards) provides for the following awards: 

	a.  The MOH is awarded by the President in the name of Congress to a person who, while a member of the Army, distinguishes himself or herself conspicuously by gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his or her life above and beyond the call of duty while engaged in an action against an enemy of the United States; while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force; or while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in an armed conflict against an opposing armed force in which the United States is not a belligerent party.  The deed performed must have been one of personal bravery or self-sacrifice so conspicuous as to clearly distinguish the individual above his comrades and must have involved risk of life.  Incontestable proof of the performance of the service will be exacted and each recommendation for the award of this decoration will be considered on the standard of extraordinary merit. 

	b.  The DSC is awarded to a person, who while serving in any capacity with the Army, distinguished himself or herself by extraordinary heroism while engaged in action against an enemy of the United States not justifying award of the MOH.  The act or acts of heroism must have been so notable and have involved risk of life so extraordinary as to set the individual apart from his or her comrades.

	c.  The SS is awarded for gallantry in action against the enemy.  The required gallantry (spirited and conspicuous acts of heroism and courage) must have been performed with marked distinction.  

12.  Army Regulation 600-8-22 , chapter 3 (U.S. Army Individual Decorations), paragraph 3-1 (Intent), states that U.S. Army military decorations are awarded in recognition of heroism, meritorious achievement, or meritorious service.  It also states the decision to award an individual a decoration and the decision as to which award is appropriate are both subjective decisions made by the commander having award approval authority.  Limiting awards to a specific number per unit is not authorized.

13.  Army Regulation 672-5-1 (Military Awards), the version in effect at the time the FSM's award was approved, did not prohibit policies against limiting awards to a specific number per unit.  It was not until Army Regulation 672-5-1 was revised, effective 1 October 1982, that the policy guidance that states "limiting awards to a specific number per unit is not authorized" first appears in regulation.

14.  At the formal hearing, the applicant, counsel, and witnesses testified as follows:

	a.  The applicant testified about her upbringing and the challenges the family encountered subsequent to the loss of their father, the FSM.  She described the FSM’s heroic actions in his attempt to rescue wounded men during the battle and concluded that he deserves award of the DSC.

	b.  MG (retired) Su-----, the applicant’s counsel, testified that the FSM met the requirements for award of the DSC.  He described the tactical, operational, and strategic situation of the Vietnam War, and explained the breakdown in the awards process during the war.  He centered his points of contention around four issues:

* command influence
* qualification of the ADB members
* ADB failure to reconsider the request
* ABCMR’s rubber-stamp of the ADB’s decision

Counsel also went over the witness statements, particularly the statements by the former brigade commander, combat medic, brigade adjutant, and LTC ACW, the former D Company Commander.  He concluded that the FSM volunteered to rescue wounded comrades when no one else did so.  He also described the structure, composition, and qualifications of the General Officer awards panel that unanimously recommended the FSM’s award be upgraded.  He concluded that the FSM’s action met the criteria for award of the DSC.

	c.  LTG (retired) B----- testified that he would have recommended approval of the DSC.  In his experience, three elements must be met:  The eyewitnesses, the facts on the ground, and the situation developed from the facts.  In this case, the eyewitnesses, specifically the combat medic who had a wider view of the battlefield, clearly show the FSM’s decision to rescue wounded comrades was not a rash decision.  The brigade commander described the FSM as a level- headed officer with good judgment.  The FSM stabilized the battle and thus prevented any retreat.  The survivors of that battle described his actions as heroic.  He is most deserving of award of the DSC.

	d.  BG (retired) B------ testified that there were no restrictions on awards and decorations.  In his unit, many Soldiers were recommended for award of the DSC or SS.  He described courage as doing something that has to be done because it is right.  The wrong had to be righted.  Senior officers, specifically the CG, 1st ID, should never have put a limit on the awards. 

	e.  COL (retired) S--- testified that the original ABCMR decision presumed regularity but the concluding statements contradicted each other.  The brigade 

commander and/or chain of command were prevented from submitting an award of the DSC.  General officers agreed to suppress any award higher than the SS.  This defeats the presumption of regularity.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS:

1.  The majority of the Board believed that the FSM's actions demonstrated extraordinary heroism while engaged in action against a superior enemy by taking the initiative to selflessly rescue survivors of the Battle of Ong Thanh, knowing it involved extreme risk to his life.  He placed himself in the direct line of fire to save others.  

2.  The majority of the Board felt his actions, evidenced by the statements submitted by the former brigade commander and the former combat medic, as well as the strong endorsement by several General Officers who later reviewed the circumstances of his actions on 17 October 1967, clearly show he demonstrated heroism so notable and having involved risk of life so extraordinary as to set him apart from his comrades and clearly show his actions on               17 October 1967 deserving of the DSC.

3.  In view of the foregoing, the majority of the Board recommended upgrading the FSM's Silver Star to a Distinguished Service Cross.  

BOARD DETERMINATION/RECOMMENDATION:

The Board determined that the evidence presented was sufficient to warrant amendment of the ABCMR's decision in Docket Number AR20090011871, dated 29 September 2009.  As a result, the Board recommends that all Department of the Army records of the individual concerned be corrected by:

	a.  revoking General Orders Number 7720, issued by Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, on 27 October 1967, posthumously awarding the FSM the Silver Star; 

	b.  posthumously awarding the FSM the Distinguished Service Cross for extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations involving conflict with an armed hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam, while serving with 

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, on 17 October 1967. 




      _______ _XXX______   ___
               CHAIRPERSON
      
I certify that herein is recorded the true and complete record of the proceedings of the Army Board for Correction of Military Records in this case.
ABCMR Record of Proceedings (cont)                                         AR20100025429



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ARMY BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS

 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS


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