RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
             AIR FORCE BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS


IN THE MATTER OF:      DOCKET NUMBERS:  01-01556
                       INDEX CODE 134.01
                       COUNSEL:  None

                       HEARING DESIRED:  Yes

_________________________________________________________________

APPLICANT REQUESTS THAT:

The 31 Mar 00 Letter of Reprimand (LOR)  and  Unfavorable  Information
File (UIF) issued  by  the  19th  Air  Force  Commander  (19AF/CC)  be
declared void and removed from  his  records,  including  his  Officer
Selection Record (OSR).

_________________________________________________________________

APPLICANT CONTENDS THAT:

He is clearly innocent of the charges for which he  was  punished  and
his career ruined.  The administration and disposition  of  this  case
was unjust, unfair and unwarranted.  Airman Basic (AB) S-- had a  pre-
existing medical condition and was sick throughout training,  but  his
true condition went undiagnosed. The training event  in  question  was
conceived and designed before he actually took command  and  had  been
conducted hundreds of times for well over a  year  without  a  single,
similar incident. The Air Force had no official guidance applicable to
such an event but its development and operation were approved  by  two
basic military training (BMT) group commanders and every commander  in
the chain. He was never counseled by his chain of command and told his
performance lapsed or was lacking for the entire period of his command
(Apr 98-Jun 00). He elaborates on the following points:

            a.  The decision making in this case was taken out of  the
hands of his chain of command, yet they supported him and indicated he
did nothing wrong.

            b.  Medical experts testified that the medical  conditions
that took the airman's life  were  internal  and  pre-existing  before
field training.

            c.  AB S-- told his parents he was sick  and  not  getting
better. The Physician Assistant (PA)  who  treated  AB  S--  on  three
separate occasions did  not  pay  enough  attention  to  the  apparent
medical signs  demonstrating  the  airman  was  in  distress.  Medical
experts testified that pre-existing medical conditions and  the  over-
consumption of water were responsible for this death and that  the  PA
did not do his job properly.

             d.  The  first  commander-directed  investigation  (CDI),
directed by the 2nd Air Force commander (2AF/CC),  found  no  personal
fault. However, an immediate  second  CDI,  directed  by  the  HQ  Air
Education and Training Command commander  (HQ  AETC/CC),  ignored  the
first investigation and medical implications, focusing solely  on  the
development of a single training event so as to find a training,  vice
medical, causation for AB S--'s death. It appears this was  fueled  by
the need to quiet the airman's hostile  family  (who  claimed  someone
killed  him  and  should  be  held  responsible  and   punished),   by
congressional support for the grieving  family's  assertions,  and  by
unceasing negative media coverage.  As a  result,  he  became  a  non-
medical, Air Force training alibi to  be  used  as  a  legal  strategy
against any legal claims based on medical deficiencies or  supervisory
neglect anticipated from the airman's family.  HQ  AETC/CC  was  fully
knowledgeable of the actual medical causation facts.

            e.  The investigator of the second CDI  admitted  he  made
his recommendations based on a superseded Army regulation and  an  Air
Force regulation that was not applicable to this training event.

            f.  Immediate commanders insured  his  performance  record
was unblemished for the period because his actions  were  prudent  and
within standards. He was promoted in job responsibility from the 737th
Training Support Squadron commander (737TRSS/CC) to the 37th  Training
Group (37TRG) deputy commander, recommended for promotion  to  colonel
by the wing commander, and  presented  with  the  Meritorious  Service
Medal (MSM) by the HQ AETC/CC

            g.  Six independent evaluations (a BMT  review,  two  wing
safety inspections, two BMT Standardization/Evaluation Teams, the 2000
HQ AETC Inspector General) performed on BMT training  for  the  period
rated the  Field  Training  Experience  (FTX)  either  "excellent"  or
"outstanding" in each instance. There was not one  single  finding  by
these evaluations indicating FTX training was developed improperly  or
was unsafe.

The applicant's 3-page statement, with 39 attachments, is  at  Exhibit
A.

_________________________________________________________________

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

The  following  information  was  extracted  from  official  documents
provided at Exhibits A, B and E.

AETC Instruction (AETCI) 48-101, Prevention of Heat Stress  Disorders,
dated 17 Oct 94, establishes AETC responsibilities and  procedures  to
prevent the adverse effects of heat stress. The instruction applies to
all personnel who are assigned to or are attending  training  on  AETC
installations.  It lists the symptoms used for the recognition of heat
stress disorders and requires that work and rest cycles be planned for
personnel occupationally exposed to hot environments. It directs  rest
stops every 30 minutes during outside activities under yellow flag (85-
87.9 degrees) conditions.

In Sep 95, the 17th BMT Biennial Review tasked BMT to instill  a  war-
fighting  spirit  in  basic  trainees.  Rapid  implementation  of   an
overnight FTX in Nov 96 institutionalized  warrior  training  for  all
trainees entering BMT. By the fall  of  96,  FTX  was  able  to  begin
testing the concept with full-scale operations  starting  in  Jan  97.
Training was still very basic. Instruction continued  in  this  manner
for approximately one year until the idea of an actual,  more  intense
march emerged following additional external critiques.

On 7 Apr 98, the applicant, a lieutenant colonel (Date of Rank:  1 Feb
98), was assigned to Lackland AFB, TX as the 737TRSS/CC  for  the  Air
Force's BMT.   His  rater  was  the  737th  Training  Group  commander
(737TRG/CC). His additional  rater  and  senior  rater  was  the  37th
Training Wing commander (37TRW/CC).

In Jun 98, the first FTX march began. During  this  time  period,  the
737TRSS/CC, the 737TRG/CC and officers responsible  for  FTX  had  all
rotated.  At approximately the same time, Warrior Week, a program that
would eventually incorporate FTX, was in its conceptual phase.  Unlike
the evolutionary development of FTX, Warrior Week began with a concept
paper and went through a series of reviews.   (The  program  would  be
inaugurated on 1 Oct 99, and FTX as an independent event  would  cease
to exist.)

In a letter dated 23 Jul 98, the applicant requested guidance on  safe
troop movements during a  5.4-mile  retrograde  walk,  specifically  a
supplement to AETCI 48-101.

AETCI 48-101 tasks BioEnvironmental Engineering  (BE)  with  assisting
tenant units in developing their supplement on heat stress. On 21  Aug
98, an interim BE memo to the applicant  provided  recommendations  on
safe troop movement during the retrograde march.  The  recommendations
were based on walking at ease carrying only canteens.  It  recommended
a rest break every 45 minutes and one-half to one quart of  water  per
hour depending on conditions. The memo also recommended trainees as  a
group check their pulse to assess their level of stress (which  proved
impracticable in a field environment). If  symptoms  of  heat  illness
were noted, they were to seek immediate medical attention.

AB S--, an 18-year-old member of the Ohio Air National Guard,  entered
BMT on 9 Aug 99 and was scheduled to graduate on 17 Sep 99. On 10  Sep
99, he collapsed  during  the  final  portion  of  the  5.8  mile  FTX
retrograde march conducted at the Medina Annex of Lackland,  AFB,  TX,
with approximately 1/10 of a mile remaining.  After receiving  medical
attention in the field from on-scene medical technicians, he was taken
by ambulance to Wilford Hall Medical Center (WHMC) where  he  received
emergency and definitive care. He was hospitalized for 2  days  before
being pronounced brain dead on 12 Sep 99 due to cerebral edema  (brain
swelling) caused by heatstroke and hyponatremia (low blood sodium). No
other trainees were transported to WHMC for heat-related or any  other
illness or injury from this  march.  The  2AF/CC  appointed  the  vice
commander of the 82nd Training Wing (82TW), Sheppard AFB, TX,  as  the
investigating officer (IO).

According to the 27 Oct 99 CDI Executive Summary [Tab 8,  Exhibit  A],
the purpose of the investigation was to discover and document as  many
of the facts as possible surrounding AB S--'s tragic death  from  heat
stroke, complicated by water  intoxication.  The  airman  had  a  pre-
existing   medical   condition   for   which    he    was    receiving
treatment/medication at the time  of  his  induction.  His  enlistment
physical was done on  23  Jan  99.  He  was  diagnosed  with  allergic
rhinitis (nasal allergy) and this was known by the Air  Force  medical
providers and his supervisors. He was progressing well in his training
and was in good physical shape evidenced by his physical  conditioning
test. He had persistent upper respiratory  symptoms,  consistent  with
allergies and/or upper respiratory infection, throughout much  of  his
time at BMT. Around the beginning of Aug 99, he  apparently  was  seen
for a cold.  He was medically screened on 13 Aug 99. He was seen at  a
Lackland AFB dispensary on 17 Aug 99 for "minor musculoskeletal  pain"
and issued over-the-counter (OTC)  medication.  His  second  visit  on
31 Aug 99 was for "minor cold symptoms" and he  was  issued  OTC  cold
medication.  He made a third visit on 8 Sep 99 and the same PA as  the
previous  two  visits  diagnosed  him  as  having  "persistent   upper
respiratory infection," noting he  was  not  in  distress  and  had  a
bruised right shin. He given OTC and prescription medication  and  was
told to follow-up the next morning to reevaluate the bruise;  however,
no follow-up visit on 9 Sep 99 is recorded.

The 2-day FTX began on 9 Sep 99, and AB S-- told a fellow trainee that
he  was  not  feeling  well.  Lights  out  occurred  at  midnight  and
activities resumed at 0520 on 10 Sep 99. The  march,  which  began  at
1417, was conducted under yellow flag conditions because the Wet  Bulb
Globe Temperature index  at  the  beginning  of  the  march  was  86.1
degrees. Therefore, the trainees were not required to carry their  35-
pound duffel bags, but did carry canteens and inert M-16  rifles.  The
trainees were dressed in Battle Dress Uniform (BDU) with hat, web belt
and camouflage face paint. Based  on  an  inventory  of  his  personal
effects, AB S-- was dressed in winter-weight BDUs. AB S-- told several
trainees he was not feeling well. Both trainee and  military  training
instructor (MTI) accounts indicate that by the third water stop, AB S--
 and other trainees were receiving assistance from fellow trainees  at
various times during the march. At 1615 the formation stopped for  the
dinner break.  Trainees  and  a  Military  Training  Instructor  (MTI)
observed that AB S-- was lying down, physically weak and  had  vomited
after eating a small portion of his meal.  A  medic  that  was  called
observed from about 8-10 feet away that the airman had vomited up  his
meal; however, the medic did not take further action as the airman was
on his feet  and  walking.  The  march  resumed  around  1650  and  at
approximately 1710 the airman was found jogging in place with his head
thrown back. MTIs could not get the  airman  to  stop  jogging  or  to
respond. He was forced to the  ground  to  assess  his  condition.  He
subsequently had an apparent seizure  and  remained  unresponsive.  An
ambulance was called at 1719.  Upon arrival at WHMC at 1740, his  core
body temperature was 108 degrees (hyperthermia). He had at  least  4.5
liters of extra water in his  bloodstream.  Large  amounts  of  excess
water over a short period of time lead to  dilution  of  minerals  and
blood cells in the blood (hyponatremia). The airman had pulmonary  and
cerebral edema (swollen water-saturated lungs and brain) as well as  a
diffuse clotting disorder, a known complication of heatstroke.  On  11
Sep 99, a  neurology  consult  revealed  massive  brain  swelling  and
changes consistent with lack of blood flow and  oxygen  to  the  brain
that caused irreversible brain injury, leading to brain death. AB  S--
was declared brain dead on 12 Sep 99.

The IO noted AB S-- had been prescribed appropriate  medication  prior
to the FTX but, according to lab results, there  were  no  medications
present in his blood at the time of the incident that  contributed  to
his death. The upper respiratory illness could have predisposed him to
fatigue  more  easily  and  reduced  his  reserves  of  energy.   Also
significant was that, by all accounts and supported by lab results, he
was drinking large  volumes  of  water.  Several  experts  pointed  to
overhydration as being a critical factor in  his  rapid  deterioration
and death. These medical issues may have made him different  from  the
other 190 students that successfully completed the march.  The IO also
indicated a variety of operational and training-related  issues  could
have complicated his ability to resist heat stress.  The  majority  of
the trainees' scheduled physical activity was  accomplished  early  in
the morning while the march was accomplished  in  the  middle  of  the
afternoon, after the trainees spent approximately 1 hour in the direct
sun. The IO also indicated that many trainees were very  reluctant  to
self-identify themselves as having any  difficulty  because  of  their
fear of being recycled. On the morning of the march the trainees  were
not briefed on the major causes  or  symptoms  of  heat  illness,  nor
instructed to watch for them.  The relationship between  trainees  and
those in charge should be based  upon  a  healthy  respect  for  their
authority but not upon fear. There are inherent risks in any  activity
that place individuals in stressful and demanding situations. However,
military recruits should be trained under scenarios that  simulate  as
realistically  and  safely  as  possible  the  conditions  they   will
encounter in real world situations. The IO recommended the following:

            a.  Establish a  standardized  procedure  that  guaranteed
squadron supervisory personnel are formally notified  when  a  trainee
has received medical attention/medication, or been placed on any  type
of physical-conditioning waiver, and that trainee medical status be  a
mandatory review item by the MTIs prior to the FTX.

            b.  Brief trainees at the start of the FTX on the  warning
signs of heat-related illness and instruct them to notify the MTIs  or
medics immediately if significant heat stress symptoms  are  observed.
Standardize the guidance for identification of and treatment for heat-
related symptoms.

            c.  Consider beginning the march in the morning  to  avoid
any complications from high  temperatures  later  in  the  day.   Also
review the acclimatization process for the trainees.

            d.  Clearly  spell  out  in  policy  guidance  the  actual
distribution of responsibilities between the medics and  the  MTIs  on
the march. This would help ensure that MTIs were  not  placed  in  the
position of having to medically evaluate the trainees and  the  medics
would have a clear definition of the difference between their roles as
medical providers and supervisors. This may aid in the willingness  of
the trainees to self-identify, as they  did  not  make  a  distinction
between the medics and the MTIs and how they were treated by them.

A second CDI was directed by the AETC/CC on 22 Nov 99 to determine  if
any actions or omissions of any personnel or organizations assigned or
attached to AETC caused or contributed to AB S--'s death. The  AETC/CC
directed  the  report  include  findings  and  conclusions  only,  not
recommendations. A complete copy of the 3-volume CDI is at Exhibit  E.


In the second CDI, dated 24 Feb 00, the IO indicated the following:

             a.  The  two  principal  documents   training   personnel
referenced as providing guidance when they  developed  and  added  the
march to the FTX program were the  737th  Training  Group  Instruction
(TRGI) 36-3, Basic Military Training,  and  AETCI  48-101.  TRGI  36-3
references the FTX program  but  does  not  specifically  mention  the
march.

             b.  The  march  was  never  assessed   by   a   qualified
organization to determine its workload nor structured  to  incorporate
validated work/rest cycles  to  prevent  heat  stress  disorders.  The
advice  in  the  21  Aug  98  BE  memo  was  superficial,  lacked   an
appreciation of the march's  conditions,  and  did  not  evaluate  the
workload of the march.  TRSS did not  make  any  further  attempts  to
obtain more practical guidance for the march and BE did not follow  up
to validate the effectiveness of its 21 Aug 98 memo.  The  end  result
was that the personal characterization of the march  remained  "light"
and the pace and number of rest breaks was at the  discretion  of  the
FTX instructors on the march.

            c.  AETCI 48-101  does  not  contain  definitive  guidance
applicable to the development of a new training  event,  nor  does  it
provide objective criteria to  measure  the  workload  of  the  march.
Further, it is not designed for BMT trainees, cannot be used to make a
determination regarding  trainee  activities,  and  does  not  contain
sufficient objective criteria to assess an event like the march.

      d.  The 10 Sep 98  march  followed  the  limited  guidance  then
existing for the conduct of the march. The trainees stood  waiting  in
the sun for about one hour and then marched at a quick pace to make up
for a late start. The rest breaks were adequate  in  number;  however,
trainees at the end of the formation [where AB S--  was  located]  did
not have the benefit of the full rest periods and  may  not  have  had
sufficient time to recuperate.

      e.  The hydration guidance in AETCI 48-101 was followed. No  one
at BMT was aware of the possibility of over-hydration.  Prior to  this
incident, hyponatremia and measures to prevent over-hydration were not
reflected in Air Force publications. AB S--'s water consumption was in
accordance with the Air Force and BMT guidance at that time.

            f.  While the conduct of the march may have contributed to
AB S--'s hyperthermia, it was not the sole  cause  of  his  developing
heat  stroke.  Hyponatremia  did  not  directly   trigger   AB   S--'s
hyperthermia, but it was  a  contributory  factor  and  increased  his
likelihood of mortality.

            g.  The training and medical groups did not have  a  joint
approach to assess the development of the march.

            h.  Self-identification is limited by fear  of  recycling,
motivation by MTIs and trainees, and other  trainees  not  wanting  to
identify a fellow trainee.  Self-identification failed to identify  AB
S-- as needing assistance

            i.  During the  course  of  the  march,  there  were  four
instances when MTIs or medics might have intervened. It  was  only  at
the dinner stop there was a clear duty to take action and there was  a
failure to do so. It could not be determined with any  certainty  that
the failure to act or properly evaluate his condition caused AB  S--'s
death or that intervention at that  point  would  have  prevented  his
death.

            j.  AB S--'s medications and pre-march medical  care  were
found to be appropriate. Toxicology  test  showed  he  did   not  take
enough medication to affect his heat regulatory mechanisms.

On 22 Mar 00, the AETC/CC designated the 19AF/CC as the general court-
martial convening authority to consider  whether  disciplinary  action
should be initiated against any AETC personnel involved in the  events
surrounding the death of AB S--.

On 31 Mar 00, the 19AF/CC gave  the  applicant  an  LOR.  The  19AF/CC
indicated that he had reviewed the second CDI,  which  concluded  that
the FTX program, specifically the march,  was  developed,  structured,
and conducted in a manner which contributed to the  airman  developing
heat stroke. The commander stated that "the [737TRG]  was  responsible
for the FTX and, within the group, the [737TRSS] was  responsible  for
the FTX. Thus, the ultimate responsibility for development, structure,
and safe conduct of the FTX march resided  with  [the  applicant,  the
737TRSS/CC]." The commander criticized the applicant for not  ensuring
that his personnel followed-up with medical  authorities  to  properly
assess the FTX march for workload and not  having  written  procedures
developed to guide the FTX cadre and MTIs  when  curtailment  measures
were  required  by  heat  conditions.   Trainees   were   exposed   to
potentially dangerous conditions.

The 37TRW/CC requested on 11 May 00 that the 19AF/CC  not  invoke  the
LOR/UIF. On 8 May 00, the 2AF/CC advised the 19AF/CC that an  LOR  was
inappropriate.

The applicant rebutted the LOR point-by-point on 15 May  00.  He  also
questioned why the PA's treatment of AB S-- was not pursued by the IO.
He contended that had the PA properly evaluated the airman  on  8  Sep
98, he would not have been on the 10 Sep 98 march. He believed he  was
being held accountable for a death neither he nor his staff was  given
a reasonable chance to mitigate  or  prevent  and  asks  against  what
specific standard was he being judged.

On 16 May 00, the applicant received  the  Meritorious  Service  Medal
(4th Oak Leaf Cluster) for the period 21 Mar 98 to 1 Jun 00.

On 9 Jun 00, the 19AF/CC notified the applicant of his intent to  file
the LOR in the applicant's officer selection record  (OSR).   However,
the applicant's area defense  council  (ADC)  disputed  the  19AF/CC's
authority to file the LOR in the OSR, arguing the 19AF/CC was not  the
applicant's senior rater as required by AFI 36-2608.  The  19AF  Judge
Advocate (19AF/JA) determined on 23 Jun 00 that the AETC/CC letter  of
delegation to the 19AF/CC included the authority to take this  action.
The ADC rebutted  this  determination.  On  26  Jun  00,  the  19AF/CC
determined that the LOR would be filed in the applicant's OSR.  On  27
Jul 00, HQ AFPC/JA  legal  review  found  that  the  19AF/CC  had  the
authority to file the LOR in  the  OSR  based  on  the  delegation  of
authority given to him by the AETC/CC.

On 1 Aug 00, the 19AF/CC advised the 37TRW/CC that  the  LOR  will  be
filed in the applicant's Officer HQ  USAF  Selection  Record  and  his
Officer Command Selection Record.

On 27 Nov 00, the  37TRW/CC  requested  that  the  2AF/CC  remove  the
applicant's UIF from his OSR.

The applicant's Officer Performance Reports (OPRs) from 25 Aug  81  to
present reflect the highest ratings.

The applicant was considered below-the-promotion-zone  (BPZ)  for  the
grade of colonel by the Calendar Year  2000A  (CY00A)  and  the  CY01B
boards, which convened on 17  Jul  00  and  3  Dec  01,  respectively.
However,  he  was  not  selected  by  either  board.   His   Promotion
Recommendation  Forms  (PRF)  reflected  overall  recommendations   of
"Promote."  He is currently serving as the 37th Training  Wing  deputy
commander at Lackland AFB, TX.

_________________________________________________________________

AIR FORCE EVALUATION:

HQ  AETC/SGP  reviewed  the  medical  documentation  provided  by  the
applicant and professionally opines that the medical care provided  to
AB S-- by the 59th Medical Wing  met  acceptable  standards  of  care.
Recommendation is deferred  to  the  Directorates  of  Operations  and
Personnel.

A complete copy of the evaluation is at Exhibit C.

HQ AETC/DOO indicates the applicant is also requesting  that  his  PRF
and OPR be corrected incident to  the  LOR  set  aside.   HQ  AETC/DOO
recommends the set aside be granted and the applicant's PRF and OPR be
corrected since the evidence  demonstrates  errors  that  resulted  in
injustice.   DOO  believes  the  record   supports   the   applicant's
assertions. Further, in his favor, all of  his  supervisors  over  the
years have rated him as a top performer and one of the finest officers
in the Air Force. Since  his  reprimand,  his  local  commanders  have
demonstrated their continued confidence in the applicant by  assigning
him to a position of increased responsibility.  The record shows  that
credible individuals,  including  the  applicant's  group,  wing,  and
numbered Air Force commanders, supported him and viewed the  direction
and outcome of this case as unjust. DOO makes the following points:

            a.   The  applicant  had  no  reasonable  control  in  the
matters for which he was reprimanded. He was not even  in  command  at
the time the FTX march was designed and approved.

             b.    The  second  investigation   largely   focused   on
deficiencies of non-training organizations yet ends with  a  reprimand
of the applicant, who is a training commander.  The  investigation  by
its own words is actually making the point that the problems  observed
are not the fault of the applicant.

            c.   The investigating officer erred when he alleged  that
the applicant failed to comply with AETCI 48-101 and  failed  to  take
actions affecting the safety of the FTX march. The entire  case  flows
from these errors  and  the  reprimanding  official  relied  upon  the
resulting erroneous information in  making  a  determination.  Certain
assertions in the LOR are not supported by documented facts and appear
to be based on conjecture. The 737TRSS/CC could not fully comply  with
AETCI 48-101 and the Lackland AFB  Supplement  because  they  were  in
conflict. The first investigation discusses some of these conflicts.

A copy of the complete advisory is at Exhibit D.

HQ AFPC/DPS discusses  the  two  CDIs  conducted  to  investigate  the
circumstances of the airman's  death.   The  use  of  the  LOR  is  an
exercise of supervisory authority and responsibility. It automatically
establishes a UIF for officer personnel and  is  not  required  to  be
legally sufficient. It is a tool for  commanders  and  supervisors  to
reprove  or  instruct  subordinates.  A  wing  commander  or  imposing
commander (whichever is higher) may remove an  officer's  UIF  at  any
time and may also direct removal of derogatory date from the OSR.   In
this particular case, the AETC/CC, for reasons  of  his  own,  removed
resolution of the case from the normal chain of command,  2AF/CC,  and
delegated the responsibility and authority  of  general  court-martial
convening authority to the 19AF/CC.  DPS indicates it  normally  works
under the premise that  a  commander's  decision-making  authority  is
paramount when issuing LORs. However, in this  case,  the  applicant's
commander and chain of command were taken out of  the  decision-making
process and, when they learned of the intent to  render  an  LOR,  all
strenuously objected in writing.  Although the applicant has  provided
compelling documentation on his behalf, AFPC/JA has  opined  [see  Tab
30F of Exhibit A] that the applicant's  performance  reports  for  the
periods prior to and immediately after the tragedy were not  tarnished
and he received a military decoration for his time in that position--a
clear indication of continued  support  from  him  chain  of  command.
Legal review has held that issuance of the  LOR  by  the  19AF/CC  was
proper. DPS defers to the AETC Directorate of Operations regarding the
applicant's culpability toward the alleged training deficiencies.

A copy of the complete advisory, as well as a copy of the second  CDI,
are at Exhibit E.

_________________________________________________________________

APPLICANT'S REVIEW OF AIR FORCE EVALUATION:

Complete copies of the Air Force evaluations  were  forwarded  to  the
applicant on 21 Nov 01 for review and comment within 30 days.   As  of
this date, this office has received no response.

_________________________________________________________________

ADDITIONAL AIR FORCE EVALUATION:

HQ AFPC/DPSF indicates that the LOR and UIF are a  matter  of  record.
His unit maintains the actual documents  and  the  personnel  database
reflects a disposition (expiration) date of 4 Jun 02--two  years  from
the date the LOR was administered.  In this case, the disposition date
isn't exactly two years from the date the LOR was given  due  to  time
allotted for the applicant to refute the LOR;  however,  the  UIF  was
still established within acceptable  timeframes.   LORs  automatically
established a UIF for officers. The  disposition  date  is  two  years
unless sooner removed by the member's wing  commander  or  equivalent.
The applicant is still in the same chain of command  that  issued  the
LOR so this option is not available to him.  DPSF checked with the OSR
office on 17 Dec 01 and their review of the applicant's  OSR  did  not
reflect the LOR.  If the Board grants  the  applicant's  appeal,  DPSF
recommends the Board address the removal of the LOR from  the  OSR  in
the event there has just been a delay in filing the document.

A copy of the complete advisory is at Exhibit G.

HQ AFPC/DPPB states that a review of  the  applicant's  OSR  confirmed
that no LOR was in the OSR  when  reviewed  by  the  CY00A  and  CY01B
Colonel Selection Boards.

A copy of the complete advisory is at Exhibit H.

_________________________________________________________________

APPLICANT'S REVIEW OF THE ADDITIONAL AIR FORCE EVALUATION:

Complete copies of the additional evaluations were  forwarded  to  the
applicant on 21 Dec 01 for review and comment within 30 days.   As  of
this date, this office has received no response.

_________________________________________________________________

THE BOARD CONCLUDES THAT:

1.    The applicant has exhausted all remedies  provided  by  existing
law or regulations.

2.    The application was timely filed.

3.    Sufficient relevant evidence has been presented  to  demonstrate
the existence of probable error or injustice to  warrant  relief.   We
note HQ AETC/DOO asserts  in  their  advisory  that,  in  addition  to
rescinding the LOR, the applicant also requested his "PRF and  OPR  be
corrected incident to the [LOR] set aside." However, we could not find
where the applicant raised any requests concerning his PRF or  OPR  in
his submission. Further, the PRFs rendered for and the  OPRs  reviewed
by CY00A and CY01B boards do not  appear  to  reflect  any  derogatory
comments or ratings.  Therefore, the only corrective issue before this
board will pertain to the LOR. HQ AETC/DOO  believes  the  applicant's
appeal should be granted, while HQ AFPC/DPS notes legal review
held the issuance of the LOR by the 19AF/CC  was  proper.   Given  the
tragic consequences of the 10 Sep 99 march,  we  took  great  care  to
thoroughly examine and consider all aspects of  this  complicated  and
emotionally troubling case before concluding that the  LOR  should  be
voided. In this regard, we note the planning and execution of the  FTX
march were already in place when the applicant took  command.  In  our
view, the available evidence does not  establish  that  he  failed  to
comply with existing requirements or failed to take actions  affecting
the safety of the FTX march. The applicant appears to  have  acted  as
responsibly and appropriately as possible  given  the  decisions  that
preceded his command and the guidance available to him.  If  anything,
we would question what appear to be insufficiencies on the part of the
PA, the MTIs and the medic  at  the  scene.  In  the  final  analysis,
everything in the Air Force puts people potentially  at  risk  and  no
physical training program is fail safe. The airman's death appears  to
have been the tragic  result  of  a  chain  of  multiple,  extenuating
factors and circumstances over  which  no  one  person  possessed  the
clairvoyance to foresee or the complete control to  prevent.  Although
HQ AFPC advised that the LOR was  not  in  the  applicant's  OSR  when
reviewed by the CY00A and  CY01B  boards,  we  note  the  19AF/CC  had
determined on 1 Aug 00 to file the  letter  in  both  the  applicant's
Officer HQ USAF Selection Record and  his  Officer  Command  Selection
Record. Therefore, in the event there may have been a delay in  filing
the letter, we agree with HQ AFPC/DPSF's suggestion that  the  LOR  be
specifically removed from the applicant's OSR, as well as his records,
and this we so recommend.

_________________________________________________________________

THE BOARD RECOMMENDS THAT:

The pertinent military records of the  Department  of  the  Air  Force
relating to APPLICANT,  be  corrected  to  show  that  the  Letter  of
Reprimand, dated 31 March 2000, and any  and  all  attachments  and/or
references thereto be declared void and removed from his  records,  to
include his Officer HQ USAF Selection Record and his  Officer  Command
Selection Record.

_________________________________________________________________

The following members of the  Board  considered  this  application  in
Executive Session on 7 March 2002, under the  provisions  of  AFI  36-
2603:


                  Mr. Roscoe Hinton, Jr., Panel Chair
                  Mr. Robert S. Boyd, Member
                  Ms. Kathleen F. Graham, Member

All  members  voted  to  correct  the  records,  as  recommended.  The
following documentary evidence relating to  AFBCMR  No.  01-01556  was
considered:

   Exhibit A.  DD Form 149, dated 1 Jun 01, w/atchs.
   Exhibit B.  Applicant's Master Personnel Records.
   Exhibit C.  Letter, HQ AETC/SGP, dated 7 Aug 01.
   Exhibit D.  Letter, HQ AETC/DOO, dated 22 Aug 01.
   Exhibit E.  Letter, HQ AFPC/DPS, dated 20 Nov 01, w/atchs.
   Exhibit F.  Letter, SAF/MRBR, dated 21 Nov 01.
   Exhibit G.  Letter, HQ AFPC/DPSF, dated 17 Dec 01.
   Exhibit H.  Letter, HQ AFPC/DPPB, dated 20 Dec 01.
   Exhibit I.  Letter, SAF/MRBR, dated 21 Dec 01.




                                   ROSCOE HINTON, JR.
                                   Panel Chair

AFBCMR 01-01556




MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

      Having received and considered the recommendation of the Air
Force Board for Correction of Military Records and under the authority
of Section 1552, Title 10, United States Code (70A Stat 116), it is
directed that:

      The pertinent military records of the Department of the Air
Force relating to           , be corrected to show that the Letter of
Reprimand, dated 31 March 2000, and any and all attachments and/or
references thereto be, and hereby are, declared void and removed from
his records, to include his Officer HQ USAF Selection Record and his
Officer Command Selection Record.





   JOE G. LINEBERGER

   Director

   Air Force Review Boards Agency