RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
             AIR FORCE BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS


IN THE MATTER OF:      DOCKET NUMBER:  02-02361
            INDEX CODE:  126.04

            COUNSEL:  DAV

            HEARING DESIRED:  NO


_________________________________________________________________

APPLICANT REQUESTS THAT:

The punishment imposed upon him under Article 15, Uniform Code  of  Military
Justice (UCMJ), 18 September 1974 and 10 September 1975  be  set  aside  and
that he be adequately compensated for lost wages, pain  and  suffering,  and
lost benefits.

_________________________________________________________________

APPLICANT CONTENDS THAT:

Regarding the Article 15 he received on 13 September  1974,  he  was  denied
due process and his initials were forged on  the  document.   Regarding  the
second Article 15 he received on  9  September  1975,  the  social  security
number on the document does not belong  to  him.   He  claims  that  he  was
ordered to  sign  the  form  while  suffering  from  Post  Traumatic  Stress
Disorder (PTSD).  He states that neither  his  representative  nor  the  Air
Force looked at his records properly in 1981.  These discriminatory  actions
should not go unchecked.

In support of the applicant’s claim, he provided a copy  of  AF  Form  1168,
Statement of Military Suspect, dated 13 September 1974, AF Form 3070,  dated
9 September 1975 and other documentation.

Applicant’s complete submission, with attachments, is at Exhibit A.

_________________________________________________________________

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

On 21 August 1974, the applicant enlisted in the Regular Air  Force  in  the
grade of airman basic for a period of four (4) years.




On 13 September 1974, the applicant was notified of his  commander’s  intent
to impose  nonjudicial  punishment  upon  him  for  the  following:   Having
received  a  lawful  order  from  your  first  lieutenant,   your   superior
commissioned officer, to sign a  statement  acknowledging  understanding  of
the motivation briefing did, at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, on or  about
11 September 1974, willfully disobey the same in violation  of  the  Uniform
Code of Military Justice, Article 90.

After consulting with counsel, applicant waived his  right  to  a  trial  by
court-martial,  did  not  submit  a  written  presentation  in  his  behalf;
however, he requested to make an oral presentation and that it be public.

On 18 September 1974, he was found guilty by his commander who  imposed  the
following punishment: 30 days correctional custody.

On 9 September 1975, the applicant was notified of  his  commander’s  intent
to impose nonjudicial punishment upon him for the  following:  You  did,  at
K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, Michigan:

            a.  On or about 2 September 1975, without authority, fail to  go
at the time prescribed to your appointed place of duty,  to  wit:   Building
502, FTD Building.

            b.  On or about 3 September 1975, without authority, fail to  go
at the time prescribed to your appointed place of duty,  to  wit:   Building
502, FTD Building.

            c.  On or about 4 September 1975, without authority, fail to  go
at the time prescribed to your appointed place of duty,  to  wit:   Building
502, FTD Building.

After consulting with counsel, applicant waived his  right  to  a  trial  by
court-martial, did not request a personal appearance and did  not  submit  a
written presentation.

On 10 September 1975, he was found guilty by his commander who  imposed  the
following punishment: reduction to the grade of airman  basic,  with  a  new
date of rank of 10 September 1975.

The Airman  Performance  Report  rendered  for  the  period  21 August  1974
through 21 August 1975 reflected a rating of “7”.

On 16 September 1975, applicant was notified of his  commander's  intent  to
initiate discharge action against  him  for  unsuitability.   The  commander
indicated that the reason for the recommended action is  his  apathetic  and
defective attitude as evidenced by his misconduct.





The commander advised applicant of  his  right  to  consult  legal  counsel,
submit statements in his own behalf, or waive his  rights  after  consulting
with counsel.

On 3 October 1975, after consulting with counsel, the applicant  waived  his
right to submit statements in his own behalf.

On 9 October 1975,  the  Assistant  Staff  Judge  Advocate  recommended  the
applicant be discharged under the provisions of AFM 39-12,  paragraph  2-4c,
without probation and rehabilitation,  and  that  he  be  issued  a  general
discharge.

On 22 October 1975, the discharge authority approved applicant’s discharge.

On 31 October 1975, the applicant was discharged  in  the  grade  of  airman
basic.  He received a general (under honorable conditions)  discharge  under
the provisions of AFM 39-12  (Unsuitability  –  Apathy/Defective  Attitude).
He served 1 year, 2 months and 11 days of total active military service.

On 8 May 1981, The Air Force Discharge Review Board (AFDRB)  considered  and
denied the applicant’s request to upgrade his discharge to honorable and  to
change his Reenlistment Eligibility (RE)  code.   They  concluded  that  the
discharge was consistent with the procedural  and  substantive  requirements
of the discharge regulation and was  within  the  sound  discretion  of  the
discharge authority and that the applicant was provided full  administrative
due process.  The Board concluded that the discharge should not be  changed.
 The Board could find no matters of record or any information  submitted  by
the  applicant  to  warrant  a   recharacterization   of   discharge.    The
applicant’s  marginal  performance  record  and   substantially   documented
infractions of regulations clearly indicate the character of  service.   The
case was transferred to the Air  Force  Board  for  Correction  of  Military
Records (AFBCMR) and on 30 August 1982, the applicant was notified that  his
case was denied.

_________________________________________________________________

AIR FORCE EVALUATION:

AFLSA/JAJM recommended denial.  They indicated that the  applicant  contends
that he was denied procedural and substantive due  process.   He  claims  he
was suffering from the side effects of prescription  medications  throughout
the periods involved (but does not describe how  that  might  have  impacted
his abilities or actions).  With respect to the 1974 Article 15  action,  he
claims that his initials were “forged” on the entry  waiving  his  right  to
appeal (although, he does not contend  that  any  of  the  ten  other  items
initialed  on  that  document  or  his  subscriptions  on  each   page   are
forgeries).  With respect to the 1975 Article 15 action, he claims that  the
handwritten entries attributed to him  are  in  two  different  handwritings
(but he does not specify which, if any, he believes is authentic).  He  also
(accurately) points out that his social security number  (correctly  entered
on page 1 of the Article 15 document, AF Form 3070) is  incorrectly  entered
on the second page.  He  (mistakenly)  contends  that  associated  paperwork
indicates his race and rank incorrectly.  Finally, he contends  that  racial
prejudice, in some unspecified way, was a factor in each Article 15  action.
 The applicant offers no explanation or other evidence  in  support  of  his
naked claim of prejudice.

The applicant presented some, if not all,  of  the  same  arguments  in  his
prior unsuccessful applications for relief.  His claim of  racial  prejudice
was rejected as unsubstantiated and the  actions  taken  in  his  case  were
determined  to  be  equitable  and  not  unduly   harsh.    The   applicant,
nevertheless, requests that the Article 15 actions involved be set aside.

Ordinarily, applicants must file an application  within  three  years  after
the error or injustice was discovered, or with due  diligence,  should  have
been discovered.  An application not timely filed  may  be  denied  on  that
basis, although the untimely filing  may  be  excused  in  the  interest  of
justice.  The nonjudicial punishment actions  were  completed  in  1974  and
1975, and the applicant was discharged on or about 31  October  1975.   Thus
his application, filed on 18 July  2002,  is  well  outside  the  three-year
statute of limitations.  As an explanation  for  the  delay,  the  applicant
notes:  “This Veteran suffers from  PTSD  caused  by  racial  discrimination
while in the USAF and should be made whole.”  The only evidence of  PTSD  in
the application is an Axis I diagnosis of “alcohol,  cocaine  and  marijuana
depn., r/o major depression & PTSD” made  on  27  February  2002,  when  the
applicant  was  entered  into   a   substance   abuse   treatment   program.
Apparently, PTSD was ruled out, as it does  not  appear  in  any  subsequent
diagnosis  records.   Moreover,  on  the  date  the  applicant   states   he
discovered the alleged error  or  injustice,  the  applicant  was  still  in
treatment.  The medical records the applicant provided make  no  mention  of
such a discovery.

Nonjudicial punishment is permitted  by  Article  15  and  governed  by  the
Manual  for  Courts-Martial  and  Air  Force  regulations.   This  procedure
permits commanders to dispose of certain offenses without  trial  by  court-
martial unless the service member objects.  Service members  first  must  be
notified by their commanders of the  nature  of  the  charged  offense,  the
evidence supporting the offense, and of the  commander’s  intent  to  impose
nonjudicial punishment.  The service member may then consult with a  defense
counsel to determine whether to accept  nonjudicial  punishment  proceedings
or demand trial by court-martial.  Accepting the  proceedings  is  simply  a
choice of forum; it is not an admission of guilt.




A member accepting nonjudicial punishment proceedings  may  have  a  hearing
with the commander.  The member may have a spokesman  at  the  hearing,  may
request that witnesses appear and testify, and may  present  evidence.   The
commander must consider any information  offered  during  that  hearing  and
must be convinced  by  reliable  evidence  that  the  member  committed  the
offense before imposing punishment.   Members  who  wish  to  contest  their
commander’s determination or the severity  of  the  punishment  imposed  may
appeal to the next higher commander.  The appeal  authority  may  set  aside
the Article 15, set aside the punishment, decrease  its  severity,  or  deny
the  appeal.   Nonjudicial  punishment  does  not  constitute   a   criminal
conviction.

Despite his claim to have been denied his procedural  rights,  clearly,  the
applicant was properly afforded the opportunity  to  choose  his  forum,  to
exercise  his  right  to  counsel  and  to  present  evidence  in   defense,
extenuation or mitigation.  Indeed, he exercised those rights as he saw  fit
in both Article 15 actions.

His claim, made 25 years after the fact, that some entries  were  forged  in
the pertinent documents is not substantiated.  First, to the untrained  eye,
the entries identified by the applicant do  not  appear  markedly  different
from those whose authenticity he does not  contest.   Second,  none  of  the
contested entries (or other errors or irregularities) deal  with  any  right
or issue involving the  applicant’s  choice  of  forum  or  the  commander’s
ultimate  determination  of  guilt  or  innocence.   Finally,  at  the  time
involved, the  applicant  was  uniquely  positioned  to  identify  purported
forgeries or  other  errors  and  obliged  to  make  them  known  to  proper
authority so that appropriate (and timely)  investigation  or  other  action
could be taken.  Accordingly, the fact that the applicant waited so long  to
raise this claim underscores its lack of merit.

With respect to applicant’s general claim to have been under  the  influence
of medication at the time involved, he offers few specifics.  He  cites  two
medications reflected in his  medical  records  at  the  time,  aspirin  and
Robaxin, and provides their respective  entries  (including  potential  side
effects) in the PDR Family Guide to Prescription  Drugs.   The  listed  side
effects are all physical  in  nature  ranging  from  heartburn  to  itching.
Neither entry lists any mental, emotional, or psychological side effect  for
the  medications  involved,  or  any  effect  that  could  conceivably  have
impaired  the  applicant’s  judgment  or  conduct.   Certainly,  other  than
applicant’s current assertion, again, made 25 years after  the  fact,  there
is not contemporary or other evidence provided in support of his claim  that
medication played any role in the matters involved.   Indeed,  if  the  side
effects of any medication were so extreme  as  to  impact  the  process,  it
seems  likely  that  such  effects  would  have  been  observed,  noted  and
addressed by the other parties involved.  The absence of any  such  evidence
further undercuts the applicant’s belated claim.

Applicant’s  remaining  claim,  racial  prejudice,  is  unsupported  by  any
evidence whatsoever.  As stated above, it was first raised twenty years  ago
and found to be unsubstantiated then.  Not only is no new evidence  offered,
no supporting evidence or explanation  for  this  claim,  of  any  kind,  is
provided by the applicant.  Clearly, it too is without merit.

With his decision to concur in each  commander’s  decision  to  address  the
allegations in the nonjudicial punishment forum, the  applicant  necessarily
vested the  commanders  with  the  fact-finding  power  in  the  case.   The
applicant  did  or  had  the  opportunity  to  make  arguments  in  defense,
extenuation and mitigation at  the  time.   Each  commander  considered  the
arguments  in  defense,  extenuation  and  mitigation  at  the  time.   Each
commander considered the arguments offered,  weighed  the  severity  of  the
offenses and determined that the punishment imposed  was  warranted.   While
different fact finders may have come to different conclusions, there  is  no
evidence that the commanders’ findings were either arbitrary  or  capricious
or should, at this late date, be disturbed.  After  reviewing  the  evidence
before him, each commander determined that  there  was  sufficient  evidence
that the accused committed one or  more  of  the  offenses  charged.   Those
decisions were subject to appeal by the applicant, who  waived  that  right.
The commander’s decisions withstood the scrutiny  of  legal  review  at  the
time, and, subsequently, before the Discharge Review Board and  (upon  prior
application) the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records.

The applicant should not prevail here absent clear error or injustice.   The
burden of proof rests with the applicant to show the  commander  erred.   He
has clearly (and repeatedly) failed to produce any  persuasive  evidence  to
carry that burden.  The  punishment  imposed  by  each  commander  was  well
within the parameters set out in  applicable  instructions.   On  its  face,
there is no evidence that it was unjust or  disproportionately  harsh  given
all the facts and circumstances before each commander.

A set aside should only be granted when the evidence demonstrates  an  error
or a clear injustice.  The  evidence  presented  by  the  applicant  is  not
sufficient to mandate the relief requested,  and  does  not  demonstrate  an
equitable basis for relief.  After reviewing  the  available  records,  they
conclude no legal errors  exist  requiring  corrective  action  and  do  not
recommend relief.  Additionally, as the applicant did not file  his  request
in a  timely  manner,  they  recommend  the  Board  assert  the  statute  of
limitations and deny the application.

The evaluation is at Exhibit C.





The BCMR Medical consultant  recommended  denial.   He  indicated  that  the
Department of Veterans Affairs medical records are available for review  and
indicate that the applicant  reported  beginning  his  use  of  alcohol  and
marijuana at age 18 (some documentation reports age 16) but had no  problems
with alcohol or drug abuse while  in  the  military  (27  February  2002  VA
documentation).  He was  hospitalized  16-20  April  1999  for  alcohol  and
cocaine abuse.  The narrative summary indicated that the applicant had  been
in a substance abuse program the prior year.  No history  of  depression  or
PTSD was noted in this hospitalization report.  His discharge diagnosis  was
cocaine and alcohol abuse.  No other psychiatric  diagnoses  were  rendered.
He was again hospitalized 23 and  24  July  1999  for  alcohol  and  cocaine
detoxification and readmitted on 28  July  1999.   The  July  28  through  4
August  1999  psychiatric  hospitalization  reported  diagnoses  of  Alcohol
Dependence,  Cocaine  Dependence  and  Substance  induced   mood   disorder.
Progress notes during the 28 July – 4 August 1999  hospitalization  indicate
that post service he was married but that  his  wife  died  in  1979  (motor
vehicle accident).  He had fathered 2 children with another  woman  whom  he
never married.  Apparently following his discharge from  the  Air  Force  he
reportedly worked in an AT&T plant as  an  electrician  until  approximately
1996 when the plant  was  closed  and  he  lost  his  job  (other  documents
indicate he worked in other electronic and communications related  jobs  for
Texas Instruments, GTE Telephone, and the railroad).   This  hospitalization
reports that the applicant started drinking alcohol  at  age  17  and  drank
regularly for 2 to 3 years but  then  stopped  for  20  years.   He  resumed
drinking alcohol in approximately 1996 and  began  using  cocaine  the  same
year.  He had symptoms of depression  in  1998  associated  with  a  suicide
attempt by overdose.  Following his discharge from the inpatient unit  on  4
August 1999, he  participated  in  outpatient  drug  rehabilitation  therapy
pending  a   scheduled   1   September   1999,   admission   for   inpatient
rehabilitation.  The applicant entered intensive inpatient  substance  abuse
rehabilitation in September 1999 and was discharged to  the  VA  Domiciliary
(living facility  for  veterans  undergoing  rehabilitation)  for  continued
intensive  outpatient  treatment  that  included  medical  evaluations   and
vocational  rehabilitation.   When  he  was  released  in  April  2000,  his
discharge diagnoses included:  cocaine dependence, THC  and  alcohol  abuse,
homelessness with lack of  income,  depressed  mood,  and  a  history  of  a
positive  TB  test  treated  with  6  months  of  medication  in  the  past.
Additional information noted a civil conviction for  domestic  violence  and
that in the motor vehicle accident that killed his wife in 1979 he  was  the
driver of the vehicle.

Following his April 2000 discharge from the VA rehabilitation program  there
are no VA records  until  6  February  2002,  when  he  represented  the  VA
hospital with a chief complaint of “I need to  get  in  Dom”  (Domiciliary),
recurrent cocaine and alcohol abuse for 4  to  5  months  with  symptoms  of
anxiety and feeling overwhelmed,  unable  to  get  shelter,  and  expressing
thoughts of suicide without a plan.  He declined  inpatient  treatment,  but
instead  wanted  admission  into  the  Domiciliary.   He  was  entered  into
outpatient treatment and admitted to the Domiciliary  on  21 February  2002.
A 27 February 2002 psychology  evaluation  rendered  diagnoses  of  alcohol,
cocaine and marijuana dependence and “Rule out major depression  and  PTSD,”
however, subsequent progress notes no  longer  listed  any  diagnosis  other
than substance abuse.

The applicant provides a copy of a psychiatry note from  the  Mountain  Home
VA Medical Center dated 21 February 2002 in which he  reports  that  he  was
beaten by 3 men with M-16s while at his last duty station.   Review  of  the
service medical record finds no entries  for  treatment  for  any  injuries.
This 21 February 2002 psychiatry  note  indicates  that  the  applicant  has
diagnoses of Major Depression, Alcohol Dependence, and  Cocaine  Dependence.
No diagnosis of PTSD, past or current is mentioned.

Following discharge from the Air Force his wife  died  in  a  motor  vehicle
accident in which he was reported to be the driver.  He held  a  variety  of
jobs and became unemployed in 1996  when  he  began  to  abuse  alcohol  and
cocaine.   Following   1996   he   experienced   considerable   social   and
occupational problems relating to his substance abuse resulting in  repeated
hospitalizations and intensive substance abuse rehabilitation.

Although the Robaxin prescribed on  17  and  18  September  1974  may  cause
drowsiness, blurred vision,  dizziness,  headache,  lightheadedness,  fever,
rash, and gastrointestinal upset, there is no evidence  that  the  applicant
experienced any of these  side  effects.   Further,  his  misconduct  on  11
September 1974 preceded the date he received  this  medication  (17  and  18
September).  He contends that when  he  signed  the  order  to  correctional
custody on 18 September 1974 his  judgment  was  impaired  by  the  Robaxin,
however, it is unlikely that this was the case.  Furthermore,  there  is  no
evidence he was prescribed any medications after September 1974  that  would
affect his level of alertness and contribute to his continued misconduct  or
interfere with his ability to understand and respond to his  punishment  and
administrative discharge.

The applicant contends he had Post Traumatic Stress  Disorder  (PTSD)  while
on active duty due to mistreatment related to  racial  discrimination.   The
service medical record including his separation physical finds  no  reported
symptoms to suggest PTSD.  Department  of  Veterans  Affairs  (DVA)  medical
records document substance abuse and a history  of  depression  after  1996.
The DVA records indicate that there was no history of mental  illness  prior
to 1996.  A single February 2002 DVA psychology note raises the  possibility
of PTSD or depression at that time, but subsequent records  entries  do  not
list any diagnosis other than substance abuse.  The  medical  issues  raised
by the applicant are without merit.


The evaluation is at Exhibit D.

_________________________________________________________________

APPLICANT'S REVIEW OF AIR FORCE EVALUATION:

The applicant reviewed  the  evaluation  and  indicated  that  the  advisory
opinions seek to downplay important issues  in  this  case,  which  are  his
service record with the Air Force, their actions  and  the  actions  of  the
AFDRB.  The death of his wife and  the  birth  of  his  children  serves  no
purposes in this case.  He has admitted that he  is  suffering  from  trauma
associated with his addiction to pain medications  that  were  dispensed  to
him by the Air Force.  These attacks on his  character  are  irrelevant  and
inaccurate.  These medical issues have never been  addressed  by  the  AFDRB
contrary to the AFLSA/JAJM this is his  first  application  to  the  AFBCMR.
Thus, these medical issues have never been addressed by the AFBCMR.

He entered BMT at Lackland  AFB,  Texas  on  August  21,  1974  after  being
involved in a motor vehicle accident.  He was 18  years  old  and  suffering
from injuries associated with that accident.  He was taking prescribed  pain
medications during that time.  Eight days later,  he  was  admitted  to  the
Intermediate  Care  Facility  for  an  upper  viral  illness  with  enlarged
tonsils.  He  was  prescribed  pain  medications  and  nasal  spray  by  the
Practitioner.  Five days later, he was seen by the Physician  Assistant  for
injuries associated with the motor  vehicle  accident.   The  injuries  were
aggravated by the physical demands expected of him in basic training and  he
was prescribed more  pain  medications.   On  11 September  1974,  during  a
motivation  briefing  his  ears  were  ringing  and  buzzing  and   he   was
experiencing severe drowsiness  and  loss  of  hearing.   One  of  the  NCOs
started screaming at him.  At that point he was so confused that he  has  no
knowledge of the rest of that day.  He understands now that he overdosed  on
the pain medications and the loss of hearing and confusion were part of  the
symptoms.  Prior  to  11  September  1974,  contrary  to  the  BCMR  Medical
Consultant’s presumptions, he had no performance difficulties.

On 17 September 1974, he was seen by the same  practitioner,  for  a  second
visit, for injuries associated with a fall at the  local  skating  rink  and
was prescribed more pain medications  which  included  several  doses  of  a
combination of Robaxin and aspirin.  To sufficiently relieve  the  pain,  he
consumed all of the available medications prescribed in one  day.   He  then
felt he was becoming addicted due to the quantities of  medication  it  took
to relieve the pain.  On 18 September 1974, he  reported  to  sick  call  to
obtain a refill and was seen for a third time by the same  Practitioner  who
had to have known that he was over medicated, yet he  prescribed  more  pain
medications.  Later that day he  was  escorted  to  the  Commander’s  office
where he was instructed to sign orders.  Those orders  advised  him  of  his
right to appeal.  He chose to appeal the  punishment  however,  his  request
was denied.  He was then escorted to jail.

Applicant’s complete response, with attachments, is at Exhibit F.

_________________________________________________________________

THE BOARD CONCLUDES THAT:

1.    The applicant has exhausted all remedies provided by existing  law  or
regulations.

2.    The application was not timely filed; however, it is in  the  interest
of justice to excuse the failure to timely file.

3.    Insufficient relevant evidence has been presented to  demonstrate  the
existence of probable error or injustice warranting the  punishment  imposed
upon him under Articles 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),  on  18
September 1974 and on 10 September 1975 be set aside.  Applicant’s  numerous
contentions  regarding  racial  discrimination  and  the  side  effects   of
medication contributing to his misconduct are duly noted; however,  we  find
no evidence that the Article 15 actions taken against the applicant were  in
error or unjust.  In this respect, the applicant was  offered  and  accepted
nonjudicial punishment for failing to obey a  lawful  order  by  a  superior
commissioned officer  and  for  failing  to  report  to  duty  at  the  time
prescribed  on  three  separate  occasions.   Therefore,  we   believe   the
commanders were in the best position to weigh the evidence in the  case  and
judge the applicant’s credibility and demeanor  throughout  the  proceedings
before rendering their decisions.  There is  no  indication  the  commanders
abused their discretionary  authority  when  assessing  the  merits  of  the
cases.    In  view  of  the  foregoing,  we  agree  with  the  opinions  and
recommendations of the  Air  Force,  in  particular,  the  Associate  Chief,
Military Justice Division, and adopt their rationale as the  basis  for  our
conclusion that the applicant has  not  been  the  victim  of  an  error  or
injustice.  Therefore, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,  we  find
no compelling  basis  to  recommend  granting  the  relief  sought  in  this
application.

_________________________________________________________________

THE BOARD DETERMINES THAT:

The applicant be notified that the evidence presented  did  not  demonstrate
the existence of material error  or  injustice;  that  the  application  was
denied without a personal appearance; and that the application will only  be
reconsidered upon the submission of newly discovered relevant  evidence  not
considered with this application.

_________________________________________________________________

The following members of the Board considered AFBCMR Docket Number  02-02361
in Executive Session on 11 February 2003, under the provisions  of  AFI  36-
2603:

                  Mr. David C. Van Gasbeck, Panel Chair
                  Mr. Billy C. Baxter, Member
                  Mr. Brenda L. Romine, Member

The following documentary evidence was considered:

   Exhibit A.  DD Form 149, dated 18 July 2002, w/atchs.
   Exhibit B.  Applicant's Master Personnel Records.
   Exhibit C.  Letter, AFLSA/JAJM, dated 19 September 2002.
   Exhibit D.  Letter, AFBCMR Medical Consultant,
               dated 7 November 2002.
   Exhibit E.  Letter, SAF/MRBR, dated 6 December 2002.
   Exhibit F.  Letter, Applicant, undated.




                                DAVID C. VAN GASBECK
                                Panel Chair