IN THE CASE OF:	  

		BOARD DATE:	  20 January 2011

		DOCKET NUMBER:  AR20110000176 


THE BOARD CONSIDERED THE FOLLOWING EVIDENCE:

1.  Application for correction of military records (with supporting documents provided, if any).

2.  Military Personnel Records and advisory opinions (if any).


THE APPLICANT'S REQUEST, STATEMENT, AND EVIDENCE:

1.  The applicant requests award of the Combat Action Badge (CAB) through his Member of Congress.

2.  The applicant states he and three other Soldiers were in close proximity to a rocket attack in Afghanistan in December 2003.  Despite repeated requests to their chain of command G-1 at the time, the applications were never acted upon. There was a period when the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB), was delegated authority to award the CAB, but NGB did not act on the requests for this award.  He and the other Soldiers were never given a definitive answer.  They were later told NGB lost their requests and therefore their requests were never forwarded to U.S. Army Human Resources Command, Alexandria 
(HRC-ALX), for processing when the CNGB delegation of authority expired.  The requests were reconstructed and submitted to HRC-ALX, but they were ultimately denied.

3.  The applicant also states that when the CAB was in its infancy, he and others received poor advice on their initial requests for the CAB.  Had they photographed the area and obtained a serious incident report, their chances of receiving the CAB would have been much higher.  He also states that HRC officials appear to apply subjective criteria rather than the specific CAB eligibility criteria outlined in the governing regulation.  Inserting a criterion that the Soldier must demonstrate he or she could reasonably have been injured by an explosion is not a requirement for award of the CAB.  Such a criterion is arbitrary.  A better way to establish eligibility is the proximity of the Soldier to the attack coupled with the capabilities of the rocket.

4.  The applicant provides:

* letter to his Member of Congress
* letter from his Member of Congress to the Office of Legislative Affairs
* self-authored synopsis
* self-authored sworn statement
* three sworn statements from the other three Soldiers
* declassified Blue Line [incidents report] for 18 December 2003
* extract of Field Manual 3-01.60 (Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar Operations)
* memorandum authorizing him wear of the shoulder sleeve insignia for former war time service
* DD Form 214 (Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty)
* DD Form 1610 (Request and Authorization for Temporary Duty Travel of Department of Defense Personnel)
* DD Form 1351-2 (Travel Voucher or Sub-voucher)
* January 2004 leave and earnings statement
* NGB Orders 089-006, amending another Soldier's temporary duty orders
* HRC-ALX denial memorandum
* DA Form 4187 (Personnel Action), request for award of the CAB and chain of command endorsements
* Military Personnel Message Number 08-190, subject:  Revised Criteria for Awarding Combat Badges (Combat Infantryman Badge, Combat Medical Badge, CAB)

CONSIDERATION OF EVIDENCE:

1.  The applicant's records show he was appointed as a Reserve commissioned officer in the rank of second lieutenant and executed an oath of office on 8 June 1985.  He completed various tours of active duty in several staff and leadership positions within and outside the continental United States and attained the rank of lieutenant colonel (LTC).

2.  At the time of the incident, the applicant served as an Army National Guard (ARNG) LTC on active duty assigned to Headquarters, Army Central Command, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, as a Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, ARNG Affairs, Mobilization and Deployment Integration and assistant executive officer to the CNGB.

3.  In December 2003, the applicant and three other Soldiers were posted at Baghram Air Base in Afghanistan to conduct a visit to Reserve Component Soldiers supporting Combined Joint Task Force-180 (CJTF-180).  In a synopsis of what occurred on 16 and 17 December 2003, the applicant states:

	a.  In the early morning hours of 17 December 2003 subsequent to a lengthy town hall meeting with Soldiers, as the four Soldiers walked back to and arrived at their billets located in a sparsely populated part of Baghram Air Base, they heard a whooshing sound overhead followed by a loud impact and explosion nearby.  The explosion was close enough to cause the ground to shake and debris to fly around.  Visibility was limited and they were new in the area so they were unaware of the need to seek cover in a bunker.  A command sergeant major, having served in combat, recognized it as a missile attack and directed the others to go inside the billet building.  Seconds later, two more rockets flew overhead and exploded a little farther away.  They remained in place until the all-clear signal was given.  The next morning, they could see the impact of the explosion in the form of debris and shrapnel scars around the area.

	b.  Intelligence analysts determined the rockets to most likely be Soviet-made 107-milimeter Katyusha rockets, but did not rule out the larger 120-millimeter.  This type of missile was abundant in Afghanistan and had a potential to kill personnel up to 133 yards away and injure at a distance beyond that.  They estimated they were within 100 yards.  Since the CAB did not exist at the time, there was no need to measure the distance or obtain eyewitness statements.

	c.  In the fall of 2005, after the Army created the CAB and believing they met the criteria of engaging or being engaged by the enemy, the applicant obtained the required witness statements and submitted a request for award of the CAB on behalf of the four Soldiers.  Ultimately, the Army's delegation of authority to the CNGB expired without their applications being processed.  They resubmitted their paperwork through their ARNG chain of command, but they were turned down by HRC-ALX on 19 January 2007.  He contacted officials at HRC and was told they were given poor guidance with respect to the CAB.  One of the other Soldiers, LTC D____ P____ S____ reconstructed the packet and obtained an endorsement from the first general officer in the chain of command, but the packet was denied by HRC-ALX on 24 October 2007 due to no new evidence/information and there was no indication any of the Soldiers could reasonably have been injured by the explosion.

4.  He submitted three sworn statements from the three other Soldiers present at the scene.  The authors agree that all four Soldiers were present at Baghram Air Base when it was attacked by 107-milimeter rockets on 17 December 2003.  They had just entered a building that was used for temporary lodging when they heard the distant sound of two 107-milimeter rockets passing directly overhead in quick succession and then impacting very close by.  The impact shook their 

building and rattled the windows.  A third rocket could be heard at a distance.  They remained in place until they heard the all-clear signal.  The next morning they viewed the impact area and estimate the impact areas were approximately 100 meters from their building.  In addition to the two impact craters, there were marks caused by shrapnel and debris on the buildings and canned containers in the area surrounding their location.  The attack clearly had the potential to cause bodily harm to all personnel in the vicinity including all four Soldiers.

5.  He also submitted a declassified Blue Line, dated 18 December 2003, which confirms that in the early hours of 17 December 2003 three 107-milimeter rockets impacted Baghram Air Base.  One landed approximately 100 meters from an aircraft ramp and another landed near a tower.  No injuries or damage from these attacks were reported.

6.  He further submitted a DA Form 4187, dated 20 October 2006, wherein Colonel (Promotable) G____ L____ H____, Acting Commander, Headquarters, MDARNG, recommended LTC D____ P____ S____ for award of the CAB.  The request was endorsed on 27 October 2006 and recommended for approval by The Adjutant General, MDARNG.

7.  The original HRC-ALX denial memorandum, dated 19 January 2007, is not available for review.  However, a second memorandum, dated 24 October 2007, states the request for award of the CAB to LTC D____ P____ S____ for actions on 17 December 2003 was previously reviewed and disapproved on 19 January 2007.  The statements provided in support of the request indicate two rockets impacted 100 meters away from the applicant's location.  Although there was evidence of enemy action, there is no indication the applicant could reasonably have been injured by the explosion.  The incident did not meet the criteria for the CAB.

8.  Army Regulation 600-8-22 (Military Awards) states the requirements for award of the CAB are branch and MOS immaterial.  Assignment to a combat arms unit or a unit organized to conduct close or offensive combat operations or performing offensive combat operations is not required to qualify for the CAB.  However, it is not intended to award the CAB to all Soldiers who serve in a combat zone or imminent danger area.  The Soldier must be performing assigned duties in an area where hostile fire pay or imminent danger pay is authorized.  The Soldier must be personally present and actively engaging or being engaged by the enemy and performing satisfactorily in accordance with the prescribed rules of engagement.  The Soldier must not be assigned or attached to a unit that would 

qualify the Soldier for the Combat Infantryman Badge or the Combat Medical Badge.  Award of the CAB is authorized from 18 September 2001 to a date to be determined.  

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS:

1.  The criteria for award of the CAB requires the Soldier to be personally present and actively engaging or being engaged by the enemy and performing satisfactorily in accordance with the prescribed rules of engagement.  It is not intended for all Soldiers who serve in a combat zone.

2.  In this case the four Soldiers heard an incoming missile.  Although they were unaware of the specific rules of engagement to seek cover in specific bunkers, they sought cover inside a building or a structure.  It is unclear how far the building was in relation to the impact area.  In their statements, the Soldiers believe the distance to have been approximately 100 meters and saw debris and shrapnel the next morning.

3.  None of the four Soldiers engaged or was engaged by the enemy.  Although it appears the intent of the enemy was to inflict maximum damage against personnel and/or equipment, the four Soldiers were not specifically targeted by the incoming rocket and there was no indication any of the four Soldiers could reasonably have been injured by the rocket explosion.  As such, the criteria for award of the CAB have not been met in this case.

BOARD VOTE:

________  ________  ________  GRANT FULL RELIEF 

________  ________  ________  GRANT PARTIAL RELIEF 

________  ________  ________  GRANT FORMAL HEARING

___X____  ___X____  ____X___DENY APPLICATION

BOARD DETERMINATION/RECOMMENDATION:

The evidence presented does not demonstrate the existence of a probable error or injustice.  Therefore, the Board determined that the overall merits of this case 

are insufficient as a basis for correction of the records of the individual concerned.




      _______ _X  _______   ___
               CHAIRPERSON
      
I certify that herein is recorded the true and complete record of the proceedings of the Army Board for Correction of Military Records in this case.
ABCMR Record of Proceedings (cont)                                         AR20110000176



3


ARMY BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS

 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS


1

ABCMR Record of Proceedings (cont)                                         AR20110000176



6


ARMY BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS

 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS


1